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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
URBANIZATION AND VOTING PARTICIPATION
IN KOREA (1963 - 1978):
AN URBAN - RURAL COMPARISON
BY
Sunki Choe
Chairman: Dr. Hong N. Kim
Major Department: Political Science
The focus of this study is the relationship between
urbanization and voting participation in Korean national
elections from 1963 to 1978 during the regime of President
Park Chung Hee. More specifically, this study attempts to
analyze: 1) urban-rural differences in voter turnout rate;
2) urban-rural differences in partisan support; 3) the
relationship between urbanization as the surrogate vari
able of socioeconomic development on the one hand and
voting participation on the other. In addition to analyzing
the linkage between place of residence and electoral par
ticipation in Korea, this study will test the validity of
leading models or theories on political participation -i.e., the "social mobilization" or "modernization” model
and the "decline-of-community" model.
The basic hypothesis of this study is that there is
an inverse correlation between the degree of urbanization
v

and voter turnout in the national elections in Korea: the
more urbanized an election district, the lower the voter
turnout rate. It is further assumed that urbanization cor
relates with direction of voting participation: the more
urbanized an election district, the lower the electoral
support for the ruling government party.
Using election district as the basic unit of analysis,
two sets of aggregate data were collected: 1) voting
statistics of three presidential and five parliamentary
elections between 1963 and 1S78; and 2) socio-demographic
statistics derived from census data as well as government
statistical yearbooks and/or other aggregated data for
the analysis.
With regard to electoral participation, the voting
rate of the urban electorate has been consistently lower
than that of the rural electorate. There is ample evidence
to believe that the low-voting rate among urban, especially
metropolitan, voters can be attributed to the weakening
of the pressure for conformity to community norms in voting
as well as to the inefficacy of community social networks
in mobilizing voters. The persistent gap between urbanrural differences in voter turnout rate in both presiden
tial and parliamentary elections substantiates the "declineof-community" model on the inverse correlation between
vi

urbanization and voter turnout rate.
As far as "radicalization" of urban voting behavior
is concerned, urban-metropolitan voters are strongly anti
government and support the opposition party. Such a ten
dency also substantiates the hypotheses advanced by Dahl
and Tufte on urbanization and political competition and
on the inverse correlation between urbanization and the
strength of the government party.
Urban voters are more susceptible to influences of
electoral rule changes than rural voters, thus making
their voting pattern more unstable and hence more unpre
dictable. If urbanization and industrialization of recent
years in Korea seem to have increased in the average level
of socioeconomic resources that individual citizens come
to possess, urban voters are more vulnerable to political
disaffection and to a sense of futility regarding their
participatory acts. With the institution of the Yushin
system in 1972, there was a diminution of participatory
opportunities. This fact, combined with the government's
increasing repressive policies toward political opposi
tion and dissent created high tensions culminating in the
assassination of President Park.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

I.

The Nature of the Problem
Any casual observer of electoral processes in South

Korea (hence, Korea) will be struck by a marked discrepancy
between urban and rural sectors in terms of their respec
tive extent and direction of voting participation.

In most

existing studies of Korean voting behavior, it is generally
observed that rural areas show higher rates of voting turn
out than urban areas and that rural areas tend to vote more
for the government party while urban areas show more support
for the opposition party.

Such a pattern of voting partic

ipation runs counter to expectations of theories of modern
ization and social mobilization which predict that urbaniz
ation will result in a higher level of political involvement
and participation.

Korea is clearly one of those cases in

which actuality deviates from theoretical expectations of a
number of empirical theories, insofar as voting participa
tion is concerned.
The focus of this study is the relationship between
urbanization and voting behavior in the Korean national
elections from 1963 to 1978 during the regime of Park Chung
Hee.

More specifically, this study will attempt to analyze:

1) urban-rural differences in voting turnout; 2) urban-rural

2

differences in partisan support; 3) the relationahip
between urbanization as the summary variable of socioeco
nomic development on the one hand and voting participation
on the other.

In addition to analyzing the linkage between

place of residence (urban-rural) and voting participation
in Korea, this study will test some competing theories or
models that have been advanced to explain the impact of
urbanization on political participation, including voting
mode of participation.
Using urbanization as the surrogate indicator of
modernization or development,^ this study attempts to ana
lyze how variations in the distribution of population and
2
socioeconomic development affect Korean voting behavior.
The basic question this study addresses is then:

Is

there any systematic variation in the rate of voting par
ticipation within each of the elections under study along
the dimension of urbanization?

Under the assumptions

that differences in community life between urban and
rural areas, or between places of residence of different
magnitude of population, are of potential importance to
voting participation, and that urban-rural disparity in
voting participation may contribute to a partisan config
uration of party system, our substantive discussion will
revolve around the following questions:

First, how urban

election districts compare with rural districts with

3

respect to:
support.

a) turnout rate; b) partisan alignment or

Second, if there is an urban-rural "gap" in

light of the above dimensions of voting participation,
what factors would account for it?
Although large scale voting studies have become a
staple in our research and substantive understanding of
political processes in advanced Western countries, includ
ing the United States, they are conspicuously absent in
3

most literature on developing countries.

This is undoubt

edly partly due to the problems of access, funding and
systematic record keeping in less developed countries,
problems of which could, at worst, result in the propaga
tion of myths and unsubstantiated comparative generaliza
tions.

Korea may not be an exception in this regard.

A systematic analysis of election and voting behavior
in Korea is still relatively new, and data-based studies on
4

parties and elections in Korea number a handful.

Thus, many

questions about Korean political and electoral behavior
remain unanswered.

Existing studies seem to have gone

through different stages of evolution and development.
Initially studies were largely discursive and based on
impressionistic or historical data in the tradition of
journalistic description.

Then came some groundbreaking

surveys of political attitudes and, even more recently,
aggregate analyses of readily available voting data.

The

4

results of these impressive beginnings, however, must be
held as tentative.
Given the urgent need for cross-cultural validation
on the impact of the community on citizen political partic
ipation, including voting participation, with data from a
variety of nations, it is hoped that the findings of this
study will not only enhance our understanding of the rela
tionship between urbanization and electoral participation
in Korea but also contribute to the long-term efforts of
theory construction.

Satisfactory specification of the

linkage between place of residence and political behavior
in different political systems will tell us, among other
things, the specific effects of urban-rural variation in
community life, as well as adding to more general knowl
edge of the variables that affect political behavior.
II.

Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
If people are influenced by their environment, the

place of residence is an important variable for under
standing the forces that influence their political behav
ior.

Concerning the influence of the community on mass

political behavior, more particularly the impact of place
of residence on one's political participation, including
voting participation, what are some relevant theories and
hypotheses?

5

One of the more useful theoretical perspectives in which
place of residence is given a prominent role, is the centerperiphery model advanced by Milbrath and others. According
to Milbrath, some individuals are more integrated than
others into political communications channels.

Variations

in social location and communication involvement are in turn
related to differences in overall political participation.
People near the center of important political decision
making are expected to participate more than those closer to
periphery.

Place of residence is one of the factors that

define social location.

Urban residents are viewed to be

closer to the center of society than their rural cousins,
and as a result are expected to be more involved in
5

politics.

Modernization or social mobilization theory predicts
similar consequences from urbanization.

In contrast to the

static and cross-sectional concerns of center-periphery con
ceptions, this theory focuses on the effects of urbanization
as one of the central processes of social change in the
contemporary age.
Modernization model as articulated by Lerner views
urbanization as one of the vital phases in a multistage
process encompassing, among other things, sequential
increase in education and media exposure.

The various

processes associated with modern social change are viewed

6

as freeing villagers from their traditional parochialism,
leading in turn to higher levels of mass participation in
national life. 6

Social mobilization, according to Deutsch,

broadens political participation.

As a society is more

urbanized, industrialized, and moving from a traditional to
a modern way of life, the results are increased dependency
on government and growing awareness of political self-inter
ests among greater number of the population.

This growth

in awareness of self-interests leads to greater demands on
government and to higher levels of mass political partici
pation. ^
These studies of social mobilization and modernization
have also indicated strong positive relationship between
aggregate measures of voting participation and those of
socioeconomic development such as percentage of the popu
lation in urban areas, per capita income, and median level
of education.

It has been argued that urbanization is the

prime mover in the process of modernization.

It shifts the

political orientations of citizens from parochial to
national participant by creating among citizens new ties
to the national scene, increasing the amount of political
communication, and leading them to greater awareness of
social and political needs.
Each of the above theories offers important and useful
perspective for the study of rural-urban patterns of polit
ical behavior in Korea.

In Milbrath, we are made sensitive

7

to the importance of variation in individual proximity to
political communication.

Of particular interest here is the

concern in this approach for the role played by personal as
well as media communications networks.

While residence is

isolable as a variable in the center-periphery concepts,
both Lerner and Deutsch emphasize the importance of linking
urbanization with other influences.

This approach encour

ages us to look at the rural-urban distribution and effects
of such factors as education and group membership.
Contrary to the above theories, various other studies
have found little direct relationship between urbanization
and political participation.

Two recent studies have gone

beyond an analysis of the relationship between urbanization
and radical political activity and have questioned the
value of urbanization for explaining any type of political
participation.

Nie, Powell, and Prewitt have found that

"knowing the size of the community in which a citizen lives
adds nothing to our understanding of his general level of
political participation."

Far from encouraging participa

tion, "living in larger cities decreases the probability
that the citizen will participate in local affairs" and
"has no significant independent effect on rates of
O

national participation."

Inkeles, in his six-nation

study of participant citizenship and the factory, has found
that, among men of lower social status, it is not urban

8
experience per se, but rather industrial work experience
which is crucial to the development of modern attitudes.

9

Verba and Nie have put forward a decline-of-community
model.

According to this model, when people move from the

small, intimate town or village to the massive, impersonal
city, their participation declines.

As the community

grows, particularly as a function of urban sprawl in a
large metropolitan setting, it becomes less "bounded" in
both the economic and social senses, as more and more
residents commute to work and as recreational and educa
tional facilities and governmental services are located
outside the community.

As community life becomes less

bounded and community residents more mobile, we find a
decline both in the integration of the community as a
cohesive, self-sufficient environment and in the integra
tion of the residents into the community's social networks.
This leads to lower levels of participation in the polit
ical and social life of the community.
Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte provide a fuller
theoretical treatise on the "decline-of-community model"
in their examination of the effects of size on participa
tion and competition.

According to Dahl and Tufte, "The

larger the citizen body, the weaker the sense of individual
effectiveness (the greater the sense of powerlessness),
hence the weaker the incentive to participate, hence the
less participation."

12

They further point out that the

smaller a community, where actions are more visible, viola
tion of norms is more threatening, conflicting norms are
more intolerable, and there is less categoric and cultural
diversity than in large communities, the greater will be
the conformity to a set of common norms.

Conversely, "the

capacity of a community to enforce conformity to a prevail
ing norm must dissipate rapidly as the size of the community
increases." 13 Furthermore, they have advanced a number of
hypotheses that relate the processes associated with urban
ization to increased political opposition and competition.
Their argument proceeds along two lines.

First, as the size

of a community increases, its density increases.

The

greater the number of people that an individual comes in
contact with, the more likely it is that he will find an
ally.

If increasing numbers appear to dilute an average

citizen's effectiveness, it increases the chances of find
ing an ally, thus enlarging the chances for dissent and
opposition to find expression and representation.

Small

group researchers have shown that one is more likely to
express dissent if he is supported by some other members
of the group.

For larger aggregates, then, one's ability

to build a coalition by winning allies seems all the more
important in order to receive political rewards.

As the

scale of the occupational and institutional associations
with which one is involved increases, the costs of dissent
decrease.

10

In small groups, dissent is difficult because it tends
to entail personal overtones when one has to confront
others on a regular basis.

In larger organizational set

tings, the cost is greatly reduced as conflict within and
between groups becomes institutionalized and depersonalized.
Secondly, as the size of the community increases, its
diversity increases.

When the size of a community increases,

it enlarges the number and diversity of interests that might
potentially come into conflict, especially in view of the
fact that urbanization is associated with the processes of
economic development which entail growing size of production
units, the differentiation and specialization of labor, and
the increased distance between functionally specific roles.
Diversity, then, produces conflict, and conflict stim
ulates the polarization of loyalties and the mobilization
of resources, the outcome of which is again increased polit
ical competition.

Based on these notions, Dahl and Tufte

hypothesize that living in more densely populated areas
and working in more modern, differentiated occupations
(i.e., nonagricultural occupations) would be associated
with increased political competition resulting in lower
percentage of the vote won by the leading party (government
party), as well as in the increased number of political par
ties competing in elections.

Thus, the larger a political

unit is, the more politically competitive it is likely to
be; conversely, the smaller it is the more politically

11

one-sided or homogeneous it is likely to be.

This notion

is clear in the following hypothesis:^
Among political units within a democratic country,
diversity and competition among political parties
increase with the size of the unit, the degree of
urbanization, and the degree of specialization and
differentiation of labor and other resources.
Dahl and Tufte tested this hypothesis using data
from the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States,
and judging from their findings and similar analyses con
ducted in other countries, population density and occupa
tional diversity are generally associated with higher
levels of political competition.
Thus, we are faced with two contradictory models of
community influence on politicization.

The first, the

modernization or social mobilization model which is
espoused by Milbrath, Deutsch, Lerner among others, pre
dicts an increase in participation as one moves from the
rural periphery to the urban center.

The second model,

the decline-of-community model which is espoused by Verba,
Nie, Dahl and Tufte among others, predicts the opposite
(i.e., decline of participation as one moves from the
smallness and intimacy of town or village to the massive
impersonality of the city).
The existence of such conflicting theories or models
has been blamed mainly on the failure to distinguish
between types of communities.

Verba and Nie, however,

attempted to distinguish between communities by using two

12

refining criteria:
center.

size and distance from a metropolitan

In their recent seven-nation study, Verba, Nie,

and Kim dichotomized communities--urban and rural--instead
of the six categories as Verba and Nie had done in their
earlier work, using the same criteria.

They found that

voting, campaigning and communal activity modes support
the decline-of-community model, while "psychological in
volvement in politics" supports the alternative model.
However, the dimension of psychological involvement in
politics which they examined is not political behavior or
activity:

it is attitude.

In an attempt to test the validity of some of the
above theories, this study examines the relationship
between urbanization and political participation, espe
cially voting participation, by adopting the decline-ofcommunity model.
III.

Hypotheses
In line with our research foci, we propose to formulate

and test the following hypotheses:
1. There is an inverse correlation between the degree
of urbanization and the rate of voting turnout:
the more urbanized an election district is, the
lower the rate of voter turnout. Urban residents
tend to participate less in elections than their
rural counterparts. The inverse correlation
between the degree of urbanization and the rate
of voting turnout is true in both presidential and
parliamentary elections.
2. There is an inverse correlation between the degree
of urbanization and the rate of government party
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support, while there is a positive correlation
with the rate of opposition party support: the
more urbanized an election district is, the lower
the rate of government party support and the
higher the rate of opposition party support.
Urban voters tend less than the rural voters to
support the ruling party. The inverse correla
tion between the degree of urbanization and the
rate of government party support is true in both
presidential and parliamentary elections.
Our third focus concerns the relationship between
urbanization and voting participation.

In light of the

two hypotheses above and our earlier discussion on the main
gist of the decline-of-community model, we are primarily
interested in the direction of relationship with no spe
cific hypothesis formulated.
According to Bruce Russett and his associates 16 , urban
ization in most countries is associated with the other
indicators of modernization such as the level of education,
the proportion of secondary and tertiary industries, the
level of media consumption, etc.
In order to give a more in-depth treatment to the
"urbanization" factor, we have chosen the following inde
pendent variables on the basis of their assumed relevance
to the spatial dimensions of electoral behavior:

1) Popu

lation size, 2) Population density, 3) Percent nonfarm
household,

h)

Percent postwar generation, 5) Percent prewar

generation, 6) Percent college enrollment, 7) Percent illiterate, 8) Percent female. 17 Our rationale for the choice
of these variables was guided by the desire to highlight
the environmental differences of election districts along

14
the dimension of rural-urban, therefore, traditionalmodern continuum. Percentages of the voter turnout and
vote received by the government and the opposition parties
will be treated as dependent variables. On theoretical
grounds we would expect to find election districts with
more urban/modern attributes to vote less frequently than
districts with more rural/traditional attributes. Moreover,
we would expect election districts with more urban/modern
attributes to support the government party less than dis
tricts with more rural/traditional attributes.
IV. Data and Methodology
The statistics for the elections are based on the
Daehanminkuk Songosa (The Election History of Korea),
supplemented by Yokdae Daet'ongnyong Songosa (1971) (Pre
sidential Election Statistics) and Kukhoeuiwon Songosanghwang (1978) (Parliamentary Election Statistics) for the
9th and 10th parliaments, published by the Central
Election Management Committee (CEMC). The statistics
for socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of
election districts are from 1966 Population Census Re
port of Korea and 1970 Population and Housing Census
Report of Korea and other statistical yearbooks prepared
by the provincial and the national governments. Informa
tion helpful on the administrative units or election
districts was obtained from Choeshin Hanguk Haengjong
Kuyok Pyollam (1976).

15
Most of economic growth data was drawn from Major Statistics
of Korean Economy, 1980, published by Economic Planning
Board of the Korean government.
In order to delineate the urban-rural differences
among election districts, election districts in presiden
tial elections were divided into the following categories:
1) metropolitan districts from special cities (Seoul, Pusan);
18
2) urban districts from cities ; 3) rural districts from
counties.

In parliamentary elections, election districts

were divided into four categories as follows:

1) metropol

itan districts from special cities; 2) urban districts from
cities; 3) semi-urban or semi-rural districts from citycounty combination; 4) rural districts from counties.

For

urban-rural dichotomous comparison, metropolitan and urban
districts were merged into "urban district:1while semiurban or semi-rural districts were merged with rural dis
tricts to constitute "rural district."
There were 196 election districts in both 1963 and
1967 and 206 districts in 1971 presidential elections.

In

the parliamentary elections, there were 131 single-member
districts in 1963 and 1967, and 153 districts in 1971 with
a plurality of votes needed for victory.
In parliamentary elections of 1973 and 1978 there
were 73- and 77- multimember districts respectively.

The

voter was allowed, in these two elections, to choose only
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one candidate, and the top two vote-getters in each dis
trict were elected.
We have collected two sets of aggregate statistics on
these election districts:

1) voting statistics of the

presidential and parliamentary elections between 1963 and
1978; 2) census data consists of information concerning
socioeconomic and cultural characteristics of these dis
tricts, i.e., the size and density of population, proportion
of farm and nonfarm households, age distribution, education
al level, and proportion of sex ratio and items of use in
classifying districts along the rural-urban continuum.
Urbanization in this study refers

to the process where

by the population of Korea comes to be concentrated in cit
ies.

Degree of urbanization refers to the extent to which

this concentration has progressed between the limiting
extremes of none or all of the population residing in cities.
The degree of urbanization is closely linked to economic
modernization.

The main linkage between urbanization and

economics has been the relationship of urbanization to
industrialization.

Under the broad notion of industrial

ization, urbanization is said to bring about increasing
specialization of labor, a shift from agricultural to indus
trial occupations, and the concentration of resources and
economies of scale necessary for industrialization.
Urban area is more than a simple agglomeration of
people.

According to the contemporary version of

17
traditional urbanization theory the political effects of
urbanization are said to be caused by alterations in social
19
relationships.
Urban areas are growing not only in population but
also in the level of industrialization, education, liter
acy, etc.

In this study, then, economic, social, polit

ical and psychological changes in the process or urban
ization are viewed as the result of the demographic shift
from rural to urban residence.
In this study electoral participation is measured by
the mean voting turnout in the three presidential elections
of 1963, 1967, and 1971 and the five parliamentary elections
of 1963, 1967, 1971, 1973 and 1978.

These eight elections

cover partisan, direct, and popular elections for the selec
tion of national political leaders during the regime of
Park Chung Hee in Korea.

The concept of party and political

support is defined as the rate of vot,e received by the
candidates of competing political parties in the above
elections.
All the variables adopted in this study are interval
variables, hence, they are subjected to Pearson's productmoment correlation coefficient.

The coefficient is the

most widely applied index of correlation that measures
amount of spread about the linear least square equation.
The correlation coefficient is the ratio of "the covari
ation to the square root of the product of the variation
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in X and the variation in Y."
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Pearson's product-moment

correlation coefficient gives information for the "form
or nature of the relationship" between variables and "the
degree of strength of the relationship."
variable can be predicted from the other.

Moreover, one
21

Therefore,

the correlation coefficients are computed to establish
the initial property of the relationships between variables.
In addition to these computed statistics, the original
election statistics are also used for the description of
the voting participation trends for the comparison between
urban and rural areas or districts.
This dissertation consists of six chapters.

Chapter II

will be devoted to a survey of urbanization of Korea with
emphasis on the analysis of ecological changes brought
about by rapid urbanization in the last few decades.

Chap

ter III will concentrate on the development of Korean polit
ical parties in the post-World War II period and electoral
politics.

Chapter IV will concentrate on delineating urban-

rural differences in voting participation while Chapter V
will be devoted to the analysis of partisan support or
alighment in hopes of testing hypotheses.

Chapter VI will

summarize major findings and evaluate the hypotheses.
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CHAPTER ONE
FOOTNOTES
^"We use words "modernization" or "development" to
refer to the overall processes of social, economic,
intellectual, political, and cultural change that are
associated with the movement of societies from relatively
poor, rural, agrarian conditions to relatively affluent,
urban, industrialized conditions. For analogous defini
tion of the term, see Samuel P. Huntington, Political
Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press,
1968), pp. ' 3 3 - M .
2
The phrase "socioeconomic development" or "modern
ization" refers to those portions of the modernization
process that involve urbanization, industrialization,
communications development, commercialization of agricul
ture, diversification of occupational structure, and other
related processes which are often subsumed under the two
concepts "economic development" and "social mobilization."
3
Some exceptions are: Seymour M. Lipset and Stein
Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: CrossNational Perspective (New York: Free Press, 1967), portion dealing with developing nations; Robert D. Tomasek,
ed., Latin American Politics: Twenty-Four Studies of the
Contemporary Scene (New York: Anchor Books, 1966).
^Data-based studies on parties and elections in Korea
include: Myong-whai Kim, Eui-young Ham and Hyoung-sup
Yoon, "Korean Voting Behavior and Political Orientation,"
Korea Observer, 3:2 (January, 1971), pp. 51-81; Kyu-taik
Kim, "Statistical Analysis of the Elections in Korea,"
Koreana Quarterly, 9:2 (Summer, 1967), pp. 60-84; Young-ho
Lee, The Political Culture of Modernizing Society (Ann
Arbor! University Microfilms, 1970); Pyong-hom Oh, "A
Study of the July 29, 1969 General Election," The Journal
of Asiatic Studies (Seoul, 1971), pp. 29-70; Doock-kyou
Chung, "Korean People's Political Consciousness and Voting
Behavior in Election," Theses of Chonnam University,
Vol. 12 (1966), 1-45; Hang Yul Rhee, "Urbanization, Commun
ication, Economic Inequality and Political Behavior: A
Study of Seoul Citizens, 1952-1971," Proceedings of 3rd
Joint Conference (KPSA and AKPSNA) (June 18-20, 1979),
pp. 93-121; Jae-On Kim and B.C. Koh, "Electoral Behavior
and Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate Data
Analysis of Presidential Elections," The Journal of Politics,
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Vol. 34:3 (August, 1972), pp. 825-859; C.I. Eugene Kim,
Young whan Kihl and Doock-kyou Chung, "Voter Turnout and
the Meaning of Elections in South Korea," Asian Survey
Vol. XIII, No. 11 (November 1973), pp. 1062-1974; Ky-Moon
Oum, "Urban Growth and Political Participation in Korea:
A comparative Analysis of 32 Cities (1962-1973)," Unpub
lished Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Univ. of
Cincinnati, 1976.
That there are many unanswered questions about Korean
political and electoral behavior is well underscored by
the conflicting findings on some of the basic questions.
For example, Kim and Koh advance a hypothesis that in Korea
"the higher the levels of education, the higher the interest
in the campaign and the greater commitment to democratic
values," (p. 840) while C. I. Eugene Kim, Young-whan Kihl and
Doock-kyou Chung, using survey data, contradict this argu
ment by observing that in Korea to the young, educated,
urban Korean, "an election is a meaningless contest" and
that they tend to be alienated which constitutes "a deep
seated pathological case" for fragile Korean democracy
(p. 1074).
In view of the negative relationship between urban
growth and the rate of participation, and the decrease in
the overall national rate of participation, C.I. Eugene Kim
et al. concluded that "Urbanization and the mobilization
of voters are inversely related; as the society is modern
ized, the overall rate of voter turnout will decrease"
(p. 1068). However, in a comparative study of 32 cities
in Korea, Ky-Moon Oum disputes this by observingthat "the par
ticipation gap between rural and urban is narrowing.
Despite rapid urbanization, the rate of participation in
urban areas was not negatively affected, although urban
areas are less participatory than rural. Therefore, it
would be unwarranted to say that Korea will have lower
participation as urbanization progresses" (p. 179).
'’Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation: How and
Why Do People Get Involved in Politics (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1965), pp. 87-122; Lester W.Milbrath and M. L.
Goel, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1977), pp. 86-122.
^Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society
(New York: Free Press, 1958), pp. 43-75.
^Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
Development," American Political Science Review, LV (Sep
tember, 1961), pp. 493-515.
8
Norman Nie, Bingham Powell, Kenneth Prewitt, "Social
Structure and Political Participation: Developmental
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Relationship," Part I & II, American Political Science
Review 63 (June and September~T5F9TT_PP^ 368 and 8X9.
Q

Alex Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Devel
oping Countries," American Political Science Review, LXIII
(December 1969), p. 1139. For a dissenting analysis of
urbanization and industrialization in Brazil and Mexico
that found both variables to be powerful predictors of
modern political participation, see Joseph A. Kal, The
Measurement of Modernization: A Study of Values in
Brazil and Mexico (Austin, TX: Univ. of Texas, 1968).
"^Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in
America; Political Democracy and Social Equality (New
York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 230-321.
^Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and
Democracy (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1973).
^Ibid. , p. 43.
^Ibid. , p. 12.
14Ibid., p. 100.
"^Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim, Partici
pation and Political Equality, pp. 269-285. Verba and Nie
have found thatof their five modes of political participa
tion, the overall pattern of participation and communal
activity tends to support the decline-of-community model,
but that voting and campaign activities do not fit either
model. See their earlier work in Participation in America,
op. cit., pp. 231-247.

16Bruse Russett, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., K. W. Deutsch,
H. D. Lasswell, World Handbook of Political and Social
Indicators (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1964).
■^POP:
(Population of election district.); DEN:
(Population density: the number of people in every square
kilometer.); IND:
(The ratio of the nonfarm households to
the total households: the percentage of the nonfarm house
holds to the total number of households.); POSTWARG:
(Per
cent postwar generation to total population: ages 15-24
for 1963 and 1967 elections, ages 15-29 for 1971, 1973 and
1978 elections.); PREWARG:
(Percent prewar generation to
total population: ages 25 and over for 1963 and 1967
elections, ages 30 and over for 1971, 1973 and 1978
elections.); COLLENR:
(Percent of those attending college
or higher to postwar generation.); ILLITR:
(Percent of

those who can neither read nor write to total population.)
FEMALER:
(Percent female of total population.)
18
Korean census definition of a city is any settle
ment of population in excess of 50,000 people.
19Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," in Sylvia
F. Fava, ed., Urbanism in World Perspective (New York:
Thomas Crowell & Co. , 1968) , p . 4"9.
90

H u b e r t M. Blalock,
Jr. , Social Statistics (New
York: McGraw Hill, 1960), p. 287. The correlation coef
ficient (r) is computed on the basis of the following
formula:

r =

2(X -

V[Z(X -

X){Y - Y)

'sxy

Y)-][1'(K -” ?)=]

where:

21Ibid., p. 285.

X
Y
X
Y

=
=
=
=

(

17. 6)

\/(2z2)(iz/0

observation of variable X
observation of variable Y
mean of variable X
mean of variable Y
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CHAPTER TWO
URBANIZATION IN KOREA
In order to understand the political behavior of the
Korean electorate in a rapidly urbanizing environment
and its sociopolitical implications, it is desirable for
us to have some perspective on the nature of urbanization
in Korea which provided the stage of dramatic social and
economic transformation in the last few decades.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the process
of urbanization in Korea with emphasis on the post-1961
period.
Although industrialization is not a prerequisite for
urbanization, usually large scale urban growth is both a
prediction for and a result of large scale industrializa
tion.

According to Kingsley Davis, the index of urbaniza

tion, defined as the ratio of urban population to total
population, rises:

1) because rural settlements grow

larger and are administratively reclassified as towns or
cities; 2) because the excess of births over deaths is
greater in the city than in the country; 3) because people
2
move from the country to the city.
All of these factors
have contributed to urban growth in Korea.

During the

1955-1975 period, ten areas gained city (shi) status:

two

in 1956, five in 1963, and three in 1973 through adminis
trative reclassification and boundary changes.

In terms
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of its relative contribution to the population increase in
metropolitan areas during the 1960s, natural increase was
less important than the flow of in-migrants.
During the 1966-1970 period, more than 70% of the
total increase in urban area was due to migration gains.
The role of migration in urban growth was more pronounced
in metorpolitan areas (Seoul, Pusan, and Taegu) than in
non-metropolitan areas in the latter half of the 1960s.
For example, migration accounted for 81% of the total pop2
ulation increase in Seoul between 1966 and 1970.
Until World War II, Korea was primarily a rural agrar
ian society.

Between 1942 and 1953, Korea experienced the

successive wrenching effects of mobilization for service
in Japanese military and industrial operations during World
War II, partition, occupation by the victorious allied
forces, and the devastation of the Korean War.

As Renaud

has pointed out, this decade was a period of dislocation
for Korea's urban system because of labor mobilization,
the surge of overseas repatriates after liberation, the
massive influx of war refugees, and the destruction of the
war years. 3
Following the 1953 cease-fire, which ended the armed
hostilities of the Korean war and resulted in the country's
division along a line roughly following the 38th parallel,
urbanization was extremely rapid, both in terms of the
absolute growth of urban areas and of the proportion of
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the population living in urban areas.

In 1955, there were

an estimated 5.3 million people, about 24 percent of the
total population, living in administratively defined city
(shi).

Between 1955 and 1975, the urban population

increased more than three-fold, to 16.8 million people.
At the time of the 1975 census, the urban population repre
sented 48 percent of the total population.

During the last

two decades, urban areas absorbed almost 90 percent of
Korea's population increase.
The process of urbanization in Korea can best be stud
ied by identifying three developmental periods.

The first

(pre-1945) is the period of pre-urbanization or the initial
stage of urbanization under Japanese colonial administration.
The second period (1945-1961) saw a relatively fast pace
of urbanization mostly due to unusual events which brought
refugees and external immigrants to the urban area.

The

rural-urban migration due to rapid industrialization is a
phenomenon of post-1961 economic development programs of
the government.
I.

The First Stage of Urbanization (pre-1945)
Despite the long history of Korea, the process of

urbanization is a relatively recent phenomenon.

Table II-1

shows Korea's total population and the urban percentage for
census years from 1915-1975, with comparable data from
Japan and the United States.

That Korea was extremely
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TABLE II - 1
Total and Urban*Populations of Korea, Japan, and the United States
1915-1975
(1,000s)

Year

Korea
Population Urban %

Japan
Population Urban %

United States
Population Urban %

1915

16,278

3.1

1920

17,289

3.3

55,391

18.1

1925

19,020

3.5

59,179

21.7

1930

20,438

4.5

63,872

24.1

1935

22,208

7.4

68,662

32.9

1940

23,547

11.6

72,540

37.9

1945

19,369

14.5

71,998

27.8

1950

20,167

18.4

83,200

37.5

1955

21,502

24.4

89,276

56.3

1960

24,954

28.3

93,419

63.5

1965

28,327

33.9

98,275

68.1

1970

31,435

43.1

103,720

72.2

1975

34,709

50.9

Source:

Edwin S. Mills & Byung-Nak Song, Urbanization and Urban Problems:
Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea:
1945-1975
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979), p. 8.

106.0

51.2

122.8

56.2

131.7

56.5

150.7

59.6

178.5

63.1

203.2

73.5

*The urban population in Korea refers to the portion of population living
in demographic concentration areas with a minimum of 50,000 inhabitants
or more.

rural is readily confirmed by the fact that the popula
tion was 90 percent agricultural in 1930.

Then the

Japanese Colonial Government began to place somewhat
greater emphasis on manufacturing production, with a con
sequent acceleration of urbanization.

According to the

1930 census compiled by the Japanese Government General
in Korea, there were only five cities and the urbaniza
tion ratio was a mere 4.0 percent.^

The Korean popula

tion was predominantly agricultural and rural.
areas, however, began to expand after 1930.

The urban

When the Japan

ese took control in 1910, 11 cities were reported to have
566,000 population.

Only five of them were cities (then

called fu) with more than 20,000 inhabitants and their
aggregate population was not more than 3 percent of the
total population.

In 1920, only 3.4 percent of the total

Korean population lived in local entities designated as
cities.
Trends in the urbanization of the Korean population
during the colonial period are summarized in Table II-2.
Indicated are the number and proportion of Koreans in
Korea living in settlements with total population of over
100,000, over 50,000, and over 20,000.
A substantial fraction of the increase of the Korean
urban population was attributable to periodic redrawing
of urban boundaries and the elevation of new places to urban
status.

(In accordance with Japanese practices, the

TABLE II - 2
Urbanization During the Colonial Period
(1,000s)
1910
Person
Total population

1926
Person

%

1935
Person

%

1941
Person

%

%

12,934

100.00

19,103

100.00

21,891

100.00

24,703

100.00

Over 100,000

341

2.6

527

2.8

863

3.9

2,428

9.8

Over

50,000

596

4.6

658

3.4

1,325

6.1

3,163

12.8

Over

20,000

752

5.8

al,378

7.2

1,908

8.7

4,672

18.9

Urban areas

Source:
Note:

Edwin S. Mills & Byung-Nak Song, Urbanization and Urban Problems, p. 58.
Including myon (townships), which have population over 20,000.
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minimum population required for classification as an
urban place changed from 20,000 to 30,000 in the mid1930s.)

For much of the period, the net number of Korean

rural-urban migrants within Korea was substantially less
than net emigration from the peninsula.

By 1925, there

were already 454,000 Koreans enumerated in Japan and Man
churia, and Tai Hwan Kwon agrues that the actual number
of Koreans in northeast Asia outside Korea proper was
probably around 776,000 at this time:

589,000 in Man

churia, 184,000 in Japan, and the remaining few thousand
in China and elsewhere.

5

The Japanese residents in Korea, throughout this per
iod, had settled down in urban areas.

According to 1940

census, there were 708,000 Japanese residents in Korea,
of which 71 percent resided in the cities.

The Japanese

were engaged in governmental service (41.4 percent), indus
try (16.6 percent), and commerce (23.4 percent), all of
which were urban-related occupations.^
Korean urban centers during the period did not have
material attraction and economic surpluses to entice the
rural people to the cities.

The cities performed mostly

administrative and commercial functions for agricultural
products.

Whereas the rural-to-urban migration was meager,

this period was characterized by enormous overseas emigra
tion in order to seek better opportunities.

Such
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demographic movement can be explained in the "push factor"
of the rural area.
II.

The Second Stage
The second stage

of Urbanization (1945-1961)
of urbanization starts fromthe end

of the second World War.

This period is characterized by-

several political events of great consequences such as the
liberation, the partition of the country, and the Korean
War.
Upon Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial domin
ation, most Korean emigrants return home.

Between 1945

and the spring of 1948, 1.8 million returned home from
Manchuria and a million or more Koreans were reported to
have returned from Japan, of which a great majority
settled in urban areas.^
The partition of

the country was followed by a huge

wave of refugees moving from North to South Korea.

Official

South Korean estimates of the North-to-South migration
between 1945 and 1950 range from 657,000 to 830,000.

How

ever, other sources have estimated the number as high as
two million, because many refugees crossed the 38th paralg
lei without formal registration.
During the Korean War, millions of people moved back
and forth as the frontline shifted up and down the penin
sula.

Over a million North Koreans fled to the South and

settled down, though the precise statistics of North Kor
ean refugees during the war are not available.

The 1955
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census reports 452,000 wartime refugees from North Korea
who survived to the census date,

Tai Hwan Kwon assumes

that wartime refugees were under-enumerated by about the
same extent as North-South refugees in the 1949 census,
raising his estimate of the number of wartime refugees to
about 650,000, a figure consistent with place-of-birth
9

data in the 1960 census.
Internal wartime movements in Korea took two forms.
One was movement from Seoul and other urban areas of the
war-torn northern provinces to Pusan, Taegu, and other
cities of the southeast.

This movement occurred princi

pally in December 1950 and January 1951 when the United
Nations forces were being pushed back toward the 38th par
allel following the entry of Chinese Communist forces into
the conflict.

A second stream was from rural and urban

areas of the war zone to rural areas of nearby provinces,
as some urbanites sought refuge with rural relatives, or
fled from the war zone.

Those who fled to rural areas

appear to have returned home soon after the Armistice of
1953, while refugees who had moved to the urban areas of
the southeast which experienced war-induced expansion were
slower to resettle. As a consequence of the war, a large
portion of the Korean people came to be exposed to urban
life at a time of great social changes.

In 1955, only

two years after the cease-fire, when most urban areas had
not yet been rehabilitated, 25.3 percent of the population
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lived in urban areas, which is already a relatively high
degree of urbanization for a developing country.
III.

The Third Stage of Urbanization: Rapid Industrial
ization and Migration (post-1961)
The most significant growth in the urbanization pro

cess in Korea has taken place as industrialization pro
gressed rapidly after 1962.

The Korean economy entered

the stage of rapid development when the government launched
five year plans.
Between 1960 and 1966, the urban population increased
by 40 percent (31 percent in constant 1966 boundaries),
while the rural population increased by 8 percent, the
town population by 11 percent, and the population of the
nation as a whole by 17 percent.^
During the First Five Year Plan (1962-1966), the eco
nomic policy was aimed at the "take-off," and was charac
terized by an "unbalanced growth approach."”^

Capital

investments were concentrated on key industrial sectors
which had a better promise of immediate increase in pro
ductivity; manufacturing naturally received a lion's
share of the resources.

During the Plan years, the aver

age annual rate of increase in gross national product
reached up to 7.6 percent and the per capita national
income increased 4.6 percent annually (see Table II-3).
The secondary industrial sector, mining and manufactur
ing, grew annually by 15.3 percent.

The primary sector,
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TABLE II - 3
GNP and Its Growth Rate By Years, 1970-1974

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

GNP (in
billion
Won)

GNP
Growth
Rate

1,130
1,184
1,221
1,328
1,442
1,530
1,719
1,853
2,087
2,400
2,589
2,827
3,024
3,523
3,810

1.9
4.8
3.1
8.8
8.6
6.1
12.4
7.8
12.6
15.0
7.9
9.2
7.0
16.5
7.2

Growth
Index based
on 1960

100.0
104.8
108.0
117.6
127.6
135.4
152.2
164.0
184.7
212.5
229.2
250.2
267.6
311.8
337.3

Per Capita
GNP (in
1,000 Won)

45
46
46
49
51
53
59
62
69
72
82
88
92
106
114

Korea Statistical Yearbook, EPB, Seoul, Korea, 1974.
For the data of 1960 and 1961: Yearbook of National Income,
Bank of Korea, 1972. For the data of 1974: Monthly Statistics
of Korea. EPB, Seoul, Korea, 1975.
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agricultural and fishery, also showed a modest growth of
4.8 percent, and the tertiary sector, service industry,
7.1 percent (see Table II-4).
Encouraged by the satisfactory results of the first
plan, the main objectives of the Second Five Year Plan
(1967-1971) focused on the development in the degree of
agricultural self-sufficiency. 12

During the Second Plan

period (1967-1971), the GNP has grown with an impressive
average annual rate of 10.5 percent.

The total export

rose to more than $1,000 million in 1970, from $350 mil
lion in 1967.

Conditions of export also improved.

Almost

80 percent of exports in 1970 were in manufactured goods,
compared to 10 percent prior to 1963. 13
Agriculture, however, was given only a secondary
priority, despite the official profession of self-suffi
ciency in food supply.

After the substantial industrial

ization in the 1960s, the agrarian sector became relative
ly disadvantaged.

As Table II-4 suggests, the primary

sector's share in GNP declined from 44.1 percent to 22.6
percent in the period of 1961-1973, while the portion of
the secondary sector has increased from 11.9 percent to
29.5 percent.
Rapid industrialization has brought about a signif
icant decline in the economic position of farm households
relative to urban households, and since industrial growth
has occurred primarily in the Seoul and Pusan regions,

TABLE II - 4
Rates of Growth and Percentage Shares To GNP By Industrial Group

Rates of Increase

Agriculture,,
Forestry and
Fishery
Mining and
Manufacturing
Social Overhead
Capital and
Other Service
Social Overhead
Capital
Other Service

Composition
Agricultures
Forestry and
Fisher
Mining and
Manufacturing
Social Overhead
Capital and
Other Service

Source:

(At 1970 Constant Market Price)
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972

1955

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

2.6

11.9

-5.8

8.1

15.5

-1.9

10.8

-5.0

2.4

12.5

-0.9

3.3

1.7

5.3

21.6
5.7

3.6
-1.1

14.1 15.7
8.9 7.4

6.9
3.0

18.7
9.9

15.6
12.6

21.6 24.8
13.8 15.4

19.9
14.6

18.2 16.9
8.9 8.9

15.0
5.8

30.9
15.3

6.2

5.3

14.6 16.2

13.2

20.2

20.4

19.2 31.0

28.6

19.1

6.7

5.9

22.3

5.6

-2.1

8.0 -.9

1.1

7.8

10.8

12.5 11.2

10.2

8.5

9.8

5.8

12.8

46. 7

44.1

40.3 40.0

42.6

39.4

38.9

34.3 31.1

30.5

28.0 26.5

25.2

22.6

8.7

11.9

13.3 14.1

13.8

15.5

15.9

18.1 20.0

20.8

22.8 24.4

26.2

29.5

44.6

44.0

46.4 45.9

43.6

45.1

45.2

47.6 48.7

48.7

49.2

49.1 48.6

47.0

Economic Statistics Yearbooks 1974.
The Bank of Korea9 1974.

1973

u>
m
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it has also led to increased regional disparities.

Table

II-5 shows the ratios for 1963 to 1974 as presented in
columns 1 and 2, and they show that the relative position
of farm households deteriorated badly in the 1960s.
In the process of economic development increases in
rural-urban disparities are not unusual; they are the con
sequences of higher productivity increases in industry
than in agriculture.

However, the decline in the relative

economic position of Korea's rural population was made
sharper by the development strategy the country followed.
In the 1960s manufacturing production expanded at about
18 percent per annum, or twice the growth rate of real
GNP.

On the other hand, agricultural output grew at about

4 percent a year, which, though respectable, was below
what was possible.

With output and productivity increas

ing substantially faster in industry than in agriculture,
a sharp widening of rural-urban productivity and income
gaps was inevitable.
By the late 1960s the decline in the relative eco
nomic position of a rural household was so sharp that
the government decided to reorder its development prior
ities.

The erosion of rural support in the 1971 presi

dential election undoubtedly also stimulated the govern
ment concern and interest.

The change was reflected in

the Third Five Year Plan (1972-1976), where the emphasis
shifted from rapid growth to regional balance

and rural
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TABLE II - 5
Comparisons of the Economic Conditions of Rural and
Urban Households (ratio of real per capita consumption of
farm households to that of households in columns 1, 2, and 3)

Year

1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

Urban
households
(1)

.858
.843
.769
.610
.445
.451
.514
.535
.544
.637
.611
.573

Urban salary &
wage earners'
households
(2)

.900
.884
.812
,643
.472
.474
.503
.552
.572
.663
.659
.608

Farm
households
(3)

.751
.682
.492
.456
.422
.400
.423
.436
.436
.504
.483
.420

Estimates of average consumption per farm household in current
prices are from Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Report
on The Results of Farm Household Economy Survey. These con
sumption figures are first deflated by the index of prices
paid by farm households for household goods and then converted
to a per capita basis by dividing the deflated figures by the
average size of farm households as reported in the annual
farm household surveys. Estimates of average consumption per
urban household and per urban salary and wage earners' house
hold are from Economic Planning Board, Annual Report on The
Family Indome and Expenditure Survey. These figures are first
deflated by the consumer price index for urban households in
all cities (before 1965 by the Seoul consumer price index)
and converted to a per capita basis by dividing the deflated
figures by the average size of urban households (or the aver
age size of urban salary and wage earners' households) as
reported in the annual urban surveys. The consumption of
non-farm households in constant prices (used in calculating
the ratios of column 3) is obtained by subtracting from
private consumption in 1970 prices (as estimated in the
national accounts) the product of per capita consumption of
farm households in 1970 prices (as estimated from the farm
household surveys) and the mid-year farm population. To
convert it to a per capita basis, it is divided by the mid
year non-farm population. The population figures, provided
by EPB, are revised estimates based on the preliminary report
of the 1975 population census. Estimates of private consump
tion are from The Bank of Korea, National Income in Korea, 1975.
Source: Samual P.S. Ho, "Rural-Urban Imbalance in South Korea in
the 1970s," Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, No. 7 (July 1979), p. 648.

development.

Specifically, the government has tried to

raise rural income and to reduce rural-urban income dis
parity by adjusting the terms of trade between agricul
ture and industry in favor of the farmers, introducing
a rural "self-help" program called New Community Move
ment (Saemaul Undong), and promoting non-agricultural
employment opportunities in rural areas.

To alter the

terms of trade, the government decided to increase farm
prices for grain prices to provide farmers with fertil
izers at low cost.
According to a demographic study, net internal migra tion in the period 1960-1970 has contributed 49 percent
of the growth of the urban sectors as a whole, ranging
from 65 percent of the growth in Seoul to only 1.1 per
cent of the growth in the cities of North Chungchong
province. 14 The number of net migrants across provinces
in the decade has reached 1.4 million, of which 486,000
migrated to Seoul, and 165,000 to Pusan, the second larg
est city.

Thus both Seoul and Pusan have increased their

population annually by 3.4 percent solely by the migration,
while the natural population growth in these cities was
under 1.6 percent. 15 The natural increase rate in urban
areas was 1.4 percent in 1973, while the national average
was 1.7.^

In short, the rate of natural increase of

population in Korea has decreased gradually during the
period of rapid urbanization.
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The reasons for migration, according to the sample
census survey in 1970, were to find a job (20.5 percent),
to join new employer-firms (14.6 percent), office transfer
(6.4 percent), to study (4.5 percent), to join the family
(52.4 percent), and others (1.6 percent). 17 Judging from
this information, at least more than 20.5 percent of
migrants had no destination.

Within six months after arriv

ing in the cities, however, only 3 percent of the migrants
18
remained unemployed.
According to migrant surveys in
Korea, around 60 percent of all urban in-migrants list eco
nomic reasons as the principal motivation for moving. Herbert
Barringer has asserted, however, that his in-depth inter
views reveal a more complex set of processes and aspira
tions, even among migrants citing economic motivations.
Barringer has argued that underlying most expressed
reasons for rural-urban migration has been the desire "to
gain access to the preferred status system:
industrial city." 19

that of the

Rural-urban migration is seen as

granting access to the system that controls economic,
social, and political resources and as providing an escape
for the parochial and relatively powerless rural status
system which is viewed with "patronizing superiority" by
the townsman and with "self-denigrating contempt" by much
of the rural population tiself.

20

The shift between

status system is eased by the openness of Korean urban
society:

high family status within the traditional social
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order continues to be respected, and wealth regardless of
the source can be transformed through education and asso
ciation into other desired forms of family status.
Man-gap Lee finds that considerations identified with
"pulling" migrants to the city were reported as a "great"
factor in the decision to move by 68 percent of the
households surveyed, while 21 percent emphasized "push"
factors and another 11 percent listed "neutral" (principally economic) factors.

21

In contrast to the two earlier periods, this period
is characterized by rapid industrialization, massive migra
tion, no new influx of refugees, and extremely unbalanced
growth of urban areas.

With the rural population contin

uing to grow absolutely, migration to the cities, especi
ally Seoul and Pusan, served to vent rural population
pressure which had previously been released through over
seas migration.
It must be noted that none of the migrant surveys in
Korea suggest that migrant status as such is a significant
barrier to occupational choice or mobility, and as a result
of the rapid expansion of the nonfarm sector after 1970.
Even in-migrants with poor prospects for successful inte
gration appear to have realized a measure of improvement
in their lives.
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IV.

Impacts of Rapid Urbanization
As discussed so far, the urbanization in Korea

throughout the 1960s and 1970s has created conditions
for significant social change.

The changes in terms of

urban size and density, the flux of migration from rural
areas, and the disparity of development patterns between
industrial and rural sector, hsve-brought.^n?-ap-y socio
political problems.
The Korean government was faced with growing urban
demands, such as education, housing, transportation,
welfare, and law enforcement.

In addition, a sense of

relative poverty, if not absolute poverty, emerged, as
the society became more complex and polarized.

The

political authority faced highly mobilized and vocal
class groups, students, intellectuals and white-collar
workers.

There have been growing fears of urban polit

ical agitation.

In a way, urbanization is not a problem

of the urban area alone but also a national problem.
Clearly, a new approach for stabilization and improve
ment of economic condition is necessary.

Under such cir

cumstances it seems reasonable to assume that Korea's
rapid economic growth, accompanied by social mobilization
which heightened new expectations would have influenced
election outcomes in large urban areas--especially in
Seoul.

The government has been under persistent pressure

to provide for the citizen's welfare.

But this demand
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could not be successfully met by the limited resources
and capabilities of the modernizing government of the
Democratic Republican Party.
A. Urban-Rural Gap and the New Community Movement
The issue of rural-urban balance is important because
rural Korea's wellbeing continues to have a major bearing
on the country's stability and overall economic strength.
In 1975, despite rapid industrialization and urbanization,
40 percent of the total population still earned their liv
ing by farming, 52 percent still resided in communities
with population under 50,000.

Rapid industrialization

accompanied by rapid migration has produced a significant
decline in farm population as well as in economic position
of farm households relative to urban households, and since
the industrial growth has occurred primarily in the Seoul
and Pusan regions, it has also led to increased regional
disparities.
The shortage in agricultural labor force resulting
from the out-migration caused a cost hike in the farm
labor market, eventually increasing the cost of farm pro
ducts.

To make matters worse, farmers lost incentive

because of the low grain price policy during the 1960s.
Korea's policy makers had to choose which sector-agriculture or industry--was to receive the bulk of the
country's limited resources for development.

Although

both industrialization and the attainment of self-sufficiency
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in food production were cited as basic objectives in the
First and Second Five Year Plans, the government in fact
gave first priority to the development of a modern indus22
trial base.
Considering its size and importance,
agriculture received a relatively small share (less than
9 percent) of the total investments in the 1960s.

The

emphasis on rapid industrialization produced spectacular
results.

As a result, in the years of 1960s development

in the rural areas lagged behind that of the cities and
towns.

Economic growth in the agricultural sector much

slower compared to industrial sector.

The standard of

living of rural people was far below that of city people;
the gap increased between 1960 and 1970.

Because of this,

large numbers of village youth migrated to the cities,
weakening the rural labor force that remained.
The Korean government, as the major buyer of agri
culture products, kept its purchase prices for rice and
barley low throughout the 1950s and 1960s, partly to sta
bilize prices but also to stimulate industrial growth by
23
keeping the wage cost in urban areas down.
From 1963
to 1968 the terms of trade between agriculture and indus
try (the ratio of prices received to those paid by farmers)
moved steadily against agriculture.

The relative decline

of the primary sector, therefore, was largely a product
of the government policy.
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The high rice price policy, which started in 1971,
on the other hand, brought increasingly loud complaints
about living difficulties from urban workers. 2,A

Accord

ing to a leading daily newspaper in Korea, however, the
average agricultural worker had only 65.3 percent of the
average income of urban laborers in 1969 while farmers
had more income than urban laborers in 1963 and 1964.
Table II- 6 shows the income gap between farmers and
urban workers.

It is misleading to infer from the table

that the migrants have a better living standard than rural
residents.

According to a bank's statistics, the annual

income of 52 percent of migrants was under 120,000 Won in
25
1971.
Moreover, it costs more to live in an urban
environment.
Rural-urban income ga1" between regions is a commonly
observed phenomenon among developing countries.

Indeed the

problem of rural-urban imbalance is probably less serious
in Korea than in most other less developed countries in
Asia.

But the decline in the relative economic position

of the rural sector in Korea in the 1960s was sufficiently
sharp that the government became concerned with the lag
in rural income and the possibility that rural-urban and
regional imbalances might widen.

The earlier mentioned

New Community Movement was initiated in order to bridge
the gap between the rural and urban sectors.

A reordering

of priorities of development was reflected in the Third

TABLE II - 6
A Comparison of Average Income Between
Farmers and Urban Labor (Annual Income)

Year

Farmer (A)

Unit: Won
Urban Labor (B)

A/B
%

1963

93,179

80,160

116.2

1964

124,692

97,200

109.3

1965

112,201

112,560

99.7

1966

131,176

161,520

80.6

1967

149,470

248,640

60.1

1968

178,959

258,960

62.6

1969

217,874

333,600

65.3

Source:

The Dong-A Ilbo, December 23,1970.
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Five Year Plan (1972-1976), where emphasis shifted from
rapid growth to regional balance and rural development.
The stated objectives of the Movement were:

1) to

develop the spirit of diligence, self-help, and coopera
tion; b) to develop rural communities by the local
residents themselves; and c) to achieve an economic
development in the rural areas.

2 (5

The Movement involved

small-scale construction works, such as construction of
farm roads, improvement of housing conditions, construc
tion of irrigation facilities, and building of public
buildings.

It also included an attempt to increase the

agricultural production by improving grain seeds and
through more effective distribution of fertilizers.
Throughout the period under study, this Movement has
emphasized village and infrastructure improvement.

Though

the government statistics documenting such accomplishments
are available, the precise meaning of the statistics is
not clear, hence it is difficult to assess the achievement. 27 Despite problems in interpreting these statis
tics, there is wide agreement among those familiar

with

rural Korea that the New Community Movement has had sig
nificant, and mostly positive, effects throughout the
countryside.

One can safely say that no village remains

untouched by the Movement, although the impact on some is
clearly greater than on others.

Under the Movement,

farmers have been mobilized to improve the physical
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environment and appearance of their villages in addition
to constructing rural economic infrastructure such as
roads and facilities for irrigation and flood control,
etc.
The emphasis on the rural development, however, did
not stem the migration flow nor the unbalanced growth.
In 1971, the year after the inauguration of the Movement,
the primary sector produced 28.9 percent of the GNP with
50.5 percent of the total work force.

The secondary

sector, on the other hand, produced 27 percent of GNP
with 16.3 percent of the total workers in 1973--an improve
ment over the 1971 record when 22.8 percent of the GNP were
28
produced by 14.2 percent of total workers.
According to the census report in 1975, urban popula
tion has increased by 29.7 percent since 1970.

Urbaniza

tion trends have become accelerated even more after the
new Community Movement.

Even though meaningful increases

in farm production will take a few more years, the most
important value of the Movement is to give to the rural
people a sense of achievement and a new resolve for self
held.

Rapid economic growth usually, and perhaps inevi

tably, creates disparities in the economy.

Had Korea

been unsuccessful at rapid industrialization, regional
balance and rural development would not be a policy issue
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today.
change.

No data are available to confirm the psychological
An attempt to improve the environment of the rural

areas by the Movement was not a solution to end urban
migration.

In essence, the urban rural disparity in con

temporary Korea is too serious to be remedied within the
next several years.

Despite urban advantages in the pro

cess of rapid economic growth, industrialization, income
inequality (by wage and salary) was associated with the
degree of urbanization.

Seoul, for example, the most

industrializaed center, scores worst in the degree of
earning inequality (see Table II-7).

In other words,

there is less inequality and less gap between rich and
poor in rural areas than in urban regions.

Thus, if

income inequality is a source of discontent, there should
be less psychological discontent in rural areas than in
urban areas.
B.

Urban Housing Problems

The basic reasons for concern over the quality and
quantity of housing are that housing is an important deter
minant of people's welfare, life-style, and social status,
and that, in most countries, it takes a larger fraction
of people's income than any commodity group except food.
In a rapidly urbanizing country like Korea, the condition
of housing is one of the most important indicators of
wellbeing in an urban area.

According to Table II-8 , in
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TABLE II - 7
Gini Coefficients for Wages and Salaries by Occupation - Korea 1970

Population Covered

Gini Coefficients

Rank

.250

—

Shi (city)

.307

—

Eups (town)

.261

—

Myons (township)

.124

—

Seoul

.313

11

Pusan

.302

10

Kyonggi

.241

9

Kangwon

.198

5

Choongbuk

.173

1

Choongnam

.204

7

Chonbuk

.187

3

Chonnam

.204

2

Kyongbuk

.226

8

Kyongnam

.190

4

Cheju

.195

6

All Korea

Source:

Bertrand Renauds "Economic Growth and Income Inequality in
Korea,11 Banking Staff Working Paper, No. 240 (World Bank,
1976), p. 13.
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1970, 24 percent of Korean households had no separate
dwelling.

Space per person in cities was less than 75

percent of what it was in rural areas.

And the housing

shortage data indicate that doubling up of families in
dwellings is predominantly an urban phenomenon.

Urban

housing was less adequate than rural despite higher urban
incomes.

This was due to higher housing cost in urban

than rural areas.

Moreover, the massive recent rural-

urban migration has left a stock of under-utilized rural
housing and has placed great stress on the urban construc
tion industry to keep up with the influx of migrants to
cities.
The changing family structure has brought a rapid
increase in the number of households thereby increasing
the demand for housing and compounding the housing short
age that has resulted from migration and natural growth
of population.

During the 1960s, the rate of household

increase reached 33.9 percent, while the rate of popula29
tion growth was 25.9 percent.
The housing shortage was even more serious in urban
areas, although 66 percent of the housing investments
were concentrated in urban areas.

The housing shortage,

as can be seen, in Table II-8 , was 43.4 percent in 1970,
whereas the figure was 45.5 percent in Seoul.
High demand for housing pushed prices so high that
many low-income families were forced to live in the shanty

TABLE II - 8
Housing Data

Space:

1970

2.5
2.8
2.4
2.8

2.3
2.7
2.1
2.7

-

6.6
5.5
7.5
5.9

-

26.6
57.0
4.0
64.9

persons per room
Korea
Urban
Rural
Seoul

Space:

square meters per person
Korea
Urban
Rural
Seoul

Facilities:

percent of dwellings with piped
water

Korea
Urban
Rural
Seoul
Age:

1960

percent of dwellings 10 years old or
less
Korea
Urban
Rural
Seoul

Housing shortage: percent of household
without separate dwelling
Korea
Urban
Rural
Seoul

Source:

30.7
45.7
24.8
51.8

21.0
38.9
12.6
50.5

17.4
“

24.2
43.4
9.5
45.5

Economic Planning Board, Report on Population and Housing
Census, 1960, 1970 (ROK).
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towns.

It is said that it would take an average income

family over 20 years to buy an average house if they
accumulated 20 percent of their income for housing.

Also

the lack of financing means was an additional cause of
decreased owner-occupancy.
The quantity of residential units alone does not
explain the housing situation; in 1970 only 57 percent of
dwelling in urban areas had piped water.

In 1971 about
41 percent of migrants lived in substandard housing. 30

These unlawful and substandard housing units, such as tents
or shanties, were concentrated in Seoul and Pusan, a figure
of 84.2 percent of the national total of substandard housing. 31 Such housing conditions were the cause for frequent
conflicts between shanty town dwellers and the government
authorities whenever the shanty towns were about to be
demolished.

Needless to say, the housing shortage pro

duces high mobility of residence because a high percentage
of the urban residents is not settled down with decent
housing conditions.

In Korea, along with the private

sector, both national and local governments build housing.
Some government housing is built for use by special groups,
like government employees and the military, but most is
for low-income families.

Government-built housing aver

aged about 15 percent of total housing construction since
the early 1960s, but rose above 20 percent in recent years.
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In the 1970s most government-constructed housing was
small apartments built by the Korea Housing Corporation
32
for low-income families.
C.

Education and Mass Communications Media

Within a period of three decades, Korea has been
transformed from a largely illiterate society into a
literate one.

At the time of independence in 1948, only

a very small minority was literate.
rate is around 90 percent.

Now, the literacy

This has been due to fast

increasing student enrollments at all levels of schools.
As Table II-9 shows, the total enrollment has seen a
seven-fold increase between 1945 and 1979.

More remark

able increases have been at secondary and college levels:
secondary school students have increased 47 times and
college students 62 times.
During the recent decades, as Table 11-10 shows, prac
tically all children reaching school age have gone to pri
mary school at least, and the proportions of students
advancing to higher levels of educational institutions
have been steadily and rapidly increasing.

In the mean

time, there has been a significant generation change in
the composition of the Korean population:

the relatively

illiterate older generations have been replaced by the
relatively literate newer generations (see Table 11-11).
Only one quarter of the current population was born before

TABLE II - 9
Increases in Student Enrollments:

Primary schools
Secondary schools
Colleges
Total enrollments*

1945-79 (in thousands)

1945

1960

1970

1979

1,366

3,621

5,749

5,641

84

819

1,909

3,960

8

98

187

484

1,457

4,539

7,845

10,303

Source:

Ministry of Education, Statistical Yearbook of
Education: 1963-1979
*Total enrollments include stud ants not classified into
these three categories.

TABLE II - 10
Enrollment Rates of School Age Children:
(in percentage)

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

Source:

95.1
94.5
96.7
96.3
96.7

1960
1971
1972
1973
1974

97.0
97.6
97.5
98.1
97.5

Primary !Schools

1975
1976
1977
1978

Ministry of Education, Statistical Yearbook of
Education:
1965-1979

97.2
97.0
97.6
98.1

TABLE 1 1 - 1 1

Generational Change in Population:

Age
as of 1945

0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45 plus

Source:

Age
as of 1980

35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75-79
80 plus

1945-80

Percent of
total population*

6.3
5.2
4.0
3.4
2.7
2.1
1.6
0.6
0.6
0.4

Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistical
Yearbook:
1978
*Estimates based on past population breakdowns.
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1945, and only eight percent had reached the age of twenty
by then.

Approximately 80 percent of the Koreans living

today reached school age after 1945.
It is important to note that by 1965, 98.2 percent
of all college students stayed in urban areas, 64 percent
of which concentrated in the city of Seoul. 33 In 1966,
82 percent of middle or high school graduates lived in
urban areas, 36 percent in Seoul alone.

College graduates

are even more heavily concentrated in cities, and 50.1
percent in Seoul.

It is obvious that there are great

gaps in the educational levels of residents between urban
and rural areas.

The concentration of individuals with

higher education as well as college students has resulted
in the presence of a highly vocal segment in urban areas.
Education would not mean much in terms of increased
political awareness if there had not been made available
more political information.

Basically a mouth-to-mouth

communications society thirty years ago, Korea is now an
electronic media communications society as Table 11-12
shows.
Only twenty years ago, there were less than eight
radio sets per 100 households; there are 270 now--nearly
three sets per household.

Twenty years ago, only three

out of every 10,000 households had a television set; now
two thirds of all households have one.

As newspaper and

magazine circulations are kept secret by the publishers,

TABLE 1 1 - 1 2
Radio and Television Sets

Radio sets:
total number

Radio sets
per 100
households

TV sets:
total number

TV sets
per 100
households

1959

314,685

7.5

1.378

0.03

1964

850,000

16.7

32,402

0.64

1969

2,540,376

43.6

223,695

3.84

1972

3,968,192

61.6

954,542

14.82

1978

20,000,000

270.2

4,773,000

64.50

Source:

Korea Press Institute, Korea Press Annual-1973;
Hapdong Press, Hapdong Yearbook-1979
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it is difficult to make exact estimates.

However, there

is no doubt that the increases over the years must have
been equally impressive.

The Korea Press Institute esti

mates that the total circulation of all newspapers in 1979
was approximately six million copies. 35 This means that
there are six newspaper copies available for every seven
households in Korea.
The distribution of mass media is also greatly unbal
anced according to the degree of urban growth.

The rural

population has only limited access to mass media.

Table

11-13 shows concentration of the mass media in urban areas,
especially in Seoul.

However, the degree of concentration

of the mass media in urban areas has declined over years,
in contrast to similar data on population, economic activ
ity, and education.

Since there was a substantial growth

of mass media in urban areas, the data suggest that the
growth of mass media in rural areas has been faster.
Nevertheless, for the period of 1965-1973, more than 70
percent of mass media were located in urban areas.
The ratio of mass media distribution in Korean urban
areas is much higher than the national average.
areas

Urban

had 81 percent of radios and 85 percent newspapers

in 1973.

In general the urbanites depend more on news

papers than radio, while rural residents rely more on
O£

radio and other personal sources.

TABLE 1 1 - 1 3
The Distribution of Mass Media, 1965-1973
(Unit:

Nation

1965

635

1967

967

1971

1,897

1973

2,825

( ):

Radio
Urban

Seoul

558
(88)
848
(88)
1,618
(83)
2,299
(81)

295
(47)
408
(42)
724
(38)
1,050
(37)

Nation

31
66
378
962

Thousand)

Television
Urban
Seoul

31
(100)
65
(98)
367
(97)
894
(93)

Newspapers
Nation
Urban

26
71 • Si
(83)
46
71 • a o
(70)
750
165
(44)
2,300
500
(52)
a

Seoul

n «3 s

xi o a »

n.a.

n »a s

506

xi o a o

1,953
(85)

1,149
(50)

% to nation

Source:

Ministry of Home Affairs,, Municipal Yearbook of Korea $ Republic of
Korea, Seoul, Korea, 1966, 1969, 1972, 1974.
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Mass media in Korea, especially newspapers, have
an "opposition" tradition. 37 The heavy reliance on the
newspapers as an information source among urbanites can
be associated with a critical orientation toward the
government.

In addition, some privately owned broad

casting systems, which are also generally critical toward
the government, are based in urban areas.

Only one nation

wide radio network was owned by the government.

At least

until 1972, when the government drastically transformed
the style of politics, the press in Korea was relatively
free for a developing country.

The situation of mass

media in Korea can be summarized as follows:

1) mass

media are highly concentrated in urban areas, particularly
in large urban areas.

However, the trend of concentra

tion was decreasing in the period of 1962-1973; 2) mass
media have proclivity toward opposition, hence more oppo
sition views were disseminated among the urban population.
D. Government Policies Toward Internal Migration
Since the early 1970s, the government has introduced
a number of measures aimed specifically at reversing the
trend of population concentration in Seoul.

These have

included the formation of regional development plans, and
promotion of heavy

chemical, export, and machine indus

try growth in the Pusan-Ulsan-Pohang-Taegu region.

In

addition, Songnam city in Kyunggi province was established
as a satelite settlement to accommodate displaced squatters
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from Seoul and to absorb new in-migrants to the region.
The promotion of new industrial centers at Puchon and
Panwol, as well as local industrial sites in the smaller
cities of the Seoul metropolitan area, has also reduced
the pressure on Seoul proper.

Moreover, certain noxious

industries have been required to relocate away from Seoul,
and tax penalties and licensing restrictions are imposed
on new industrial construction in Seoul.

A special resi

dence tax is also borne by the populations of Seoul and
Pusan, but low-income exemptions and the small amount
involved prevent it from being an effective deterrent.
In order to relieve regional imbalances in educational
opportunities as a spur to metropolitan growth, measures
have been taken to scale public schools fees to city size,
restrict the transfer students in national universities,
restrict the expansion of college enrollments and facil
ities in Seoul, and encourage the establishment of regional
branch campuses of private universities.

Since the concen

tration of government officials and decision-making author
ity in Seoul is also viewed as a major contributing factor
to the concentration of economic activities in the capital,
selected government agencies linked with regional develop
ment or research activities have been moved out of Seoul.
There are long term plans to relocate other government
offices well to the south of the current built-up areas.
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The construction of an entirely new and more centrally
located capital city is also under consideration. 38
V.

Political Implications of Rapid Urbanization
Despite the relative advantages the urban areas enjoy

during the process of industrialization and urbanization,
the major source of opposition activities is in urban
areas.

Some observers point to the migrants for the

explanation.
Economic deprivation of migrants, it is popularly
believed, leads to frustration and political aggressive
ness.

They are assumed to be uprooted, isolated, and

therefore anomic, that is, unrestrained by binding norms
of behavior.

Uprooted migrants plunge into a bewildering,

harsh, impersonal environment, where traditional controls
are absent.

This radicalization theory, however, is dis

counted by some other observers who criticize radicaliza
tion theory and suggest instead the following four reasons:
1)

a great majority of migrants do not have contacts in

the city and they tend to lock together according to their
regional origin, thereby preserving their rural culture;
2)

most migrants consider themselves better off in the

city than they were before the migration; 3) slum dwellers
and migrants are naturally concerned with immediate bene
fits in food, jobs, and housing which can be secured only
by working, and thus they cannot afford to pay attention
to politics; 4) the patterns of social disorganization in

6.3
the slum may discourage political radicalism because of
39
the high level of mutual distrust and antagonism.
Although some may be disappointed and bitter, accord
ing to Joan Nelson, there is no reason to believe that
those who are embittered will express their frustration
politically.

She postulates the psychological trends of

frustration in migrants as follows:
They may turn their anger inward in withdrawal
and defeat; they may beat their wives or quarrel
with neighbors; they may seek oblivion in alcohol
or solace in religion.
In addition to these indi
vidual reactions, there are many associational
responses with little or no political relevance.
Political action, whether individual or associa
tional, moderate or extremist, legal or illegal,
is only one class of reaction to frustration among
many others.40
Nelson, then, regards the frustration of migrants as only
individual reactions to urban life, not as a class reaction.
Vincent Brandt, an anthropologist who has observed
shanty-towns in Seoul, reports on the characteristics of
migrants in Korea with the following conclusion: a) shanty
town dwellers retain rural values; b) shanty town dwellers
are gathered together according to their regional or pro
vincial origin; and have no horizontal communication with
other shanty town dwellers from different regions; c) mi
grants enjoy the life of Seoul better than the life they
had in rural areas, even though they are not satisfied;
d) the reason why migrants like the city of Seoul lies in
urban anonymity and psychological compensation that comes
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from the environment; and e) they have weak volition to
cope with new conditions and tend to escape from reality.^
If Brandt's report is correct, urban migrants are far
from being a political force in Korea.

In fact, migrants

and shanty town dwellers in Korea have never made a serious
political demand, except when the authorities tried to
demolish their town.

In this sense, the political role

of migrants is minor and defensive, reacting only when
their interests are directly threatened.
Huntington argues that migration is a "substitute
for rural revolution" and that instability of the city
is, in some measure, an inevitable character of modern
ization.

He further argues that urban middle class in

developing countries cannot be satisfied:
This pattern of urban middle class intelligentsia,
and student opposition suggests that it is the
sort which reforms will not moderate but may well
exacerbate. This opposition does not stem, in
most cases, from any material insufficiency.
It
is an opposition which stems instead from psycho
logical insecurity, personal alienation and guilt,
and an overriding need for a secure sense of
identity. The urban middle class wants national
dignity, a sense of progress, a national purpose,
and opportunity for fulfilment through participa
tion in the overall reconstruction of the society.
These are utopian goals. They are demands which
no government can ever meet. Consequently these
elements of the urban middle-class cannot be
appeased by reforms.
Through much of the time during the period under study,
urban labor forces have not been a political force.
ditions of organized labor in Korea were still in an

Con
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inchoate stage.

Since the government exercised consider

able control over labor activities, labor organizations
have had difficulties in wage negotiations and other
related activities while their own leadership has been,
more often than not, closely associated with the govern
ment .
Given the recent labor unrest this situation may
43
change rather rapidly.
VI.

Summary and Conclusion
The general characteristics of Korean urbanization

have been surveyed.

The major findings on the nature of

the Korean urban growth can be summarized:

1) The major

source of Korea's recent urban growth was rural-urban
migration,

not natural

increase.

The massive migration

flows into urban areas were accompanied by rapid indus
trialization,; 2) Urban areas have better socioeconomic
conditions.

Moreover, socioeconomic wellbeing was con

centrated in several major urban areas.

The gaps between

urban and rural, and between regions, have increased dur
ing the period of rapid urbanization and industrialization.
The relative poverty of the rural area was a major cause
for migration; 3) Metropolitan cities enjoyed major por
tions in every category of socioeconomic development.
However, urban problems were also concentrated in the
cities.

In those cities, social changes were signifi

cant; 4) The migrants who lived in squatter settlements
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were far from being an active political force in Korea.
Rather Korea's urban unrest comes from the middle class
intellectuals or students.

Urban problems as such did

not appear to be major political issues^ 5) The role of
the city of Seoul in the Korean scene was dominant.
Rapid urbanization invariably creates problems of
scarcity and cost of housing, congestion and inadequate
transportation, and strains on most kinds of public serv
ices.

But, despite the speed of urban migration and the

growth of cities, these urban problems seem to have
been less serious in Korea than in most other developing
countries where urban problems have become chronic sources
of frustration, conflict and violence.

The main reason

for such a fortuitous circumstance seems that the Korean
national government has concentrated its energies on pro
moting economic growth rather than on controlling urban
growth and structure.
With this preliminary survey on the process of urban
ization and industrialization in Korea, let us now turn
to consider the background of party politics and elections
in Korea.

67
CHAPTER TWO
FOOTNOTES
^Kingsley Davis, "Urbanization of the Human Popula
tion," in Gerald Breese, ed., The City in Newly Developing
Countries: Readings on Urbanism and Urbanization (Engle
wood Cliffs, N J : Prentice Hall, 1969), p. 12.
2

Son-Ung Kim and Peter J. Donaldson, "Dealing with
Seoul's Population Growth: Government Plans and Their
Implementation," Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, No. 7 (July,
1979), p. 662.
3

Bertrand Renaud, "The Evolution of the Urban System
in Korea 1910-1970: An Economic Interpretation," Bulletin
of Population and Development Studies Center, Vol. 3
(Seoul, Korea, 1974) , p . 12'.
^Economic Planning Board, ROK, Korea Statistical
Yearbook 1970 (Seoul, Korea, 1970), pT TT.
’’Edwin S. Mills and Byung-Nak Song, Urbanization and
Urban Problems: Studies in the Modernization of the
Republic of Korea:
1945-1975 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1979), p . 59.
^Shannon McCune, Korea's Heritage: A Regional and
Local Geography (Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle Co.,
1956), p7 56;
department of the Army, U.S. Army Area Handbook for
Korea (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army), Pamphlet
No. 550-41, 1964, p. 51.
^Ibid., p. 50
9

Tai Hwan Kwon, "Population Change and Its Components
in Korea: 1925-1966," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Australian National University, 1972, p. 292.
"^Mills and Song, o£. cit., p. 79.
■^T.C. Rhee, "South Korea's Economic Development and
Its Sociopolitical Impact," Asian Survey, XIII (July, 1973),
p. 678.
^Ibid. , p . 680
"^EPB, Korea Statistical Yearbook 1970.
p. 247.

68

Eui-young Yu, "Components of Population Growth in
Urban Area of Korea, 1960-1970," Bulletin of the Popula
tion and Development Studies Center, 11:1/2 (April, 1973),
p . 30.
^~*EPB, Korea Statistical Yearbook 1970, p. 27.
^ Ibid. , p . 27.
Korea Housing Bank, Hankuk Chutek Konsol Chongram
(Overview of the Korean Housing Construction) (Seoul,
Korea, 1975), p. 163.
^ Ibid., p . 163.
19Herbert Barringer, "Migration and Social Structure,"
in Man-gap Lee and Herbert Barringer, eds., A City in
Transition: Urbanization in Taegu, Korea (Seoul, Korea,
1971) , p. 90.
20

Vincent Brandt, "Mass Migration and Urbanization
in Contemporary Korea," Asia Vol. 20 (Winter 1970-1971),
p . 36.
21

Man-gap Lee, "Pushing or Ptilling?" in Report of the
International Conference on Urban Problems and Regional
Development (Seoul, Korea, 1970).
22
For an analysis of Korea's Five Year Plans, see
Paul Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure in the
Republic of Korea (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1977),
ch. 6.
23
It should be noted that the importance of large
amounts of U.S. aid-financed grain also helped to dampen
agricultural prices.
0/
Nae-Bok Han, "The New Community Movement," Korea
Journal, XII:7 (July, 1972), p. 6.
25Korea Housing Bank, Hankuk Chutek Konsol Chongram
(Seoul, Korea, 1975), p. 163.
0A

Ministry of Culture and Information, ROK, Saemaul
Undong (Seoul, Korea: MCI, 1973), pp. 7-8.
27
For example, the data on road improvements are
ambiguous because they do not make a distinction between
major improvements and minor alterations.
28

EPB, Kyongjae Paekso (White Paper on Economics)
(Seoul, Korea:EPB, 1974), p . 50.

69
29
p. 163.
30

Korea Housing Bank, Hankuk Chutek Konsol Chongram,
Ibid., p . 43 .

^IbjLd. , p. 162.
32 Mills and Song, o£. cit., p. 125.
33
Ministry of Home Affairs. Municipal Yearbook of
Korea 1966 (Seoul, Korea: MHA, 1966), pp. 258-59.
"^EPB, Korea Statistical Yearbook 1970, pp. 42-43.
35Korea Press Institute, Korea Press Annual 1979,
p. 139.
’
'
36Ki-Uk Han, "Influence of Traditional Factors on the
Effectiveness of Mass Communication in Korea," in C. I.
Eugene Kim and Changboh Chee, eds., Aspects of Social
Change in Korea (Kalamazoo, M I : The Korean Re sear cb. and
Publication Inc., 1975), p. 123.
37 David Cole and Princeton Lyman, Korean Development:
The Interplay of Politics and Economics (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1971) ,' pp. 23-24.
38
The various policies aimed at stemming or dispers
ing the growth of Seoul are reviewed by Son-Ung Kim and
Peter Donaldson, "Dealing with Seoul's Population Growth:
Government Plans and Their Implementation," Asian Survey
Vol. 19, No. 7 (July, 1979), pp. 660-673.
39 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies (New Haven:

Yale Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 7-11.

^ J o a n Nelson, Migration, Urban Poverty, and Instabil
ity in Developing Nations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1969), pp. 7-11.
^Vincent S.R. Brandt, "The Poor and the Migrants in
Seoul," Unpublished paper prepared for Seminar on Tradi
tion and Change, Seoul, Korea, 1969, pp. 1-28.
/2
Huntington, o£. cit., p. 371.
3
Given the outlawed collective bargaining, some 200
female employees, who had been laid off by Y.H. Industrial
Co., the first of a series of bankruptcies in August 1979,
staged a sit-in demonstration at the headquarters of the
NDP , setting off a confrontation between Park's govern
ment and opposition parties, eventually culminating in the
assassination of Park himself by one of his henchmen over
the dispute
how to resolve the explosive political
crisis.

70

CHAPTER THREE
POLITICAL PARTIES AND'ELECTIONS IN KOREA
The purpose of this chapter is to describe:

1) the

development of political parties in Korea; 2) the evolu
tion of electoral systems and their political consequences;
3) the major issues and salient features of elections dur
ing the period between 1963 and 1978.
I•

The Development of Political Parties
Discussing the crucial role of political parties for

the political development of new nations, Lapalombara and
Weiner specified the functions of parties to be popular
participation, legitimacy building, national integration,
conflict management and political socialization of the
1

masses.

In the analysis of the party development of Korea, it
might be useful to trace the development process in light
of some universal aspects of party development.

Max Weber

maintained that modern political parties have evolved
through the following stages:

1)

the stage of nobilities'

appendage; 2 ) the stage of political gathering among social
notables; 3) the stage of plebiscitarian democracy.

Hun

tington states that the four phases of party development
include:

1)

the phase of factionalism; 2 ) polarization;

3) expansion; 4) institutionalization.

2
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Let us describe certain aspects of party politics in
Korea in light <?f these various stages of development in
order to locate the state of Korean party politics during
the post-WW II period.
A. Party Politics in the Post-Liberation Period (194519T8)
The liberation of Korea from Japanese rule marked the
beginning of party politics in Korea.

Under prevailing

chaos and disorder of the early post-WW II period, innumer
able political parties mushroomed overnight in the American
occupation zone, ranging in ideology from the extreme left
through center to the extreme right.
Ki-shik Han characterizes the broad outline of the
major political alignment thusly:
In the extreme left position stood the South Korean
Workers Party, led by the Communists.
In the mod
erate left positions stood the Working People's
Party, led by Yo Wun-hyung, who enjoyed consider
able popularity among the younger generation.
In
the middle-of-the-road positions, there coexisted
a number of political parties, of which An Jaehong, representing the moderate progressive indig
enous intellectuals, and Kim Kiu-sik, representing
the liberal elements of the Korean revolutionaries
from exile, were the prominent leaders. In the
position of moderate right wing we may place the
Korean Independence Party (KIP), comprised of the
old right-wing revolutionaries from the Korean
Provisional Government in exile. The leader of
the party was a bona fide nationalist named Kim
Ku. The Korean Democratic Party was the right-wing
conservative group, comprised of influential social
notables and the local landlord class. The KDP
was the first right-wing political party, organized
in September in order „to cope with the Communist
threat in South Korea.
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A number of right-wing activist groups supported Syngman
Rhee's anti-Communist nationalist movement.

Several con

tentious issues which divided the various political groups
and parties in post-liberation Korea included:

1) the

question of the People's Republic; 2) the stand on the
trusteeship plan as announced by the Moscow Conference of
foreign ministers of Allied Powers; 3) the formation of a
separate government in South Korea by an election'under
the auspices of the United Nations; and 4) reunification
of divided Korea.^
There was a violent disagreement among these polit
ical forces concerning the timing and method of nation
building.

The left-wing groups pledged their full support

to the Moscow Agreement'* placing Korea under the five
years' trusteeship of the allied powers.

When the U.S.-

U.S.S.R. Joint Commission could not reach an agreement on
the method for implementing this decision, they espoused
the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea so
that Koreans could decide on their own problems.
The right-wing groups staunchly opposed this stand of
the leftists, believing that it was a scheme of Communist
take-over of Korea.

Leaders of moderate right-wing and

middle-of-the-road groups strongly opposed Syngman Rhee's
idea of founding the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south,
believing that it would only perpetuate the political
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division of the country and eventually incur a tragic fratri
cide between north and south Korea.
When the issue of reestablishment of Korea as an inde
pendent state failed to find a solution in conferences of
the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission, the United States pre
sented the Korean question before the United Nations Gen
eral Assembly in September 1947.

Subsequently, an election

was held only in the south in May 1948 to elect the Consti
tutional Assembly because of the Soviet refusal to admit
the United Nations mission into their occupation zone.
The Assembly (hence, parliament) drafted a constitution
which set up a democratic system, mixing American presi
dential and British parliamentary practices.

On August

15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was formally inaugurated
with Syngman Rhee as its first president.

In an atmosphere

lacking consensus support while nationalists of middle-ofthe-roader type were withdrawn, the leftist resistence was
sternly hunted down.
What seemed to characterize party politics between
1945 and 1948 then was the increasing bipolarization and
forceful confrontation of the political forces of both
the extreme left and extreme right.

As a result, moderate

political forces could not maintain a legitimate ground
for existence.
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B. Party Politics under the Rhee Regime (1948-1960)
With the founding of the Republic of Korea, party
politics became centered around the participation in and
the sharing of governmental power.

Electoral contests to

win parliamentary seats, parliamentary maneuvering to
improve the position of negotiating groups and the struggle
to share political power with the executive were the
■C
< .
6
primary means of
action.

After a brief halt of the process of party contest
with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, active party
politics revived and increased in intensity as the conflict
began to subside.

Differences arose on the question of

whether to amend the constitution to make it truly presi
dential or parliamentary.

Following a period of party

realignment, two major parties eventually emerged--the
Liberal Party (LP) and Democratic Party (DP).^
Formed to manufacture "the will of the people" in an
attempt to force the opposition-dominated parliament, the
LP passed a constitutional amendment.in 1952 providing for
direct election of the president by popular vote, instead
of by indirect election by the parliament as specified in
the constitution at that time.

The LP was instrumental in

passing another constitutional amendment in 1954 which
gave Rhee life-long tenure.

In short, the primary function

of the LP was to serve as the main instrument for Rhee in
perpetuating his personal rule.

The DP, the main opposition

75
during the Liberal regime, was formed in 1955 in protest
to the arbitrary passage of the 1954 constitutional amend
ment.
The DP was a loose coalition of various opposition
factions in the parliament united temporarily against the
perpetuation of Rhee's authoritarian and arbitrary rule.
As mentioned already in the previous section, the KDP was
composed of the indigenous influentials and men of social
repute with conservative tendencies.

Before the founding

of the government party, the KDP was the most influential
right-wing party.

They had played a decisive role in

supporting Rhee's cause of founding the Republic.

Bitterly

disappointed by the meager reward by Rhee when he formed
his first cabinet, the KDP made a radical shift from the
most loyal government supporters to the most determined and
influential opposition to the Rhee regime.
In terms of organizational structure, the KDP could
be characterized as a form of "cadre" party, a political
gathering of social notables.

The loose gathering was

tightening in order to cope with the challenge of Commu
nist mass organization.

Not having an adequate mass base,

the party had made rather a poor showing in the general
elections, despite their actual influence in the social
and political realm.

Under the necessity of confronting

the government parties (or political groups close to Rhee),
the party changed its name to the Democratic National Party

(DNP) in 1949, absorbing a sector of the Korean Indepen
dence Party, headed by Shin Yik-hee. In 1955, the party
changed its name to the Democratic Party (DP) amalgamating
all other opposition forces including some defectors from
the Liberal Party. This action was taken so as to wipe
out the image of the party as being a conservative party,
primarily consisting of the landlord and business elites
centered around the Honam areas of the country.^
The Korean party politics made impressive progress in
the 1950s. In particular, the strengthening of the opposi
tion forces against the autocratic power is impressive in
view of the ruthless governmental suppression and persecu
tion. In response to this situation, the government party
was also strengthened as a model of mass party organi
zation, boasting of 3 million membership in the nation.
The LP exercised a considerable influence under the leader
ship of Yi Ki-bung, Rhee's hand-picked successor, over
the government administration.
On the other hand, we must observe here that party
politics were not carried out in a representative and
responsive manner, as is expected in a democratic party
system.
In the absence of peaceful transfer of power, the
opposition parties looked for an opportunity for mass
uprisings. This, however, only served as a justification
for intensifying government repression against
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oppositionists.

The more government became repressive and

domineering, the more extreme and fanatical the opposition
became in return.

As a result, a state of institutional

and behavioral anomalies and irregularities became a condi
tion of normalcy in the political process in Korea.

Rhee

was 85 years old when he was elected to the fourth term
of presidential office.

Therefore, the government party

was more concerned about the election of Rhee’s successor,
Yi Ki-bung in 1960.

Having been aware of Yi's unpopularity,

the regime had overdone their election riggings, resulting
in student uprisings of April 1960.
Such being the case, we cannot say that government
and opposition parties in Korea had performed the functions
of accelerating the popular participation, legitimacy
building, national integration, conflict management and
political socialization adequately.

In Weber's term, the

opposition party remained in the state of the political
gathering.

It had certainly a good prospect of becoming

a mass party organization had it not been for the govern
ment repression.

On the other hand, the government party

showed the appearance of mass party organization.

Yet, the

mass party membership was only nominal in that most of the
membership was perforce mobilized under the government
pressure.

There was little of intra-party democracy, and

it stopped short of institutionalization under the one man rule of Rhee.

In Huntington's term, party politics
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had reached the phase of polarization, but stopped to grow
into the state of expansion.
Party politics under Rhee can be characterized by two
dominant tendencies:

1)

the general formation of a two-

party system, owing to the strengthening of a solid opposition party;

9

2)

the increasing tendency of the government

party to resort to autocratic measures of suppression for
the purpose of perpetuating its own power.

10

C • Party Politics under Chang (1960-1961)
In the wake of Rhee's forced resignation on April 27,
1960, Huh Chong, the foreign minister under Rhee, was given
the task of a care-taker government.

During the interim

period, the parliament adopted a new constitution under
which the cabinet system of government replaced the old
presidential system.
Many were getting apprehensive about the rapid growth
of the socialist forces which were suddenly released from
the long suppression of the Rhee government.

Yet, the

socialist parties did not have enough time to organize
themselves with coherent policies and organizations.

Con

sequently, the Democratic Party (DP) won a landslide vic
tory in the general election held on July 29, 1961.
The radical increase of independents was made of those
who failed to obtain a party nomination, but who were deter
mined to run for office without a party label.

Many of

them had covert or overt financial and political backing
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from either the old or the new factions of the DP.

Besides,

there were some Liberal Party members who chose to run for
reelection without the disadvantage of using the unpopular
patty label.
The DP was split into three main groups by the late
1950s in the process of continuous party expansion, amal
gamating a number of heterogeneous elements against their
common foe.

One was the mainstream opposition KDP group;

second was the so-called parliamentary Liberal Party faction,
consisting of ex-bureaucrats and new professionals; third
was the so-called "Hungsadan" (An Elite-Building Corps),
composed of social and Christian notables who were originally from the northwestern region of north Korea. 11
The latter two groups constituted the "new faction,"
which was headed by Chang Myon, the former Prime Minister,
and United Nations envoy under Rhee.

The "old faction" was

led by Kim Do-yon who had a long intimate association with
the leaders of the KDP.

Although a broad-minded personal

ity, he did not have a popular image as his predecessors
like Shin Yik-hee and Cho Byung-ok.

The old faction was

repeatedly unfortunate in having lost its strong and pop
ular leaders in every critical moment.
When the leader of the new faction won premiership, the
two irreconcilable factions had little reason to stay to
gether after the downfall of their common enemy, i.e., the
LP.

The loser and his group seceded from the party, and
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formed the New Democratic Party to take up the role of a
new opposition party.

The fact that the ruling party failed

to maintain internal unity, let alone achieve an inter-party
national unity, gave rise to the popular feeling that the
Democrats, "new" and "old" alike, were too power-hungry and
narrow-minded to place national interest above their parti
san interests.

Kim describes the DP's predicament thusly:

While faced with a rapid disintegration of its
organizational base, the Democratic Party was
unable to secure other effective political tools.
Its sole ideological core had rested on opposi
tion to the Rhee "dictatorship" and support for
a parliamentary s y s t e m . 12
Beyond the factional problems, the DP had to contend
with a more fundamental problem, the crisis of its legit
imacy to rule.
unearned:

The Party's right to rule was really

it was a gift from the students who, having

annointed themselves as "the guardians of Korean democracy,"
were protective of their achievement.

Emergence of the

students' power in politics produced a "fourth branch of
the government."

The government's reluctance to take any

actions against unruly students

resulted in

numerous demon

strations demanding political change, and as time passed
non-student political activists joined with students in
demonstrations.

Bradner estimated approximately 2,000

demonstrations to have occurred with more than 900,000
participating during the 9 months of the Second Republic. 13
In addition, the Chang

regime was plagued by severe

economic problems inherited from the Rhee government and
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the turbulent interim period.

Disorder, stemming from

disaffection of the intellectual community for the new
regime, aggravated these problems.

The Democratic Party's

claim to rule was further undermined by its internal loss
of independence and initiative in policy making resulting
in a government of indecision and inaction which lacked
firm direction and purpose, all this at a time when a
strong political leadership was needed.
At the time of military coup in 1961, however, not
too many people seemed to regret the untimely overthrow
of the democratic regime.

In short, if the Rhee regime was

discredited for being too strong and authoritarian, the
Chang government lost the popular confidence for being too
weak yet liberal.'*'"’
D. Party Politics under Park (1961-1978)
In a limited sense, the military coup of 1961 was a
reaction to internal disorder and political instability
during the previous regime which, the military believed,
were caused by party politics.

Immediately after the

coup, therefore, the military leaders dissolved political
parties, arguing that this was the only way to save the
nation from corrupt, faction-ridden politicians and
Communist subversion.

In the opinion of the military,

the failure of party politics in Korea was due, to a con
siderable extent, to the survival of the quasi-colonial
elements which had constituted the core of the Liberal
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and the Democratic Party leadership. 16

For this reason,

one major objective of the coup was to bar all traditional
elements from further political activity and to encourage
the emergence of a new, modernizing elite.
At the same time the coup leaders stressed the tempor
ary nature of the military regime and pledged publicly
that they would return power to a civilian government in
the summer of 1963 after general elections.

Preparing for

the time of transferring power to civilian rule, some mem
bers of the junta thought it necessary to build a strong
party organization, capable of retaining power in their
hand.

So the organizational activities of the Democratic

Republican Party (DRP) started much earlier in secrecy
than others were permitted to engage in political activi
ties .
Democratic Republican Party was organized by Kim
Jong-pil, an ex-colonel, the architect of the coup and
the head of South Korea's Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) during most of the military rule.

Kim and his asso

ciates laid down a blueprint for the new party and its
monopoly of the decision-making apparatus of a new civil
ian government.

Among other things, the DRP was planning

to run General Park Chung Hee for president and include
several junta members in its list of candidates for the
parliamentary elections.

Kim recruited and trained a great

number of young intellectuals and local elites who were
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considered "unstained" in politics and attempted thereby
to build a new political force capable of prevailing over
the opposition forces of the well-entrenched old politi
cians.

The DRP was a mass party with 131 local party

branches staffed by approximately 1,300 paid party bur
eaucrats and composed of reportedly 1 % million members.
According to Kim's original plan, the DRP was to maintain
a dual ‘‘organization in which parliamentary party organ
ization would be subordinated to the extra-parliamentary
party organization, i.e., party secretariat."^
It should be noted, however, that the functions as
well as structure of the DRP have been increasingly mutil
ated after the purge of the Kim Jong-pil faction from the
party, and it became closer to the model of a conservative
party.
The DRP, in terms of party organization, resembled
Apter's model of solidarity party, which is more change18
oriented, mass movement party.
The party of solidarity
designates a kind of authoritarian party which is led typ
ically by a charismatic leader who rules the nation in an
authoritarian fashion.
The party organization, under a strong authoritarian
leader, tends to be omnipotent, self-righteous and highly
exclusive, particularly ruthless against the opposition.
Such was the case with the government parties not only
under Park but also Rhee.
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By contrast, the opposition parties are closer to
Apter's party of representation.

Such a party tends to

resist any kind of authoritarian domination within and with
out the party.

As a loose coalition of various factions,

the party organization tends to be fragile, lacking in
party discipline.

Decisions are made on the basis of

"give-and-take" among the party influentials.
Ki-shik Han, noticing such an irony in Korean polit
ical parties, comments:
The government party approximates the change-oriented
party of solidarity in its organizational form, but
it is conservative in its ideology and more often
behaves as such even though the government bureauc
racy is highly development-oriented under President
Park. The opposition parties resemble the conserva
tive and "status quo” oriented party of representa
tion in their organizational form. Their formal
ideology was conservative in the past, but their
behavior frequently assumed a revolutionary air.^
Under the regimes of Rhee and Park, government parties
tended to stress the cause of anti-Communism and the prime
value of national security and political stability, while
opposition parties tended to demand full realization of
liberal democracy, respect for individual freedom, demo
cratic rights and mass welfare.

Opposition parties were

prone to denounce the government for its violations of
constitutional law and democratic principles.

Government

parties, on the other hand, defended their rule in terms
21
of anti-Communism.
Now that this study is concerned with the pattern of
voting behavior during the regime of Park Chung Hee, let
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us discuss in greater detail the dynamics of party politics
of this period.
When the ban on party activities was lifted in prepar
ation for the 1963 presidential election, the DP, which had
been in power following the student uprising in 1960, was
revived under a leadership weakened by the banning of many
of its key leaders.

Meanwhile, former president Yun Po-sun

formed the Civil Rule Party (CRP) based on the old guard
of the DP, the main opposition during the Democratic
regime.

The opposition forces remained divided until mid-

1965, when the two major opposition parties merged to form
the People's Party (PP).

The merger was simply an attempt

to form a united front of opposition forces in the parlia
ment to oppose the Korea-Japan treaty then under negotia
tion.

As might be expected, the merger lasted only a few

months; a dispute arose over the tactical question of how
to present passage of the treaty by the DRP-dominated
parliament.

The so-called extreme faction within the

party was willing to resign en masse from the parliament
as a protest against the treaty, while the moderate fac
tion insisted upon the continuation of parliamentary opposi
tion.

Angered by the position taken by the moderates, the

extremist faction led by Yun withdrew from the party and
established early in 1966 a party known as the New Korea
Party (NKP), while the moderate faction remained in the PP.
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As the 1967 general election approached, however, a
DRP victory appeared a foregone conclusion in the absence
of a merger between the NKP and the PP.

The well-financed

and well-organized DRP backed up by administrative power
was too formidable to be beaten by a fragmented opposition.
Under the circumstances, the two major opposition parties
had to work together to achieve their common goal:
defeat of President Park.

the

The opposition New Democratic

Party (NDP) dates from February 1967, when the NKP and the
22
PP were finally merged into a single party.
As a com
promise solution, Yun of the NKP was made the presidential
candidate of the NDP, while Yu Chin-o of the PP became
the party chief.

What needs to be stressed is that the

circumstances in which the NDP arose were similar to those
in which the DP arose as a unified opposition party during
the Rhee regime.

First, both were formed as a reaction

against the ever-growing power of the ruling group.

Second,

the NDP, like the DP, was an uneasy coalition of several
opposition factions in and around the parliament, tenu
ously held together to oppose one-man rule of the Park
regime.
What are the basic factors involved in the NDP's inter
nal weakness?

Y.C. Han points out the following:

1) absence

of a modernizing elite, its inability to recruit new forces,
especially young people, for party leadership; 2 ) ultra con
servative image, failure to present itself as an alternative
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government; 3) factionalism; 4) inadequate contact of the
23
party with the masses.
Aside from such internal weaknesses of the opposition
party there were certain external obstacles that were
beyond the NDP's control.

Han lists factors of the latter

type of obstacle to the development of an effective oppo
sition:

1)

absence of local autonomy; 2 ) special relation

ship of the ruling party with big business; 3) inflow of
o/
huge amounts of foreign loans.
The government party has been able to obtain the vast
majority of rural votes, largely because the party in power
can mobilize the bureaucracy and national police in sup25
port of its candidates.
Under President Park there was no local autonomy and
all important local officials such as provincial governors,
mayors, and county chiefs were appointed by the central
government.

Also national police force was under the super

vision of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Concerning the special relationship of the ruling party
with the big business, it must be noted that most private
industries in Korea are owned and operated by a small hand
ful group of entrepreneurs, most of whom achieved their
status after independence in 1948. 2 6
Three main devices by which they became so rich within
such a short time are well known:

1) the sale of Japanese-

owned properties and factories in Korea to pro-government
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businessmen at a fraction of their value; 2 ) the allocation
of vast amounts of foreign exchange obtained from U.S. aid
funds to pro-government businessmen at official rates which
were far lower than black-market rates; 3) more recently there
has been the inflow of foreign loans, especially since the
Korea-Japan treaty of 1965.

For those interested in large

industrial projects it was necessary to apply for such loans,
the approval of which required normally a government-operated
bank guarantee for their repayment.

Needless to say, govern

ment guarantees were given to those who supported the party
in power and administration.

Big business was also depen

dent upon the government for other contracts involving such
projects as construction of highways, bridges, buildings,
etc.

In return for these favors the ruling party received

from the businessmen campaign funds and other contributions.
It is ironic that, despite its dominant position in
the parliament and its financial and organizational strength,
the DRP was not a decisive factor in the decision-making
process.

Although every leading member of the ruling group

belonged to the DRP, each had derived his influence not
from his position in the party but from his position in
27
the presidential secretariat and administration.
For several reasons administrative power had steadily
increased, while the party was downgraded.

The DRP was

deeply divided internally and faced with multiple problems.
Because of factional strife among its leading members, the
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DRP was not an effective sounding board; nor had it been
able to use its majority in the parliament to initiate
maj or programs.28
As the DRP became dependent upon administration, a
process facilitated by President Park's personal antipathy
toward "party politics" and "politicians," its leaders were
preoccupied with administrative roles, while the party
itself lost its effectiveness as an instrument of political
29
participation and recruitment.
The ruling group operated
on the assumption that only a strong administration could
rapidly promote economic development, which in their view
was the most urgent task facing the nation, and that eco
nomic development would almost automatically bring about
political development.
In retrospect, then, the problem of the DRP regime
lay in the fact that the sequence of development of the
political party system got stuck in the initial stage
instead of progressing to the next stage:

entrenched

administrative authority used its power to perpetuate a
narrow oligarchy in the name of political stability rather
than meet the demand for popular participation.
II.

Electoral Systems and Their Political Consequences
In Korea elections perform the function of determin

ing who will be the official policymakers of the national
government.

During the regime of Park Chung Hee the
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presidency and the parliamentary seats were the only elec
ted offices on direct, partisan basis for the selection
of national political leaders.

Elections cannot be said

to be the only means of political alteration as demonstra
ted in the 1961 military coup.

However, the feeling is

strong among the Korean people that elections are the only
legitimate determinant of political competition. 30
The Korean experience represents an interesting case
that illustrates the interplay between electoral systems
and the emergence of a two-party system.

Beginning with

the first imposition of rules by the American occupation
authorities in 1948, the successive changes in electoral
systems have been occasioned by such traumatic events as
the overthrow of the Rhee regime in 1960, the military
coup in 1961, and Yushin reforms in 1972.

The changes in

electoral systems and their political consequences are
summarized in Table III-l.
Korea held altogether 10 parliamentary elections
between 1948 and 1978.

The first election held in 1948

under the UN auspices, utilizing a single-member plurality
system, gave birth to Korea's Constitutional Assembly.
The next three elections were held under the presi
dency of Rhee.

The first parliament (The Constitutional

Assembly) made the important changes in the rules govern
ing parliamentary elections:

1)

elimination of the

TABLE III - 1
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Summary of Changes in Rules
Affecting Assembly Elections, 1948-1978

Year

Systemic Traits

Salient Features of Electoral Rules

1948

Constitutional
Assembly
elects President

1. Single-member plurality formula
2. Collaborators with Japanese rule
barred from running for Assembly

1950

Presidential
system

1. Restrictions lifted for former
collaborators with Japanese
2. Official compilation of eligible
voters' rosters
3. Restrictions on campaigning
1. Major parties begin officially to
endorse candidates
1. Cash deposit system adopted in order
to discourage minor candidates

1960

Bicameral
system

1. Single-member plurality rule for
lower house, and two-member dis
trict, two-vote plurality rule
for upper house

1963
1967
1971

Reinstatement
of presidential
system

1. Combination of single-member plu
rality rule with modified propor
tional representation system
2. Party endorsement required of all
candidates
3. Size of election district increased
4. Restrictions on campaigning
tightened

1973

Presidential
power vastly
strengthened

1. Two-member district, single-ballot
plurality formula combined with
presidential appointment of onethird of Assembly members
2. Two-fold increase in election
district size
3. Restrictions on campaigning further
tightened
4. Revival of independent candidates

1954
1958

1978

Source:

Jae-On Kim and B. C. Koh, "The Dynamics of Electoral Politics:
Social Development, Political Participation, and Manipulation
of Electoral Laws," in Chong Lim Kim, ed., Political Partici
pation in Korea (Santa Barbara: Clio Press, 1980), p. 73.
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restrictions on former collaborators with the Japanese;
2)

replacement of the system of voter registration with

one of an official compilation of eligible voters' rosters;
3) appearance of the public management of campaign activ
ity.
In the third parliamentary election (1954), major
parties for the first time endorsed their candidates.

By

the fourth parliamentary election (1958), a cash deposit
system had been adopted with a view to discouraging minor
candidates.

Under this system, those candidates obtaining

less than a certain percentage of votes forfeited their
cash deposits.

Following Rhee's downfall in 1960, a new

constitution was adopted instituting a cabinet system of
government with a bicameral legislature.

Of particular

interest is that members of the upper house were to be
elected under two-member (large size) district, two-ballot
plurality formula.
The military coup of May 1961, which toppled the
Chang Myon regime, adopted a new constitution.

The three

parliamentary elections held between 1963 and 1971 were
marked by the following features:

1)

the single-member

plurality system combined with a modified proportional repre
sentation system; 2 ) requirement of party endorsement of
all candidates, thus proscribing independent candidacies;
3) increased size of election district by the reduction of
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the total number of election districts; and 4) tightened
restrictions on campaign activity. 31
In the last round of electoral rule changes (carried
out in late 1972) , under which the 1973 and 1978 parliamen
tary elections were held, a novel electoral formula was
introduced; a two-member district, single-ballot plurality
system was combined with de facto appointment by the presi
dent of one-third of the members of the parliament.

The

size of each election district was doubled due to the
decrease in the number of districts from 153 to 73 in 1973
and 77 in 1978.

Other electoral rule changes included the

revival of independent candidacies and the further tighten
ing of campaigning.
One of the main goals for rule change, at least until
1973, has been to discourage minor candidates and minor
parties and to encourage the development of a stable par
liamentary majority.

This goal was often reinforced by

the ruling party's desire to ensure its dominant position.
The installation of the cash deposit system, the ban on
independent candidacies, and the adoption of proportional
representation to supplement the single-ballot plurality
system (1963-1971) clearly reflected such calculations.
Under PR rule, the leading party was allocated at least
half of the seats reserved for the pool of proportional
representation, even if its actual share of the vote was
less than 50 percent.

The rule allocated seats to the
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second leading party two-thirds of the remaining seats,
regardless of its actual share of the popular votes. The
remaining parties would share the balance of the seats
in proportion to their votes, provided they won 5 per
cent or more of the popular votes, or three or more
seats in the regular election district. 32
In Table III-2, the numbers of parliamentary seats
won by various types of groups are presented. There were
no real government parties for the elections of 1948
and 1952; for convenience's sake, we counted that poli
tical party or group which was most closely related to
Rhee (who became president in 1948 and remained in office
until 1960) as the government party.
The trends within the two periods, 1950-1958 and
1963-1971 are clear. Minor parties and/or independents
diminish in strength as electoral experience accumulates;
the divisions in the parliament reflect strong two-party
competition. The results of the last elections in these
two periods were thought to be a sign of the maturity of
the Korean electorate as well as a harbinger of a stable
two-party system under which an electoral transfer of
power between parties would become a distinct possibility.
Nervous about increasing strength of the opposition par
ties and closer election outcomes in 1958 and 1971 elections,
the ruling elites in 1960 and 1972 resorted to election fraud
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TABLE III - 2

Fortunes of Parties as Measured by Percentage of
Assembly Seats Won in Direct Elections9 by Types of Parties

Year

Government
party

Largest
opposition
party

Other
parties

Independents

Total
seats

1348

27.5

14.5

15.5

42.4

(200)

1950

11.4

11.4

17.2

60.0

(210)

1954

56.2

7.4

2.9

33.5

(203)

1958

54.1

33.9

0.4

11.6

(233)

1960*

75.1

1.7

2.1

21.1

(233)

**

53.4

6.9

5.2

34.5

( 56)

193***

67.2

19.8

13.0

(131)

1967

77.9

21.4

0.6

(131)

1971

56.2

42.5

1.3

1973

50.0

35.6

1.4

13.0

(146)

1978

44.2

39.6

1.9

14.3

(154)

*Lower house elections.
**Upper house elections.
***Totals of other than 100.0% result from rounding errors.
Sources:

(153)

—

t.

Official publications of the Central Election Management Committee
(CEMC) of the Republic of Korea (ROK).
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and institutional tamperings to introduce "Koreanized
democracy" under Rhee and Park respectively.
The Korean experience seems to support Duverger's
proposition that the single-member district with plurality
formula favors a two-party system.

At least, the "natural

tendencies" revealed in the two periods clearly support the
long-term implications of the plurality formula.

At the

beginning of each period, parties proliferated and voters
cast a fair number of votes for minor parties and indepen
dent candidates.

By the time of the third election in both

periods, however, voters clearly chose to side with the
two major parties.
Yet the trends in voting are not as drastic as those
in the actual distribution of parliamentary seats.

Table

III-3 presents the proportion of votes won by the various
groups.

While the trends in voting revealed in the table

are interesting in their own right, comparison between
each group's share of votes and its share of seats is more
enlightening.

Thus we compare the above two tables to

show clearly the accentuation effects of the plurality
rule; conversion rates between votes and seats are presented
in Table III-4.
The rate of conversion was high for the leading party
and low for the minor parties.

In other words, the govern

ment party was the prime beneficiary of the plurality form
ula.

In certain elections, the conversion rate of the
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TABLE III - 3

Votes for Government Party, Major Opposition
Party, and Others (percentages)

Year

Government
party

Major opposition
party

Other
parties

Independents

1948

26.1

13.5

20.1

40.3

1950
1954
1958

9.7
36.8
42.1

9.8
7.9
34.2

17.6
7.4
2.0

62.9
47.9
21.7

1960

39.0

5.9

5.8

49.3

1963
1967
1971

33.5
50.6
47.8

2 0 .1
32.7
43.5

46.4
16.7
8.7

---

1973
1978

38.7
31.7

32.6
32.8

10.1
7.4

18.6
28.1

Sources:

Official publications of ROK Central Election Management Committee.
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TABLE III - 4

Conversion Rate: Ratio between Seats
and Votes* by Types of Parties

Year

Government
Party

Major
opposition
party

Other
parties

Independents

1948

1.05

1.07

0.77

1.05

1950

1.18

1.16

0.98

0.95

1954

1.53

0.94

0.39

0.70

1958

1.29

0.99

0.53

0.20

1960

1.93

0.29

0.43

0.36

1963

2.01

0.99

0.28

1967

1.54

0.65

0.04

1971

1.18

0.98

0.15

1973

1.29

1 .0 S

0.14

0.70

1978

1.39

1.21

0.26

0.51

*Conversion rate is obtained by the following simple formula:
.
„ ^
% of seats won by a given party
Conversion Rate = — ----------- r-2— r—2----- ---% of votes won by the same party

—
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leading party was impressive.

The spectacular showing

of the government party in 1960 may have been due to the
fact that the Democratic Party was given credit for its
long record of struggle as the opposition party under Rhee's
rule, and therefore had a sizable following in almost every
election district, while the other parties were unorganized
and independent candidates too numerous.

As a result, with

only 39 percent of the votes, the DP was able to obtain twothirds of parliamentary seats.

Similar effects achieved

by the Democratic Republican Party in 1963 may be explic
able in terms of the efficiency with which leaders of the
military coup controlled all aspects of the election,
thereby severely curtailing the campaign activities of
opposition candidates.

Such restrictions were particu

larly effective in rural areas.
To appreciate the effects of accentuation (or defractionalization), one should compare the government party's
conversion rate with that of minor parties.

(The low

conversion rate of independents is partly due to their
excessively large number. )
Table III-5 shows the effects of electoral systems
designed to encourage the emergence of a two-party system.
The adoption of a partial proportional representation
system, reflected in the "national district," had the
effect not only of penalizing minor parties but also of
benefitting the two major parties, though not evenly.
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TABLE III - 5

Effects of Proportional Representation (Mixed System)

Year

1963

Formula

Government
party

Opposition

Others

Popular vote
Mixed system*
Single-member
districts alone**

33.5%
62.9

33.7%
30.9

67.2

26.7

6 .1

Popular vote
Mised system
Single-member
districts alone

50.6
73.7

32.7
25.7

16.7
0.6

77.9

21.4

0.7

Popular vote
Mixed system
S ingle-member
districts alone

47.8
55.4

43.5
43.6

8.7
1.0

56.2

42.5

1.3

1973

Popular vote
Mixed system***

38.7
66.7

32.6
23.7

28.7
9.6

1978

Popular vote
Mixed system***

31.7
63.8

32.8
26.4

35.5
10 .0

1967

1971

32.8%
6.2

*Percentage of seats won by the various parties under the mixed formula
which combines the single-member plurality formula with a modified
proportional representation formula.
**Percentage of seats won by the various parties in single-member districts
alone. In other words, seats allocated from the national district under
the modified proportional representation formula are excluded from
calculations.
***In 1973, the "national district" was replaced by appointive seats.
One-third of Assembly members were in effect appointed by the president.
The mixed system therefore refers to the combination of elective and
appointive seats.
Sources:

Kim & Koh, o£. cit., p. 79; Kukhoe uiwon Songo Sanghwang
(Parliamentary Election Statistics), (Seoul, CEMC, 1978).
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Moreover, there are many seemingly innocuous rules which,
upon closer inspection, turn out to be politically consequential.
For example, the professed goal of public management of cam
paigning was to make campaign activity fairer and less corrupt
originally but in later years the system of public management
degenerated into a tool in the hands of the governing party
for restricting free and fair campaign activity by opposition
candidates. More recently, a drastic tightening of campaign
activity was reinforced by an increase in the size of election
districts. As Table III-6 shows the size of the election
districts doubled under Park in relation to the earlier period.
In 1973 following Yushin reforms, the size once again
increased two-fold, with the introduction of two-member
districts (see Table III-6). Concerning the implication of
this electoral reform, Sung-il Choi makes the following
observation:
There is little question that the change from a
system of single-member to multi-member election
districts is a gerrymander designed to increase
the urban representation of the ruling DRP.
With increased size and heterogeneity of electoral
districts, the most effective way to expand the base
of political support is to find the broadest possible
common denominators of constituents' demands and
interests. As a result, electoral reform is likely
to bring to the fore issues, voter demands and
interests whose consequence will be an increase in
in the rationalization of politics. On the other
hand, large electoral districts will tend to make
the election of political new comers difficult.33

TABLE III - 6
Size of Election Districts

Year

Average registered voters per district

1948-1960

40,000 to 50,000*

1960-1971

1 0 0 ,0 0 0

1973

200,000

^Figures are approximate
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As far as institutional influences in election
outcomes are concerned, the 1973 and 1978 parliamentary
elections were dependent on the combination of electoral
rules, manipulation of district size, and gerrymandering.
III. Issues and Salient Features of Elections
A.

1963 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections

The main issue of the October 15 presidential elec
tion was the nature of the regime to replace the military
government. The opposition parties contended that democracy
could not be created unless the military turned over the
intricate art of politics to the civilians. The military
leaders countered by arguing that civilian rule would in
vite political instability and a cycle of revolutions.
Policy matters were significantly played down by the can
didates during the entire course of the campaign, as each
side sought to emphasize the other's weaknesses and past
failures. The main opposition party, the Civil Rule Party
(CRP), organized by Yun Po-sun, the former president of
the Second Republic, hinted at reducing the tax burden by
eliminating unnecessary expenses in the administration,
controlling inflation through financial stabilization, and
maintaining "appropriate” rice price policies. 3A’ Such
opposition strategy seemed aimed at urban voters who were
susceptible to the opposition persuasion.
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The name of the opposition party clearly indicated
its primary political goal. The CRP candidate Yun criticized
Park as an ex-Communist, dredging up the past records of
Park. Such charges presumably were aimed at influencing a
large number of urban voters, who were, as described in
Chapter II, refugees from North Korea and who continued to
hold strong antipathy toward the Communists. The DRP had
practical advantages in rural areas where they had close
knit organizational networks and enjoyed favorable financial
conditions. According to financial reports submitted to
the Central Election Management Committee, the DRP spent 3.3
times more money than the CRP. 35
Political funds influence the election returns much
more directly in rural areas than in urban districts in
Korean context, because rural campaigns tend to have more
personal contact while urban campaigns are largely based
on mass media.
In the presidential election, 85.0 percent of the
eligible voters participated. Park won a narrow victory,
edging the CRP's Yun by only 1.4 percent of the popular
votes (see Table III-7). Despite defeat, Yun won majority
supports in the cities by a ratio of 54.1 to 35.6 percent.
Seoul gave an overwhelming support to Yun, 61.8 percent
and only 28.6 percent to Park. In contrast, rural areas
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TABLE III - 7

Vote Turnout by Region and Urban-Rural Comparison
(The 1963 Presidential Election )
Unit: Thousand

Eligible
Voters
(A)

Participant
Voters
(B)

Seoul

1,676.3

Pusan

DRP
(C)

CRP
(D)

B/A

C/B
DRP

D/B
CRP

1,298.5

371.6

802.1

77.5

28.6

61.8

665.5

532.6

242.8

239.1

80.0

45.6

44.9

12,985.0

11,036.2

4,702.6 4,546.6

85.0

42.6

41.2

Urban

4,241.8

3,408.1

1,214.5 1,844.8

80.3

35.6

41.2

Rural

8,743.2

7,628.1

3,488.1 2,701.8

87.2

45.7

35.4

Source:

The Republic of Korea (ROK), Central Election Management Committee
(CEMC), Daehanminkuk Songosa (The Election History of Korea)
(Seoul: CEMC, 1973).

Nation

106

favored Park by 45.7 percent to 35.4 percent. Since
the rural voters constituted 67.3 percent of the total voters
and because the turnout rate was higher in rural areas (87.2
percent to 80.3 percent), Park won.
In the parliamentary election the voting rate in
urban areas was 64.8 percent, which was 7.3 percent lower
than the national average and as much as 15.5 percent lower
than the urban average for the 1963 presidential election.
The rural voting also declined to 75.7 percent from 87.2
percent in the presidential election (see Table III- 8 ).
According to Table III- 9 , the DRP took 67.2 percent of
the seats with 32.4 percent of popular vote, and the CRP
won 20.6 percent of the seats with 19.4 percent valid votes.
Other minor parties received only 12.2 percent of the seats
with 41.8 percent of the votes.
B.

1967 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections

The presidential election of May 3 was reported to
have been fair and honest. Election results show that,
despite several crises that jeopardized the popularity of
the government, Park fared much better than he did in 1963.
DRP scored an impressive victory in the July 8 parliamentary
election by obtaining more than a two-thirds majority of
seats in the legislature. Despite this decisive victory,
the image of the party was seriously tarnished in the course
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TABLE III - 8

Voter Turnout by Region, and Urban-Rural Comparison
(The 1963 Assembly Election)
Unit: Thousand

Eligible
Voters
.(A)

Participant
Voters
(B)

Seoul

1,774.2

Pusan

DRP
(C)

NDP
(D)

B/A

C/B

D/B

1,021.3

223.1

288.3

57.6

21.8

28.2

687.0

467.8

169.8

130.9

68.1

36.3

28.0

Nation

13,344.1

9,622.2

3,113.0 1,871.0

72.1

32.4

19.4

Urban

4,383.1

2,840.8

721.2

64.8

30.1

25.4

Rural

8,961.0

6,781.4

2,258.0 1,149.8

75.7

33.3

17.0

Source:

Ibid.

855.0
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TABLE III - 9
DRP's Seats by Types of Constituency
Types of Constituency

1963

1967

1971

1973

1978

Metropolitan

8

3

3

11

13

Urban

8

8

6

5

5

Semi-rural

.13

20

10

25

20

Rural

59

72

67

32

32

Total

8 8 (2 2 )

86(27)

73

70

103(2 7)

TABLE III - 10
NDP ’s Seats by Types of Constitutency
1963

1967

1971

1973

1978

Metropolitan

8

18

24

12.

16

Urban

5

6

12

3

3

Semi-rural

5

1

10

12

18

Rural

9

2

19

25

24

65(24)

52

61

1973

1978

Types of Constituency

Total

27(14)

27 (17)

TABLE III - 11
Minors '* Seats by Types of Constituency
Types of Constituency

1963

1967

1971

Metropolitan

5

—

—

1

3

Urban

1

—

—

2

2

Semi-rural

3

—

—

9

8

Rural

7

9

10

21

23

Total

16(8)

*0ther parties and/or independents;
Sources:

1

2

1 (0 )

2 (0 )

Numbers

in p a r e n t h e s e s

are PR seats.

Official publications of ROK Central Election Management Committee.
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of election campaigns due to some isolated election irreg
ularities.
During the campaign, the DRP accentuated accomplish
ments of the economic development plans and promised con
tinuation of economic prosperity along with political
stability. They depicted Park as the son of a poor farmer
and champion of Korean modernization. The necessity of having
political stability for the implementation of the Second
Five Year Plan was emphasized. They promised the program
would achieve: 1) an average increase of 8.5% in the annual
economic growth rate; 2) an annual rise of less than 7% in
consumer price; 3) self-sufficiency of the food supply by
1971; 4) the lowering of the price of fertilizer; 5) a
doubling of personal income along with the creation of jobs
for two million by 1971; and 6) salary increase for service
men and public officials. They tried to create an image
of the election as "the confrontation between the progres
sive forces of DRP and the conservative force of oppositions,"
and insisted that Park alone could guarantee a "new bal
anced society.
The NDP accused Park's government of corruption, dic
tatorship, abuse of KCIA power in politics and protection
of a few financial combines in the name of industrializa
tion. It criticized the governmental policy for making "the
rich man richer and the poor man poorer." 37 The NDP campaign
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pledges included the guarantee of freedom of speech, the
expansion of human rights, the curbing of presidential power
by increasing cabinet responsibility, the limitation of
presidential tenure to one term, the neutralization of the
police, the abolishment of the party regulation law, the
realization of local self-government, the exchange of let
ters and newsmen between north and south Korea, the shorten
ing of military service, the revision of the Japan-Korea
normalization treaty, and the withdrawal of Korean forces
from Vietnam. The major issue for both parties seemed to
have been the welfare of the farmers who constituted the
largest occupational segment of the population. For this
reason the DRP promoted the image of Park as the son of a
farmer who was determined to bring about agricultural modern
ization of the country along with industrial development.
In many ways the NDP was at a disadvantage during the 1967
election while the ruling party enjoyed such advantages
as services of administration, extensive nationwide orga
nization, and relatively abundant financial resources.
In the presidential election, Park received support
from 48.9 percent of participant voters, while Yun had
38.9 percent. Park led Yun even in urban areas, by 48.1
to 40.8. Although Yun led Park by 49.6 to 43.7 percent in
Seoul, the progress of the DRP candidate in the city was

Ill
notable compared to the 1963 election. Park increased his
support by 12.5 percent over the 1963 election in urban
areas and 3.5 percent in rural areas. Support rate of the
opposition candidate decreased by 13.3 percent in urban
areas, but he gained 2.6 percent more votes in rural areas
than in the 1963 election (see Table 111-12/.
The voting rate of the nation was 83.6 percent, which
was 1.4 percent lower than the 1963 election. Urban parti
cipation decreased by 5.1 percent, but rural participation
decreased by 0.9 percent. The participation rate of Seoul
was the low 66.7 percent.
In the parliamentary election, the DRP controlled
73.7 percent of the parliamentary seats with 48.7 percent
of votes garnered, while NDP took only 25.7 percent of the
seats with 31.7 percent of the popular votes cast. In
cluding seats allotted by the proportional representation
system, the DRP occupied 131 seats out of 175, which was
74.9 percent of the parliamentary memberships. Most signi
ficant was the DRP's control of more than a two-thirds ma
jority in the parliament later (see Table 111-13).
Despite the setbacks suffered in the election, the
NDP received more votes than the DRP in the urban areas
by the ratio of 44.0 to 40.9 percent. All but three NDP
candidates were elected from the urban constituencies. The
NDP took 18 out of 21 metropolitan districts. As in the
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TABLE III - 12

Voter Turnout by Region and Urban-Rural Comparison
(The 1967 Presidential Election)
Unit: Thousand

Eligible
Voters
(A)

Participant
Voters
(B)

Seoul

2,043.6

1,363.4

Pusan

692.0

Nation

DRP
(C)

NDP
(D)

B/A

C/B

D/B

595.5

675.7

66.7

43.7

49.6

545.7

338.1

164.1

78.9

62.0

30.1

13,935.1

11,645.2

5,688.7

4,526.5

83.6

48.9

38.9

Urban

4,866.3

3,659.0

1,761.0

1,496.3

75.2

48.1

40.8

Rural

9,068.8

7,986.2

3,927.7

3,032.2

88.1

49.2

38.0

Source:

Daehanminkuk Songosa (The Election History of Korea)(Seoul :

TABLE III -

CEMC, 1973),

13

Voter Turnout by Region and Urban-Rural Comparison
(The 1967 Assembly Election)
Unit: Thousand

Eligible
Voters
(A)

Participant
Voters
(B)

Seoul

2,255.4

1,300.0

Pusan

777.5

Nation

NDP
(D)

B/A
(%)

C/B
(%)

D/B
(%)

434.1

681.6

57.6

32.6

52.4

539.9

223.2

257.4

69.4

41.3

47.8

14,717.4

11,202.3

5,494.9

3,554.2

76.1

48.7

31.7

Urban

5,225.6

3,500.6

1,431.5

1,540.8

67.0

40.9

44.0

Rural

9,419.8

7,701.7

4,063.4

2,013.4

81.1

52.8

26.1

Source:

Ibid.

DRP
(C)
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presidential election, urban voters supported the opposi
tion party. In urban districts, the NDP won 24 out of 35
seats (see Table III-lO).
C. 1971 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections
The critical issue of the 1971 election was perhaps
the very fact that Park and his DRP had been in power for
38
too long,
and official abuses and corruption associated
with it.
The opposition NDP seemed well united behind its
presidential candidate, Kim Dae-jung, who was an eloquent
speaker and energetic campaigner. Kim was able to air many
issues. For instance, he proposed drastic changes such as
dissolution of the KCIA, a new distribution of wealth and
social welfare in order to cure the urban-rural income
disparity, an end of regional discrimination in development
projects, such discrimination being a "result of the DRP
economic policies," and termination of the army reserve
organization and military training on the university and
college campuses. 39
In the election campaign, the DRP utilized many in
formal organizations such as Hyanguhoe (groups of friends
from the same regions), Chongchinhoe (clan organization),
Bonyonghoe (organization for regional development), and
40
Sarangbang Chwadamhoe (discussion groups).
Usually these

114
types of organizations are effective in rural areas.
As the tempo of the election was heightened, however,
Kim was increasingly identified with the Cholla region
where he was regarded as a favorite son as against Park's
geographical identification with the Kyungsang area. In the
end, the 1971 presidential election was largely a contest
between the geographical bases of the candidates.
In the presidential election of April 27, Park won
a controversial third term with 51.1 percent of the total
votes cast, while Kim polled 43.5 percent of the votes.
The voting rate of the election was at 79.8 percent, 3.8
percent lower than the 1967 presidential election. The voting
rate of the urbanites was 75.4 percent, which is almost
identical with the urban participation in 1967. The rural
areas showed 5.1 percent decrease in participation. Despite
the rapid urbanization in the period of 1967-1971, the over
all urban voting rate did not change. In fact, voting rate
of Seoul increased by 4.5 percent. The decline in the voting
rate for the whole nation was due to a rapid decline in
rural areas (see Table 111-14).
In the parliamentary election of May 25, 73.2 percent
of the electorate voted, which is 2.9 percent lower than
the 1971 presidential election. The voting rate of urban
areas, however, stayed at 67.0 percent which is identical
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TABLE III - 14

Voter Turnout by Region and Urban-Rural Comparison
(The 1971 Presidential Election)

Eligible
Voters
(A)

Participant
Voters
(B)

.Seoul

2,900.0

2,066,4

805.8

Pusan

944.9

708.5

15,552.2

Urban
Rural

Nation

Source:

DRP
(C)

B/A

C/B

D/B

1,198.0

71.3

39.0

58.0

386.0

302.5

75.0

54.5

42.7

12,417.8

6,342.8

5,395.9

79.8

51.1

43.5

6,445.8

4,857.6

2 ,2 2 0 . 0

2,466.6

75.4

45.7

50.8

9,106.4

7,560.2

4,122.8

2,929.3

83.0

54.5

38.7

NDP
(D)

Daehanminkuk Songosa (The Election History of Korea)(Seoul:

CEMC,

TABLE III - 1 5
Voter Turnout by Region and Urban-Rural Comparison
(The 1971 Assembly Election)

Eligible
Voters
(A)

Participant
Voters
(B)

Seoul

3,022.5

1,789.]

698.7

Pusan

950.0

684.5

Nation

15,610.3

Urban
Rural
Source:

B/A
(%)

C/B
(%)

D/B
(%)

1,037.5

59.2

39.1

58.0

275.7

379.5

72.1

40.3

55.0

11,430.2

5,460.6

4,969.1

73.2

47.8

43.5

6,580.6

4,406.1

1,864.2

2,292.6

67.0

42.8

52.0

9.029.7

7,024.1

3,596.4

2,676.5

77.8

51.2

38.0

Ibid.

DRP
(C)

NDP
(D)
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to the voting rate of the 1967 parliamentary election
(see Table III-I5 ). The DRP carried 86 seats, while the
NDP won 65 seats in 153 constituencies. After the alloc
ation of the proportional representation seats (51 seats),
the DRP took 112, the NDP 89. The NDP with 43.5 percent of
the popular votes cast elected the corresponding portion
of the parliamentary seats (43.6 percent).
In exclusive urban constituencies, the NDP had an
overwhelming victory taking 36 seats out of 45. The DRP,
on the other hand, carried 67 seats out of 88 in rural
districts. The urban-rural combined districts were shared
by the two parties, 10 to 10 (see Table III- 9

and Table

111- 10) .
D. 1973 Parliamentary Election
First election under the Yushin constitution was held
on February 27. Yushin reforms profoundly transformed the
Korean political system and can be characterized by the
notion of a strong executive and weak parliament. By the
end of 1972 new Political Party and Election Law was pro
claimed, the characteristics of which can be summarized:
1) The electoral districts are enlarged each electing
two members. Thus 146 assemblymen are to be elected
in 73 constituencies, in addition to 73 assemblymen
which are to be elected by the National Council for
Unification. The voters are to vote for only one
candidate on the ballot.
2) Election campaignings are to be arranged by the
Election Management Committee, prohibiting candi
dates' campaigning.

117
3) Independents, without partisan affiliation may
run for the assembly.
4) Candidates are to post bonds, a requirement designed
to discourage frivolous candidacy.^1
Before the election, the opposition party became
divided into two. Some of the NDP faction leaders left the
party and organized the Democratic Unification Party (DUP)
claiming that theirs alone was the "genuine opposition
party."
In the election, the DRP won half of the seats (73),
while the other half were divided by the NDP (52). The
national voting rate was 72.9 percent, which was slightly
lower than the 1971 parliamentary election. However, urban
turnout rate had increased to 68.5 percent from 67.0 in
1971 (see Table 111-16).
Another interesting aspect of the election was the
decline of votes for the major parties but without any cor
responding loss of their voting strength in the parliament.
The DRP elected 50 percent of the total parliamentary
membership with 38.0 percent of the votes. However, the
DUP and independents, which received 28.2 percent of the
vote, elected only 14.4 percent of the seats. The major
beneficiaries of the new system were the two major parties.
Including the 73 seats of the Yujonghoe (literally, Friends
of Government Association), the pro-government members in
the parliament, the DRP
Table III-9 ).

had a two-thirds majority (see
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TABLE III - 1 6

Voter Turnout by Region and Urban-Rural Comparison
(The 1973 Assembly Election)

Eligible
Voters
(A)

Participant
Voters
(B)

DRP
(C)

Seoul

3,055.5

1,894.2

638.8

Pusan

999.6

702.4

Nation 15,690.1

B/A
(%)

C/B
(%)

D/B
(%)

827.3

62.0

33.7

43.7

246.4

340.4

70.3

35.1

48.4

11,190.5

4,251.8

3,579.3

72.9

38.0

32.0

NDP
(D)

Urban

6,760.4

4,633.9

1,665.7

1,750.8

68.5

35.9

37.8

Rural

8,929.7

6,562.6

2,586.1

1,826.5

73.5

39.4

27.8

Source:

Daehanminkuk Songosa (The Election History of Korea)(Seoul:
CEMC, 1973).
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In the election, the DRP showed major gains in large
urban districts, while the NDP improved greatly in rural
districts. The concentration of pro-government votes to
one candidate in a district enabled the DRP to elect 16
seats out of 34 in urban districts. On the other hand, the
NDP advanced in rural areas taking 25 seats out of 66 seats.
In a sense, the two parties exchanged the regional (urban
and rural) background of support. The new election system
enabled the DRP to gain seats in urban districts and secure
absolute majority of the parliamentary seats under the
new system.
E. 1978 Parliamentary Election
The ruling DRP seemed much better prepared to face
the election than its major opposition, the NDP. As the
government party, the DRP would ride on the record of pro
gress experienced by Korea since the party achieved power,
with Park as president, in 1963. The DRP was much better
organized and proved more financially resourceful than the
NDP. Park did not allow any public bickering in the candidate
selection process in the D R P . ^
The NDP, on the other hand, was badly split, with
many factional leaders contending for party endorsement of
their followers. The DRP's optimism about the coming elec
tion was justified. Park had already won his second sixyear term under the Yushin constitution through the new
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indirect presidential election process conducted by the
National Conference for Unification (NCU). The Yushin con
stitution empowered the NCU to select one -third (77) of
the parliamentary members recommended by the president.
This so-called Yujonghoe was drawn through a careful,
political balancing act and it included many from the in
tellectual-academic and business communities. Assured of
one-third membership in the parliament, Park's DRP could
modestly aim for election of only one candidate in each
of the two-member electoral districts.
The election was held on December 12 and lacked major
issues. The Yushin constitution and emergency decrees had
prescribed the limits of each candidate's airing of views.
There were no major policy debates. It was so obvious that,
whatever the election outcome, no transition of power would
occur. The NDP asked for at least 77 seats in the parlia
ment as necessary for the meaningful opposition in the Park
and DRP-dominated government. Strangely, the DRP strategy
was to support the NDP cause, advocating a two-party system
and continued political stability and economic development.
Describing the 1978 parliamentary election as an
interplay of two differing forces, C. I. Eugene Kim ob
serves :
On the one hand, the government ruling party attempted
to maintain political stability, continue with its
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forced modernization of the country, and mastermind
a quiet election. On the other hand, the voters,
dissatisfied with all the abuses of power associated
with the long-time ruling party, wanted some
meaningful personnel change in the government.^
The rapid pace of modernization in Korea brought
about an enormous disparity in income and a high rate of
inflation -- 30% in 1978. Even though the DRP suffered a
loss in the election, its dominant position in the legi
slative process was not challenged.
In the election, the voter turnout rate x^as the
highest since the beginning of Park's presidency with 77.1
percent, 4.2 percent higher than the 1973 election.
Although the DRP showed the best success rate, more votes
were cast for the opposition NDP candidates (32.4%) than
for the DRP candidates (31.3%). Never before in Korean
electoral history had the ruling party received fewer votes
than the major opposition party. The urban DRP support rate
declined to 28.1 percent of total votes cast from 35.9
percent in 1973 (see Table 111-17).
With a little over 30 percent popular votes, the
DRP, by taking 70 constituencies, was in a position of con
trolling 45.4 percent of the total seats (see Table III-9 ).
In urban areas, the NDP candidates amassed many more
votes than their DRP opponents substantiating the tradi
tional urban-rural government and opposition party support
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TABLE III -17

Voter Turnout by Region and Urban-Rural Comparison
... (The 1978 Assembly Election)

Eligible
Voters
(A)

Participant
Voters
(B)

DRP
(C)

Seoul

4,575.0

3,113.8

819.1

Pusan

1,596.6

1,187.1

Nation

19,489.6

Urban

NDP
(D)

B/A
(%)

C/B
(%)

D/B
(%)

1,578.3

68.1

26.3

50.7-

348.7

464.5

74.4

29.4

39.1

15,023.3

4,695.9

4,861.1

77.1

31.3

32.4

10,523.8

7,742.9

2,173.6

3,038.5

73.6

28.1

39.2

Rural

8,965.8

7,280.4

2,522.3

1,822.6

81.2

34.6

25.0

Source:

Daehanminkuk Songosa (The Election History of Korea)(Seoul:
CEMC, 1973).
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patterns. Moreover, in this election, voters tended to
reject party notables and incumbents prefering younger
and better-educated new faces. That more independents were
elected than in 1973 election seems to indicate the Korean
electorate's reluctance to identify themselves with
political parties, hence the low level of institutionali
zation of party system in Korea.
IV. Summary and Conclusion
The foregoing analyses seem to warrant the following
conclusions.

First, concerning the state of party politics

in Korea, several negative factors that have prevented the
proper or effective functioning of the party system were:
1) lack of imaginative alternatives among competiting par
ties because of uniformly conservative orientation; 2) con
temptuous attitude toward "party politics" on the part of
supreme leaders - Rhee and Park; 3) endemic factionalism
especially among oppositionists; 4) the monopoly of poli
tical funds in the hands of government parties; 5) external
security threat; 6) absence of incentives to get involved
in party politics.
To the extent that political parties have failed to
become the instrument of free and effective mass partici
pation and channel of elite recruitment, they have failed
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to function as representative and responsive institutions.
The party politics stopped short of the phase of institu
tionalization. With the ushering in of Yushin reforms in
1972, the party system in Korea became irrelevant as a
means of changing the government through a free, open
electoral process, as far as presidency was concerned.
Second, with regard to the changes of electoral sys
tems, Korea experimented with a variety of electoral formulae
the dominant feature of which was the single-member plu
rality formula. This electoral system accentuated the
advantage of the government party by giving it a pro
portionately larger share of parliamentary seats than it
actually merited on the basis of popular votes garnered.
Even though modified proportional representation system
was designed to benefit the dominant party, its net effect
was to strengthen the major opposition party at the ex
pense of other minor parties, thus tending to create a
two-party system.
The government parties did not hesitate to resort to
rule manipulation or extra-constitutional means to prevent
the unfolding of "natural tendencies" in electoral behavior.
During the regime of Park and his DRP, the party politics
was sustained by "administrative democracy" whereby the
party itself lost its effectiveness as an instrument of
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political participation and recruitment. Political parties
then merely served as procedural device for accrediting
candidates for election purposes.
Third, concerning the descriptive voting statistics
in the three presidential and five parliamentary elections,
a few generalizations can be made: 1) more rural voters
tended to vote than their urban counterparts; 2) urban
voters, particularly in Seoul, tended to cast their ballots
against the government party while ruralites tended to favor
candidates belonging to the government party.
A more detailed discussion of rural and urban voting
patterns will be presented in Chapters IV and V.
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CHAPTER FOUR
URBANIZATION AND VOTING PARTICIPATION
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate the
differences in the rate of voting turnout along the dimen
sion of urban/rural continuum of election districts and to
probe into select socio-demographic concomitants of voting
participation in Korea.
I.

Urban Residence and Voting Turnout
The effect of place of residence on political behav

ior in general and voting turnout in particular has been
ambiguous.

As discussed briefly in Chapter I, theories

of modernization have assumed a positive relationship
between urban residence and higher levels of political
participation, hence voting participation.

Lerner, for

example, was specific about the place of urbanization in
his sequential model of modernization when he asserted
"everywhere...increasing urbanization has tended to raise
literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase media
exposure; increasing media exposure has 'gone with 1 wider
economic participation (per capita income) and political
participation (voting)."^

While recognizing some exceptions,

one may still argue that urban residence is usually correl
ated with high socioeconomic status and high organizational
involvement, which themselves have an independent impact on
political participation, including voting.
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However, cross-national data do not present close
fit between urban residence and high levels of political
participation.

For example, Inkeles has found a mild

relationship between urban residence and his "active citizenship scale" in several countries he studied.

But when

he controlled for other variables such as education and
factory experience, these relationships disappeared and
even became negative in some countries, implying that urban
residence had no independent effect on active citizenship.
Urban voting turnout is usually higher in most Western
3

democracies.

The most significant exceptions in this

regard are France and Japan, where voting turnout rates
have consistently been higher in rural areas.^

Interest

ingly, rural residents in these two countries compare fav
orably with their urban compatriots not only with respect
to voting, but also with respect to some other forms of
political participation.

5

In both countries, this high

level of participation is combined with a low level of par
tisanship as indicated by weak party identification and
emphasis on personalities rather than on party label.^
Korea is another major exception to the assumed relation
ship between urban residence and high political participa
tion, insofar as voting participation is concerned.

As can

be seen in Table IV-1 and Table IV-2, the voting turnout
rates showed remarkably significant differences among the
"locality" categories in the three presidential and five

TABLE IV - 1

Voting Participation Percentages in 3 Categories of
Districts in Presidential Elections, 1963, 1967, and 1971

Types of District

1963
(N-183)

1967
(N-184)

1971
(N-185)

Metropolitan Districts

78.6%

71.6%

73.5%

City Districts

84.3

83.1

82.0

County Districts

87.7

88.6

83.8

Urban Districts (Metropolitan+City
Districts)

82.4

79.3

79.1

Rural Districts (County Districts)

87.7

88.6

83.8

Nation

86.4

86.3

82.7

Definitions:

Metropolitan Districts:
Seoul and Pusan.

Districts from special cities of

City Districts: Districts from cities with population of
50,000 or above.
County Districts: Districts from counties in which the
largest town contains less than 50,000 people.
Sources:

Official publications of the ROK Central Election Management Committee.

TABLE IV - 2

Voting Participation Percentages in 4 Categories of Districts in National
Assembly Elections9 1963„ 1967, 1971» 19739 and 1978

Types of Districts

1963
(N)

1967

Metropolitan Districts

62.0% (15)

62.5% (15)

64.9% (15)

66.0% (11)

70.9% (11)

Urban Districts

66.7

(9)

70.4

(9)

74.7

(10)

69.4

(4)

75.3

(4)

Semi-Rural Districts

76.2

(21)

80.6

(21)

78.2

(20)

77.8

(23)

80.7

(25)

Rural Districts

76.2

(75)

82.7

(75)

78.4

(88)

71.8

(31)

83.3

(31)

Urban Districts (Metropolitan-HJrban)

68.8

65.5

68.8

66.9

72.0

Rural (Semi-Rural+Rural)

76.2

82.3

78.3

77.4

82.1

Nation

73.7

78.9

76.5

75.1

80.0

Definition:

Metropolitan Districts:
Urban Districts:

1978

Districts from special cities of Seoul and Pusan.

Districts which combine city and county population.

Districts with 100 percent rural population.

Official publications of the ROK Central Election Management Committee.
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Source:

1973

Districts with 100 percent urban population.

Semi-Rural Districts:
Rural Districts:

1971

135
parliamentary elections under study.
20

An aveage of almost

percent of voters stayed away from the voting booths in

metropolitan and city (urban) districts in presidential elec
tions,, while in county (rural) districts, the ratio was about
13 percent.

In parliamentary elections, an average of almost

33 percent of voters stayed away from polls in urban dis
tricts while only about 21 percent of voters abstained in
rural districts.

Furthermore, urban and semi-rural categor

ies in both types of elections fell in between the two
extremes, with the semi-rural closer to the rural districts.
In comparison the voting turnout rate in presidential elec
tions was consistently higher than that of parliament's in
all categories of urbanization:

74 percent compared to

65.3 percent among metropolitan districts; 86.7 percent com
pared to 76.5 percent among rural districts.

In terms of

gross urban-rural dichotomy, an average of 80.3 percent of
presidential voting participation rate compared favorably
against the average of 67.4 percent of parliamentary par
ticipation rate among urban districts, while the rural
districts were 86 percent to 79.3 percent.
Data organized on different units of analysis and at
different times also demonstrate an inverse correlation
between urbanization and voting participation.

Table IV-3

presents rates of voting participation in all the presi
dential
1978.

and parliamentary elections held in Korea till
While there is no clear-cut pattern, the general
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TABLE IV - 3

Voter Turnout in Presidential and National Assembly Elections

Presidential Elections
Year
Turnout
Nonvoting

1948

-

-

Year

Assembly Elections
Turnout
Nonvot:

1948

95.5

4.5

1952

88.0

12.0

1950

91.9

8.5

1956

94.4

5.6

1954

91.1

8.9

1960

97.0

3.0

1958

87.7

12.3

1960

84.4

15.6

84.1*

15.9

1963

84.9

15.1

1963

72.1

27.9

1967

83.6

16.4

1967

76.1

23.9

1971

79.8

20.2

1971

73.2

26.8

1973

72.9

27.1

1978

77.1

22.9

*Turnout rate in upper house elections.
Source:

Official publications of the ROK Central Election
Management Committee.
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trend in electoral participation may be described as one
of gradual decline.

This trend should be seen against

the background of growing urbanization, rising levels of
educational attainment on the part of the electorate, and
in the last two decades, marked economic growth.

Such

an inverse correlation between urbanization and electoral
participation is unmistakably confirmed by Table IV-4,
which shows that rates of nonvoting vary positively with
levels of urbanization--a pattern which holds true in all
three presidential elections.
Voting is the most common form of political partici
pation for Korean citizens.

As is the case in many devel

oping countries, more Koreans participate in elections than
in any other kind of political participation.

As compared

to the United States, the voting turnout rate is much
higher in Korea with the greater turnout rate in the rural
districts than in the urban districts.

A similar pattern

to this is found in local elections of all kinds.

For

example, an analysis of the 1960 elections shows the fol
lowing turnout rates in different types of local elections
(see Table IV-5).

In addition to this evidence in aggre

gate measure, Lee found the same inverse correlation in a
survey (see Table IV-6 ).
The same tendency is also found in cities of differ
ent sizes.

Voting turnout in the 1960 parliamentary elec

tion in seven major cities representing the national and
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TABLE IV

Rates of Nonvoting in Presidential Elections,
by Urbanization

1963

1967

1971

Rural county (1)

12.3%

10.9%

16.5%

Rural county (2)

12.9

12.1

17.9

Small city

15.1

15.7

17.6

Large city

17.3

19.6

21.5

Metropolis

21.7

30.2

27.8

Whole country

14.8

16.1

20.3

Definitions:
Rural county (1)

county with no eup (administrative
unit); population of largest town less
than 19,999

Rural county (2)

county with at least one eup; popula
tion of the largest town between
20,000 and 49,999

Small city:

population between 50,000 and 199,000

Large city:

population between 200,000 and 999,999

Metropolis:

population more than a million

Source:

Jae-On Kim & B.C. Koh, "Electoral Behavior and
Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate
Data Analysis of Presidential Elections," The
Journal of Politics, Vol. 34, 1972, p. 834.
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TABLE IV - 5

Voting Rates and Local Election, 1960

Types of Election

Voting Rates

City Mayor

54.6%

Chief of Eup (town)

7217

Chief of Myon (village)

81.6

City of Legislature

62.6

Eup Legislature

77.5

Myon Legislature

83.7

Kyu-taik Kim "Statistical Analysis of Elections in Korea,"
Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 9 No. 2 (Summer 1967), p. 66.

TABLE IV -

6

Place of Residence and Turnout*

Area

Turnout Rate Reported

Big Cities

64.7%

Eups

71.0

Myons

75.6

Young Ho Lee, "Social Change and Political Participation in
Korea," (unpublished paper, University of Georgia). Prepared
for presentation at the Conference of Tradition and Change in
Korea, 1970.
*Percentages indicate the rate of participation in national
election at least once in past elections among eligible voters.
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provincial capitals shows a disproportionate relation to
the size of city, with the only exception of Taijon, which
contains two parliamentary districts (see Table IV-7).
The pattern noted clearly runs counter to the predic
tions of theories of modernization but gives support to the
decline-of-community model of politicization.
Treated as a summary indicator of modernization or
socioeconomic development, urbanization can be thought to
stimulate educational advancement and communications expan
sion in every society, thus increasing political sophis
tication on the part of the electorate.
Table IV-8 , adapted from Lee's survey, indicates that
education and political attitude vary in the predicted
fashion of theories of modernization in all areas except
voting participation.

According to Table IV-8 , the higher

the level of education, the higher the interest in cam
paigns and the greater the commitment to democratic values.
Given these data, we are constrained to raise the question:
What accounts for the apparent inconsistency between the
levels of political interest and of commitment to demo
cratic values on the one hand and the rates of voting par
ticipation on the other.

If the rate of mobilization were

related only to the context of community or level of urban
ization, we would find the relationship between educational
level and voter participation positive within each level of
urbanization.

It is not clear, however, whether we would
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TABLE I V - 7
Voting Rates of the Cities, 1960

City

No. of Districts

Voting

Seoul

16

80.4%

Pusan

10

84.1

Taegu

6

85.7

Inchon

3

86.9

Kwangj u

3

86.9

Taijon

2

83.9

Chonju

2

87.9

Source: Chon-ju Yun, "Urbanization and Political Participation,11
Koreana Quarterly (Autumn, 1967), p. 62.

TABLE I V - 8

Various Political Attitudes and Activities (percentages)

Say
election
needed

Say
campaign
needed

Pay
attention
to cam
paign

Prefer
democracy
to dicta
torship^

Ever Vote
in presl
dential
election

By education

None
Primary School
Middle School
High School
Some College

Nation

58.3

100.0
100.0

33.5
56.1
56.9
70.7
91.3

75.0

47.7

86.1
91.3

38.1
82.0
93.1

97.1
90.3

36.1

100.0
100.0

80.0

16.6

62.2

91.2

56.8
79.8

91.3
90.0

5.7
19.1

By rural-urban residence

Rural
Urban

72.6
80.1

42.6
59.5

12.4
26.2

^Percentage includes those who were unable to express a preference for either
democracy or dictatorship. Almost all respondents who were able to answer
preferred democracy to dictatorship.
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Source: Young-ho Lee, "The Political Culture of Modernizing Society: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Korea," an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation submitted
to the Department of Political Science, Yale University, 1970.
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find such a relationship in Korea, partly because lesseducated people will in general be more susceptible to
government pressure, manipulation, and partly because it
is possible that educated people are less likely to vote
in an election where the outcome is obvious.

As Downs

argues, if the expected outcome of voting is clearly one
sided, there are no rational grounds for an individual to
vote, given the effort voting requires from the individ
ual and the low probability that it can visibly affect the
outcome.

Assuming that the presidential election was

rarely close and that the general expectation was that
the government party candidate would win, we might expect
that the better-educated and the more-urbanized citizen
(who traditionally voted more for the opposition) would
stay away from the polls.

In fact, Table IV-4 indicates

that the urban-rural difference in the rate of nonvoting
was smallest when the result of the presidential election
was closest (1963), and the differences were largest when
the election was clearly one-sided (1967).^
Impressionistic evidence alone seems to suggest that
it would be highly unrealistic to assume that urban resi
dents are less politically informed, concerned, interested,
and involved than the villagers.

Rural to urban migrants

in Korea seem to be younger, better educated, and more
skilled than the average rural population.

There is little

evidence supporting the argument of widespread social
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isolation, disorganization, and pessimism among urban
migrants in Korea.

Cities also clearly surpass the coun

tryside in organizational activity directly or indirectly
associated with politics.

Why, then, do we have lower

participation rates in the urban areas?
Lacking any empirical evidence bearing on this ques
tion, Kim and Koh hypothesized that a sizable portion of
voters, especially in the rural areas of Korea, as in
other non-Western societies, are "mobilized" or "presg
sured" to participation.
This hypothesis holds that many
traditionally oriented citizens, especially those living
in rural villages, may participate in elections merely in
compliance with or out of respect for the views of their
community leaders.

The act of voting in this instance

expresses conformity to both traditional collective norms
and authority rather than self-assertive and autonomous
individual choice regarding candidates or their policies.
Pressures from local notables or community associational
groups to turn out voters in support of the communityendorsed candidates are common in Korea.
Alternatively, C. I. Eugene Kim and his colleagues
attribute the low turnout rate in urban areas to "alienation"
9

among well educated young urban voters.

These highly edu

cated young people show a great deal of interest in politics
but have little faith in the efficacy of elections.
more politically sophisticated they become, the more

The
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intensely they feel about the futility of political action.
To them, then, an election is a meaningless contest or a
mechanism for the ruling party to mobilize the masses to
legitimize its continued rule.

No wonder they refused to

partake in the electoral process.
Ever since Korea adopted democratic political system
following liberation, high voter turnout has strongly been
encouraged by both election administrative authorities and
the mass media.

The notion that voting is a citizen's

duty is highly advocated, especially in rural areas.

Korean

villages are cohesive and compact communities wherein voters
are more easily mobilized by personal connections than urban
residents.

According to Kyu-taik Kim, Korean rural commun

ities are slow in social changes and human relations tend
to be multifunctional and intensely tied by consanguinity,
regionalism and l o c a l i s m . V o t e r s in rural areas are
related to candidates, directly or indirectly, one way or
another, so they are more likely to feel a sense of obli
gation and duty to vote for the particular candidate they
have in mind.

Furthermore, Kim attributes higher rural

turnout to the importance of election to ruralites

in the

absence of organized interest group activity and also to
the image of government authorities held by rural voters
which tends to evoke fear of retaliation if they fail to
- 12
vote.
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Chae Jin Lee links the low urban turnout to the "disruptive effect of over-urbanization." 13 Urban mass society,
due to its anonymous and competitive social and political
relations, renders atomized urbanites less susceptible to
communal pressures for their electoral participation.
Urban-rural differences in turnout rates have been seen
as a direct result of population mobility in many analyses
of European countries."^

Due to the transient nature of

residential patterns of urbanites, little stakes are seen
in election outcome, hence low turnout in urban centers.
The compact nature and social proximity inherent in
residential patterns of different types of communities are
said to be responsible for the differential rates of voter
- 15
turnout.
Although all of the above theories are helpful in our
understanding of the urban-rural differences in the rate of
voting turnout, we can readily see that the existing alter
native explanations are applicable to both urban and rural
dominance in involvement and participation.

Such theoreti

cal anomalies reflect in part the real probability--often
overlooked in comparative research--that place of residence
has different meanings in different settings.
A more useful and comprehensive perspective might be
found in the "decline-of-community" model which predicts
a decline of participation as one moves from the smallness
and intimacy of town or village to the massive impersonality
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of the city.

According to Verba and Nie's formulation of

this model, in the small town, the community is manageable
size.

In such a setting, citizens know the ropes of poli

tics, know whom to contact, know each other so that they
can form political groups easily.

In contrast, in large

urban centers, politics is more complicated, impersonal,
and distant, making meaningful participation difficult.
Moreover, "modernization" blurs the identities of indepen
dent communities as they become small towns in a mass
society.

These changes, according to the decline-of-com-

munity model, tend to reduce the level of participation
16
within the community.
According to Dahl and Tufte, "the smaller a community,
where actions are more visible, violation of norms is more
threatening, conflicting norms are more intolerable, and
there is less categoric and cultural diversity... the greater
will be the conformity to a set of common norms." 17

There

fore, in the smaller community participation might be thought
of as less private and more social if the obligation

to

participate in politics is a widespread communal norm.

As

the size of community increases, then, "the capacity of a
community to enforce conformity to a prevailing norm must
dissipate rapidly." 18 Considering such effect of size,
Dahl and Tufte hypothesize that "the larger the citizen
body, the weaker the sense of individual effectiveness (the
greater the sense of powerlessness), hence the weaker the
incentive to participate, hence the less the participation."^
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According to the decline-of-community model, the
difficulty of cooperation and the difficulty of access make
electoral participation difficult.

In the large urban cen

ter, then, the ability of various community associational
groups to reach out and influence voters would decrease
necessarily while in small rural communities a strong sense
of community solidarity and loyalty is experienced by their
.i

.
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residents.

Rural areas differ greatly from urban areas in social
structure, social interaction, and value systems.

Within a

rural setting, it is much easier to mobilize voters by per
sonal contacts.

Given the fact that cooperation among

households is a practical necessity for agricultural pur
poses, frequent and strong personal ties develop among
villagers.
City residents, on the other hand, usually live in a
much less socially integrated environment.

They tend to be

less involved in neighborhood affairs and to be less inter
ested in their neighbors.

In part high residential and

geographic mobility among city dwellers explains this phenom
enon.
Mobility, which accompanies urbanization, tends to
weaken the individual's integration into community associa
tional networks.

As a result, his sense of local loyalty

or consciousness is diluted which, in turn, reduces the
effectiveness of mobilizing capacity of personal networks.
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As Table IV-9 shows, in 1971

a little more than thirteen

out of every 100 households moved their residence but in
22
1977, nearly twenty-one did.
Moreover, urban residents
not only commute to work but also work in large organizations
where the pattern of human interaction, authority, and com
munication is much more impersonal.

Consequently, urban

residents live in an environment where tradition is less
binding.

Within this kind of social milieu, voter mobil

ization through personal contact is far less effective.
Pessimism and cynicism emerge when one feels ineffective
in the political system.

In Korean context, prior to the

introduction of democracy, no commoner dared to think of
exerting influence upon the government and, therefore, there
23
was no room for cynicism to develop.
In democracy, including
competitive authoritarian type of dictatorship, however, the
citizen becomes alert about politics because he is indoctrin
ated to do so, and yet he finds no way of linking himself to
the government.

Education helps one to assess political real

ity more realistically, and, therefore, the more keenly one
is aware of the absence of a link between himself and the
government, the more he would be cynical about his role in
public affairs.
A study on political socialization found an interesting
relationship between father's education and student's sense
of political efficacy demonstrating that students having
college educated fathers feel far less efficacious about
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TABLE IV - 9
Changes of Residence

Persons
moving

Persons mov
100 populat

1971

4,210,164

13.5

1972

3,687,938

11.7

1973

4,860,418

15.1

1974

5,297,969

16.1

1975

9,011,440

26.4

1976

6,773,250

19.5

1977

7,397,624

20.9

Source:

Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook:

1978
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politics than those with less educated fathers
IV-10).

24

(see Table

Moreover, distrust of politics and political pes

simism among the highly educated people, specifically among
college professors, is evidenced by another survey. 25 To
the question, "Among the following causes, which do you think
is most responsible for political instability and economic
poverty?:

a) people's low level of education; b) poor

politics; c) foreign influence; d) scarce natural resources;
3) feudal thinking; or f) others," only 1% of the respondents
attribute failure of modernization to the attitudinal factor-feudalistic thinking--and more than half of them point to
politics as the major spoiling factor-(see Table IV-11).
Intellectuals' dissatisfaction with politics was well re
flected in their responses to the question, "Suppose your
son is going to apply for a job in the government or in a
private organization, which one would you recommend if
both offer the same amount of salary and other equally
attractive condition?"

As Table IV-12 indicates that intel

lectuals consider politics in a cynical and negative way
is clear from the evidences of their profound distrust in
politics and their reluctance to get involved in politics
as seen in this survey.
In addition, it should be pointed out that well edu
cated Koreans in urban areas tend to be cynical not just
toward politics and politicians but also toward the ruling
party in particular.

Close ties between ruling party
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TABLE IV - 10

Relation of Father's Education to Political Efficacy

Source:

Primary

79.2%

Junior High

81.5%

Senior High

78.9%

College

66.5%

Hwa-Soo Lee, "A Study of Political Socialization Process,"
Koreana Quarterly (Summer, 1968).

TABLE IV - 11
Professors' Opinion on Failure in Modernization

Low Education
Poor Politics
Foreign Influence
Scarce Natural Resources
Feudalistic Thinking
Others
Unknown
No Response

Total

Source:

14%
52%
12%
16%
1%
3%
1%
1%

100%

Sung-chik Hong, "Values of Korean College Professors with
Emphasis Placed on Problems Related to Politics,"
Koreana Quarterly (Spring, 1971).
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TABLE IV - 12
Job Preference for the Son Among
College Professors, Farmers and Businessmen

Job Preference

Professors

Businessmen

Farmers

Government Job

32%

33%

82%

Private Job.

65

67

18

Others

1

0

0

No Response

2

0

0

Total

100%

100%

100%

No. of Respondents

352

261

392

Source:

Ibid.
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leaders and special interest groups, especially big busi
ness, are often sources of corruption and scandal. This,
coupled with the bitter personal infighting of the opposi
tion parties, and the difficulty of influencing govern
ment policies may also constitute the major sources of
political alienation and cynicism among well educated
urban residents.^
Many educated citizens in urban areas are less con
strained by personal social networks than those in rural
areas. Educated citizens in rural areas, by contrast,
are not only under strong social and personal pressure
to vote but also under pressure to support the ruling
party to produce a certain quota of government votes
because they tend to be the leaders in their communities.
Educated community leaders in rural areas tend to
OQ

be also adherents to the status quo

and, for this

reason, are less likely to be critical of the policies
of the ruling elites.

29

II. Relationships between Demographic Indicators and
Voting Participation
How does social development or modernization affect
political participation in general and voting partici
pation in particular?
In this section, we shall probe more deeply into
some socioeconomic and cultural concomitants of voting

27

155
participation in Korea, using election district level data.
30
It is widely believed that psychological elements
such as
cognition, beliefs, and attitudes are as important in elec
toral participation as are ecological factors such as char
acteristics of the political system or urban-rural charac31
teristics of the community.
In Korean context, there is
reason to believe that ecological factors are far more
salient than the psychological factors in determining the
extent and direction of electoral participation.

According

to Choi and Lee, this situation results from the lack of
32
individuation and political secularism in Korea.
Even
now individual citizens in Korea tend to define themselves
in collective rather than individual terms, especially in
rural areas.

Their values tend to be those of the community

to which they belong, and their identity is defined in com
munal frame of reference.

Their political decisions and

behavior may reflect not so much their own personal polit
ical beliefs and attitudes as the prevailing norms and
pressures of the community.

That is why an understanding

of the socioeconomic and cultural characteristics of elec
toral districts becomes so crucial in explaining electoral
politics.
Voting data were correlated with a number of demographic
indicators reflecting the level of social development such
as population size and density, percent nonfarm household,
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percent postwar and prewar generation, percent college
enrollment and illiteracy, and percent female. Utilizing
socioeconomic and demographic data on election district and
employing the Pearson product-moment correlation coeffi
cients as the major statistical measure, we shall attempt
to analyze the relationship between urbanization as the
summary indicator of modernization and voting participation.
Table IV-13 and Table IV-14 present the correlations be
tween the rates of voting participation in the three presi
dential and five parliamentary elections and the indicators
of social development of election districts.
On theoretical grounds of the decline-of-community
model, we would expect election districts whose main fea
tures include large population, high density, high level
of industrialization to show a low level of turnout. We
would anticipate also districts characterized by a high level
of education, a concentration of postwar generation would
not score high on voter turnout, as relative political
freedom and deep-seated skepticism and cynicism about
politicians, which are so characteristic of contemporary
youth, would result in low turnout. On the other hand, we
would anticipate districts with a high level of illiteracy,
a concentration of prewar generation and females to show a
high level of turnout, given the presumption that in these
areas the influence of the traditional mode of thinking and
behavior is strong. Without exception, in all elections
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TABLE IV - 13

Correlation Coefficients between Voting Participation
and Socio-Economic Variables of Districts:
Presidential Elections, 1963, 1967, and 1971

District Characteristics

1963
Nation

1967
Nation

1971
Nation

POP (Population

-.57

-.67

-.56

DEN (Density)

-.50

-.53

-.45

IND (Industrial)

-.60

-.67

-.40

POSTWARG (Postwar Generation)

-.68

-.70

-.45

PREWARG (Preway Generation)

-.01

-.09

.39

COLLENR (College Enrollment)

-.64

-.79

-.53

.36

.49

.30

-.13

-.17

-.20

ILLITR (Illiteracy)
FEMALER (Female)

*Since our analysis involves a universe of cases rather than a
sample, both weak and strong correlations are theoretically
significant. Our primary interest, however, is in the direction
of relationship in testing hypotheses.

TABLE IV - 14

Correlation Coefficients between Voting Participation
and Socio-Economic Variables of Districts:
National Assembly Elections, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1973, and 1978

1963
Nation

1967
Nation

1971
Nation

1973
Nation

1978
Nation

POP (Population)

-.53

-.54

-.58

-.66

-.06

DEN (Density)

-.49

-.61

-.55

-.63

-.65

IND (Industrial)

-.71

-.82

-.65

-.67

-.73

POSTWARG (Postwar Generation) -.64

-.73

-.66

-.66

-.77

PREWARG (Prewar Generation)

-.03

-.11

.54

.45

.23

COLLENR (College Enrollment)

-.68

-.79

-.69

-.68

-.73

ILLITR (Illiteracy)

. 66

.69

.67

.62

.63

FEMALER (Female)

.02

-.05

-.09

.05

-.11

District Characteristics
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variables population, density, industrialization, postwar
generation, college enrollment show strong negative correl
ations while other variables such as prewar generation,
illiteracy, and female show either very weak relationship or
strong positive relationship with voting participation.
Even though our data are crude, these findings essentially
confirm our hypothesis concerning urbanization and election
participation in Korea.
How do we explain this situation, which runs counter
to the expectations of theories of modernization and
social mobilization?

Are there some other alternative

logical explanations?
One may conceivably argue, for example, that the more
developed and urbanized election districts are less depen
dent on government and, consequently, more indifferent to
elections.

Low rates of turnout, in this sense, may be
indicative of a "politics of happiness." 33 Or, one may

emphasize the greater availability of other modes and
means of political participation (particularly, partici
pation in interest group activities or some other more
effective modes of participation) in the more modern
areas of the country.
Yet, such explanations leave many questions unan
swered.

The prosperity of the more developed districts is

certainly not great enough to generate a "politics of hap
piness."

These areas, with their more modern and complex

socioeconomic structures, may indeed be more deeply
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affected by particular governmental policies than the
less developed areas based primarily on traditional agri
culture; therefore, they tend to be more, not less, con
cerned about the outcome of elections.

Similarly, the

availability of other means of participation does not
quite explain the low voting turnout in the more modern
districts.

Comparative research has generally shown that

although some people limit their political participation
mainly to voting (hence the relatively weak correlation
between voting and other modes of political participation),
those who are active in other modes of participation are
q/
also likely to vote.
Perhaps a more cogent explanation can be found in the
different motivational bases of political participation
among the different sectors of the Korean population.
Socioeconomic modernization tends to increase autonomous
and instrumental participation and to decrease mobilized
and deferential participation.

In the more backward areas

of the country, traditional local notables can often
mobilize their clients into voting at consistently high
levels of turnout.

Where voting has become an autonomous

act, on the other hand, individual voters may or may not
feel motivated to vote.

Therefore, modernization may

bring about a decline in the rate of voting participa
tion by limiting the mobilizing capacity of local notables
or, to put it differently, by reducing the amount of

161
mobilized participation in a society.

In this sense, one

does not expect to find very high rates of participation
in a transitional society like Korea where the traditional
mobilizing influences have weakened, and the necessary
supporting features of a modern participatory society
(namely, widely shared high SES, and a high level of
organizational involvement) have not fully developed.
Also the effects of socioeconomic modernization on
the "attitudinal" components of political participation
may sometimes be mixed and contradictory.

Just as certain

attitudinal concomitants of political participation (such
as political information and awareness, sense of political
efficacy, perceived salience of governmental action,
desire for political participation, etc.) are associated
with modernization, so may be political cynicism and ali
enation.

Modernization raises the level of expectations

and lowers the threshold of frustration and alienation.
Impressionistic observations suggest that such feelings
are quite common among the modern and modernizing segments
of the Korean population.
III.

Summary and Conclusion
To summarize and conclude, the place of residence is

a major source of variation in voting participation in
Korea.

Rural districts clearly and regularly surpass urban

districts in voting participation in both presidential and
parliamentary elections.
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We have found that the degree of urbanization was
inversely correlated with the rate of voting turnout in
Korea, thus substantiating the decline-of-community model
on political participation.

The ranking of the rates of

voter turnout is in a decreasing order of rural, semirural, urban and metropolitan districts.
In addition, using urbanization as a surrogate indica
tor of social development, we correlated voting participa
tion with several select environmental variables which were
intended to tap the degree of modernity of election dis
tricts.

We have found an inverse correlation between

voting turnout rate and with variables of population size,
density, industrialization, college enrollment, and postwar
generation, while a positive correlation with illiteracy,
prewar generation and female.
In attempting to explain the persistent urban/rural
gap in voter turnout rate, we have found a most useful and
supple perspective in the decline-of-community model.
There is ample evidence to believe that the low-voting
among urban-metropolitan voters can be attributed to the
weakening of the pressure for conformity to community norms
in voting as well as the ineffective community social net
works in mobilizing voters.
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CHAPTER FIVE
URBANIZATION AND PARTISAN SUPPORT
Now that we have examined the urban-rural differences
in the rate of voting turnout and the relationship
between urbanization and electoral participation, we are
ready to analyze the urban-rural differences in
partisan support and also the relationship between urban
ization and electoral competition, notably partisan
alignment.
I.

Urbanization and Political Competition
Many seasoned observers of the Korean electoral pro

cesses have commented on the differences in party prefer
ence between urban residents and rural dwellers.

The

most striking pattern that emerges from the analysis of
available aggregate statistics is the division of par
tisan support along the urban-rural dimension.

The pres

idential and parliamentary elections held between 1963
and 1978 clearly indicate that urban areas have proved
a bulwark of opposition to President Park and his party
(DRP), while rural areas have gone consistently pro
government.

That is to say, relatively modernized sec

tor (urban districts) has tended to support the opposi
tion party, while the more traditional sector (rural
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districts) has, by and large, buttressed the ruling govern
ment party.
As we discussed briefly in Chapter I, Dahl and Tufte
advanced a number of hypotheses that relate the processes
associated with urbanization to increased political oppo
sition and competition utilizing the concept of size.
The general argument found in the decline-of-community
model--especially in its Dahl and Tufte's formulation--is
that urbanization not only increases diversity and com
petition among political parties but also decreases the
percentage of the vote cast for the leading (government)
party.'*'

In short, Dahl and Tufte predict an inverse correl

ation between urbanization and the electoral strength of
the leading party:

the more urbanized a district, the

stronger its opposition would be.
In seeking to determine, by means of statistical
analysis, the extent to which the Korean electorate divides
itself along party lines, it is necessary to make certain
assumptions.

Voter registration in Korea is done by offi

cial compilation of all eligible voters and therefore does
not require the registrant to declare his party preference.
When he goes to the polls, he does not have the opportunity
to vote for a "party ticket."

Rather, he votes for a

particular candidate, who is usually affiliated with one
party or another.

Hence the only way to measure party

support is to take the total votes garnered by candidates
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of various parties, with the understanding that for some
voters, at least, the act of voting may have been divorced
from the idea of indicating party preference. With this
caveat in mind, we may proceed to analyze partisan support.
Table V-l and Table V-2 present the percentages of
the government party vote in the three presidential and
five parliamentary elections under study by urbanization.
In presidential elections, there are three different ca
tegories of district while in parliamentary elections there
are four categories of district, as we defined in Chapter
IV. Given the dismal performances of minor parties, we
exclude them from our analysis. Now that the percentages
have been calculated from the votes cast for the two major
parties only -- the government party (DRP) and the major
opposition party (NDP) -- their complements indicate the
percentages of the opposition party vote.
In 1963 and 1971 presidential elections, we see an
inverse correlation between the degree of urbanization and
the proportion of the progovernment vote. Support for Park
Chung Hee (DRP) ranges from 39.3 percent (1963) to 55.7
percent (1967) with the average of 47.7 percent in the
metropolitan districts, while it ranged from 56.5 percent
(1963) to 59.3 percent (1971) with the average of 57.4
percent in the county districts. The almost complete
absence of any relationship between urbanization and government-opposition cleavage in 1967 is explicable

TABLE V - 1

Votes polled by Political Parties in 3 categories of Districts in Presidential
Elections9 1963, 196 7, and 1971 (Two major party compulation only)

Party

District Types*

1963

1967

1971

DRP

A
B
C
Urban (Metro+City)
Rural (County)

39.3%
44.3
56.5
42.6
56.8

55.7%
60.1
56.5
58.0
56.5

46.8%
52.7
59.3
50.7
59.6

A
B
C
Urban (Metro-City)
Rural (County)

60.7
55.7
43.5
57.4
43.2

44.3
39.9
43.5
42.0
43.5

53.2
47.3
40.7
49.3
40.4

NDP

*
A=Metropolitan
B=City
C=County
See Table IV-1 for definitions .
Source:

Official publications of the ROK Central Election Management Committee.
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TABLE V - 2

Percentages of Votes Polled by Political Parties in 4 Categories of Districts in
National Assembly,, 1963s 1967„ 1971» 1973 and 1978 (Two Party Computation Only)

Party

NDP

District Types*

1963

1967

1971

1973

1978

A
B
C
D

52.0
57.4
70.8
66.2

42.7
54.9
63.0
68.2

41.1
47.4
53.5
59.2

44.6
64.3
64.3
56.3

38.4
50.5
55.4
58.0

Urban
Rural

54.0
67.2

47.2
67.1

43.6
58.2

49.8
58.8

41.6
56.8

A
B
C
D

48.0
42.6
29.2
33.8

57.3
45.1
37.0
31.8

58.9
52.6
46.5
40.8

55.4
35.7
37.8
43.7

61.6
49.5
44.6
42.0

Urban
Rural

46.0
32.0

52.8
32.9

56.4
41.0

50.2
43.2

58.4
43.2

*A-Metropolitan
B-Urban
C-Semi-rural
D-Rural
See Table IV-2 for definitions.
Official publications of the ROK Central Election Management Committee.
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Source:
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largely in terms of the potency of regionalism which is
defined as the "affective identification of the electorate
9
with their regional candidates."
Table V-3 shows, in 1963 the strong support of the
Yongnam region (see the map in Figure 1) for its favorite
son, General Park (61.3 percent), was responsible for
Park's narrow victory.

When the effects of urbanization

were controlled for, regionalism accounted for 54 percent
of the variance in the electoral preference.

In 1967, the

support of Yongnam voters for their regional candidate,
Park Chung Hee, not only did increase to almost 71 percent
but also the explanatory power of regionalism rose remark
ably (69 percent).

At the same time, the support by

Kyonggi and Seoul, where regional loyalties and sentiments
are less salient, voters for Yun Po-son, their favorite
son, declined substantially, thus failing to offset Park's
impressive gains in the Yongnam region.
Regionalism as a political force was particularly
influential in the 1971 presidential election, in which two
candidates with distinct

ties with Yongnam and Honam

regions, respectively contended for the nation's highest
elective office.

Park, running for his third term as

president, once again generated massive support in his
native Yongnam region, polling 71.7 percent of the twoparty vote.

Kim Dae-jung, Park's principal opponent, made

an equally impressive showing in his native Honam (67.9
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TABLE V - 3

Percentage of Vote for Government Party in Presidential Elections,
by Regional Identification, Adjusted for Urbanizations*

1963

1967

1971

Government region**

61.3

70.7

71.7

Neutral region

50.4

50.3

51.5

Opposition region

37.3

46.5

32.1

Amount of variance explained by regionalism
When urbanization
is adjusted for

54%

69%

87%

51%

69%

67%

When urbanization
is not adjusted for

*Percentage of the two-party vote.
**The government region remained the same - Yongnam - throughout the
three presidential elections. But the opposition region in 1963
and 1967 was defined as Kyonggi-do and Seoul, and in 1971 as Honam.

Source:

Jae-On Kim and B. C, Koh, "The Dynamics of Electoral Politics:
Social Development, Political Participation, and Manipulation
of Electoral Laws," in Chong Lim Kim, ed., Political Partici
pation in Korea (Santa Barbara: Clio Press, 1980), p. 6 8 .

174

riuuitE 1

P novrxcK s

and

S p e c ia l

C it ie s

in

South

Kohla

•— 3rtTH P A K A U . U

SEOUL

KYOSOSAIiGPUKTC
CH&LLA :
PUKTO •

_
/
J
\CHEJU^J»/

|______

KCSAH
OTHER

175
percent).

But, most important, regionalism, when the effects

of urbanization were adjusted for, accounted for 87 percent
of the variance in the outcome of the 1971 election.
In all five parliamentary elections held between 1963
and 1978, statistically significant differences can be
observed in the DRP preference among the metropolitan,
urban, and rural districts.

The degree of support for the

government party, however, was inversely correlated to the
degree of urbanization with no exception on the basis
of data organized on urban-rural dichotomy.
Specifically, support of the ruling DRP ranged
between 38.4 percent (1978) and 52.0 percent (1963) with
the mean of 43.8 in the metropolitan districts, while it
ranged from 56.3 percent (1973) to 68.2 percent (1967)
with the average of 61.6 percent in rural districts.
However, Table V-2 presents a rather crude picture of
partisan alignment along the urbanization dimension.

The

table shows that only in 1967, 1971 and 1978 did the pat
tern of the rural-government alliance (or, conversely, of
the urban-opposition alliances) manifest istelf in par
liamentary elections.
On the basis of these data, we can state, that, inso
far as parliamentary elections are concerned, there devel
oped a metropolitan-opposition alliance, but the picture
is not clear with respect to the other areas.

What seems

clear is that the predictive power of urbanization at the
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level of parliamentary elections does not even begin to
match that of the level of presidential elections.
In Korean political context, presidential elections
play a far more important role than parliamentary elec
tions.

With the exception of the brief interlude of the

Chang Myon rule (1960-1961), the presidency has been the
repository of political power, and whenever there was a
conflict between president and parliament, the former invar
iably emerged victorious.

As we saw in Chapter III, in the

two most notorious cases of the "political upheaval" of
1952 and the "October revitalizing reforms" of 1972, the
president emasculated the opposition forces in the parlia
ment.

In both cases, the rules of the game were changed

by the chief executive to maximize his power at the
expense of parliament.
The pattern of the urban-rural cleavages manifested
in urban-opposition party alliance in presidential elec
tions seems to have serious political implications for the
future.

Since we are using urbanization as a surrogate

for social development and modernization, the chief impli
cation of the pattern is that, as Korea makes headways
in the socioeconomic arena, the prospects for an electoral
transfer of power brighten.

But socioeconomic development

represents only one ingredient in the mix of electoral
politics; the very fact that electoral transfer of polit
ical power was imminent elicited an extraordinary reaction
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from another, more powerful element--the government in
power.

Park and his party read the signs and promptly

resorted to extra-constitutional means to stop the process.
The office of president came to be closed to direct, pop
ular election as a result of the so-called revitalizing
reforms of Yushin system.
Various voting studies in the Western democracies
corroborate the finding that the existence of an enduring
partisan identification is the most important source of
3

voter alignment.

The broad pattern of voter alignments

is fashioned over many elections, but once established, it
remains relatively stable because of this partisan iden
tification.

In Korea, however, the history of political

parties has been rather short, hence the lack of institu
tionalization of party system.

A recurrent pattern of

voter alignment appears along a somewhat different dimen
sion.

During the regime of Syngman Rhee, especially toward

its end, when Rhee and his party tried to perpetuate their
rule, the urban centers provided the needed support for
the survival of the opposition.

The government party

relied heavily on rural votes while the opposition thrived
in the cities.
This pattern persisted through the 1963 presidential
election and reemerged in the 1971 election.

In 1963 the

military government and the DRP faced the legitimacy issue.
There were strong, if not overt, sentiments against the
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extraconstitutional take-over.

By 1967 election, however,

the civilian government of the DRP had acquired respecta
bility, and legitimacy was no longer an issue.

Impressive

administrative and economic achievements by the Park gov
ernment brought about a landslide victory in 1967, but by
1971, a new issue arose.

The DRP amended the constitution

to allow Park to run for his third term, and the continu
ation of one-man rule became a strong campaign issue.
According to Huntington, in most developing countries
the cities are the center of opposition to the government;
loci of opposition movements, sporadic demonstration and
political violence.

If a government is to be stable, it

requires substantial rural support.^
Such a pattern of urban opposition persisted in Korea
through several regimes.

During the 1950s the Liberal

regime under Rhee dominated the rural sector while the
opposition Democratic Party had the support of the urban
sector of Korean society.

Table V-4 summarizes the

distribution of parliamentary seats gained by the two major
parties and other minor parties in parliamentary elections
from 1954 to 1971, the period of meaningful party politics
in Korea.
What stands out is the predominant positions of the
government parties and the decline of opposition parties'
influence.

What is most interesting, however, is the pro

portion of seats gained by the major opposition parties in

TABLE V - 4

Parliamentary Seats Gained by the Government
Party9 the Opposition Party and the Minors

1954

1958

1960

1968

1967

1971

Govt. P .

56.2%

54.1%

75.1%

62.9%

73.7%

55.4%

Oppos. P.

7.4

33.9

1.7

23.4

25.7

43.6

36.4

12.0

23.2

13.7

0.6

1.0

Minors

Source:

Central Election Manager Committee, Yukdai Kukhoiuiwon
Songo Sanghwang (History of National Assembly Elections),
1971.
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1958 and 1971.

In these two years the differences gained

by the two major parties were rather minimal--especially
in comparison with other years--hence the possibility of
two-party system was created.

In 1958 the DP elected 23

members from the five largest cities, the Liberals only
5.

In Seoul, the opposition captured 15 out of 16 seats,

and no Liberal candidates were elected in Taegu and Inchon.
In 1971 the opposition NDP got 18 out of 19 seats in Seoul
alone while getting 35 out of 42 total assigned seats in
9 largest cities.

It appears, therefore, that as electoral

experience accumulated, there developed an "urban consen
sus against the government."^
In 1956 the Democratic candidate Chang Myon was elected
Vice President as a result of urban voters' support defeat
ing Rhee's running mate, Yi Ki-bung.
Henderson describes the favorable conditions under
which the opposition DP began to gather its strength in
the mid-1950s thusly:^
By 1955, with the war two years past and the govern
ment again in Seoul, the swollen cities were under
going reconstruction and the press was growing.
Repression, corruption, and inflation now had loci
of concentration and aggravation. Public reaction
against them and corresponding sympathy for the
opposition markedly increased. Taken out from under
war news the Assembly's voice--and even opposition
negotiations--sounded louder.
As we saw in Chapter III, the circumstances leading
to the adoption of a given constitutional amendment were
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almost always pucntuated by bitter partisan political
clashes, and sometimes, the use of coercive instruments
available to the incumbent regime.

The constitution, there

fore, more often tended to divide than to unite the polit
ical public.

It came to be viewed, especially by

politically conscious and active urbanites, less as a
charter reflecting the ideals, purposes, and consensus of
the nation than as a self-serving legal instrument with
which to legitimize the political structure established
by the governing elite or regime.
Under the regimes of Rhee and Park, government parties
tended to stress the cause of anti-Communism and the prime
value of national security and political stability, while
the opposition parties tended to demand full realization
of liberal democracy, respect for individual freedom, demo
cratic rights and mass welfare.

Opposition parties under

both regimes--DP and NDP respectively--arose as loose
coalition entities of several opposition factions held
together primarily by tactical requirements of effective
campaigning.
Party politic iansfell into disrepute during the 1950s
and 1960s, initially because they were instrumental in
Rhee's efforts to remain president for life.

Following

the demise of the Rhee regime, it was widely hoped that
the Democratic Party might be able to reverse the politi
cians' negative image.

The DP, however, quickly disappointed
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the public.

In September 1960 its internal strife for

political advantage broke open into two rival factions
of "old faction" and "new faction."^
Faring better than the DP, the Democratic Republican
Party (DRP) demonstrated a degree of responsiveness to
the electorate between 1963 to about mid-1969.

The party,

however, suffered from factional infighting and had to
endure charges of corruption among its top leaders.

In

the popular view, however, these actual and alleged short
comings were outweighed by positive achievements under
President Park--economic growth and political stability
accompanied by vigorous and open politics.

Beginning in

late 1969 when the DRP had the constitution amended to
preserve and extend Park's tenure, its popularity declined
sharply.

The Korean electorate came to view its leaders

just as corrupt and self-seeking as the party politicians
of old mold.
In Korean context, urbanites unquestionably have
better access to education and mass communications media,
and therefore, it is reasonable to assume their political
sophistication and consciousness to a greater degree than
the rural population.

But the election outcomes show that

the political awakening and consciousness of urbanites
usually show a strong support of the opposition party.
That there is a positive correlation between the
level of urbanization and voting for the opposition is
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graphically depicted in the 1971 parliamentary election
(see Table V-5).

In the 1958 parliamentary election,

the Democratic Party (opposition party) won the election
in urban areas over the ruling Liberal Party by a ratio
of 43 to 13 (see Table V-6).
The typical and similar tendency was revealed in the
presidential and parliamentary elections in 1963.

As can

be seen in Table V-7, the presidential nominee of the
opposition party (Civil Rule Party) won the election over
the government party (DRP) by a ratio of 22 to 8 in thirty
cities even excluding Seoul and Pusan.
As Table V-8 shows, the government party won the elec
tion in 29 constituencies, while opposition parties won in
27 constituencies.

But as Table V-9 shows, the opposi

tion parties gathered more votes in 50 pure city and other
constituencies including city area, while the government
party garnered more votes in only six constituencies of
similar size.
Thus, the past elections in Korea can be character
ized by the landslide support of the opposition party by
urban population.

As election riggings by and dictatorial

rule of the Liberal regime under Rhee increased, the urban
population grew more and more anti-government in their
political propensity.

Our data above clearly demonstrate the

validity of the decline-of-community model on partisan orien
tation.
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TABLE V - 5

Assembly Seats Won In Major Urban Areas, 1971 National Assembly Election

Rank by Population

Assembly Seats
Assigned

DRP

NDP

Others

Seoul

19

1

18

0

Pusan

8

2

6

0

Taegu

5

1

4

0

Inchon

3

2

1

0

Taejon

2

1

1

0

Kwangju

2

0

2

0

Chongju

1

0

1

0

Chungj u

1

0

1

0

Masan

1

0

1

0

Source:

Compiled from Dong-A Ilbo, May 27, 1971

This table is adapted from C. I. Eugene Kim, "The 1971 Elections and
the Transformation of the DRP" in C.I. Eugene Kim and Young Whan Kihl,
eds., Party Politics and Elections in Korea. Silver Spring, MD: The
Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976, p. 42.
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TABLE V - 6

Number of Candidates and the Elected of the Liberal
Party and the Democratic Party in Cities in 1958 Elections

Province

Number of
Cities

Liberal Party

Democratic Party

Candidates Elected

Candidates Elected

Others
Elected

Total
Elected

Seoul

1

12

1

15

14

1

16

ICyonggi

2

4

0

4

4

0

4

Chungpuk

2

2

1

2

1

0

2

Chungnam

1

2

1

2

1

0

2

Chonpuk

3

4

2

4

2

0

4

Chonnam

4

6

1

6

5

0

6

Kyongpuk

4

6

3

9

3

3

9

Kangwon

3

3

1

3

2

0

3

Cheju

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

6

62

Total

Source:

55

13(23.6%)

60

43(71.6%)

Chon-ju Yun.Hanguk Chongchi Chegye (Political System of Krea)(Seoul:
Korea Univ. Press9 1961)s p. 181.
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TABLE V - 7

Number of Cities where Government and Opposition
Parties Led in 1963 Presidential Election

Cities where
Gov't Party led

Cities where
Opposition
Party led

Province

No. of
Cities

ICyonggi

3

-

3

Inchon a Suwon, Uij ongbu

Kangwon

4

—

4

Chunchon, Won ju , ICangnung,
Solccho

N . Chungchong

2

-

2.

Chongju, Chungju

S . Chungchong

2

—

2

Taejon, Chonan

N. Cholla

3

-

3

Chonju, Kunsan, Iri

S. Cholla

4

1 (Sonchon

3

Kwangju, Mokpo, Yosu, Suncl

N . Kyongsang

5

1(Taegu)

4

Taegu, Pohang, ICyongju,
ICimchon, Andong

S. Kyongsang

6

5

1(Masan)

Masan, Chinju, Chungmu,
Chinhae, Samchonpo, Ulsan

Cheju

1

1

-

Cheju

Total

30

8

22

Source:

Remarks

Republic of Korea (ROIC), Central Election Management Committee
(CEMC), Daehanminlcuk Songosa (History of Elections in Korea)
(Seoul, CEMC9 1964), pp. 713-720.
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TABLE V - 8

Party Affiliation of Elected Members in City Constituencies
(The 1963 Election)

Area covered

N o . of
Constituencies

Govn't Party
Dem-Rep

Opposition Parties
Civil Rule Democratic Lib-Dem

1

Seoul

14

2

7

Pusan

7

6

1

City electing
2 assemblymen

8

6

2

City electing
1 assemblyman

6

2

3

1

21
Constituency
including city area

13

4

2

2

56

29

17

7

3

Total

4

27

Source:

Ibid.
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TABLE V - 9

Number of Urban Constituencies where Government and
Opposition Parties gathered more Votes
in 1963 National Assembly Election

Area covered

Where more votes
No. of
constituencies
were gathered by:
Gov't P.
Oppos. P.

Members elected
Gov't P. Oppos. P.

14

2

12

7

7

6

1

Inchon

2

2

1

Kwangju

2

2

1

Taegu

4

2

4

Suwon

1

1

1

Chongju

1

1

1

Taej on

1

1

1

Chonj u

1

1

1

Mokpo

1

1

1

Masan

1

1

1

Seoul

14

Pusan

2

1

Other constituencies
including city area

21

4

17

13

8

Total

56

6

50

29

27

Source:

Note:

ROK, CEMC, Daehanminlcuk Songgosa (History of Election in Korea) (Seoul,
1964), pp. 495-501.
Opposition parties include the Liberal Decratic, People's, Democratic,
Civil Rule Parties.
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Given such a consistent pattern of partisan orientation
of the Korean electorate, the intriguing question is:

Why

has the urban electorate preferred the opposition party
while the rural electorate has favored the government
party?
Let us attempt to identify a few prevalent hypotheses
in the literature.
1) Commitment to democratic value hypothesis
O
Kim and Koh have observed that urbanization serves
as the basis of partisan alignment along the governmentopposition cleavage, reflecting the differential commitment
of the electorate to democratic values.

Urbanites, accord

ing to this thesis, are more committed to liberal democratic
values than ruralites which makes them less tolerant to any
violations or breaches in the democratic norms and consti
tutional rules of the game.

The official ideology of

political democracy in Korea, then, has provided the opposi
tion forces with their most valuable political issues and
weapons to challenge the ruling party in elections, i.e.,
legitimacy issue of military dictatorship in 1963 and oneman rule and resulting corruption issues in 1971.
2) Relative deprivation hypothesis
Many studies demonstrate that, in economically good
times, the government and the ruling party maintain polit
ical strength and that, in bad times, the opposition party
g
gains strength in challenging the government.
An underlying
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assumption of these studies is that national economic growth
means an increase in the level of income for the public in
general and, as such, provides the electorate with psy
chological satisfaction.

However, this assumption does

not necessarily hold true in a developing country like
Korea where nation's economic growth often takes place
along with a high level of inflation which, in turn, breeds
inequality among the people.

As Korea has undergone a

remarkable economic growth in a short span of time, rapid
economic expansion, despite its general desirability, may
have a destabilizing effect upon urban political complex
ities.

As Olson points out, it not only disrupts the

traditional social values and structures, but also increases
the income of some people absolutely but not relatively
and hence intensifies their dissatisfaction with the exist
ing political order.^

Measuring economic inequality in

terms of wages and income, Rhee finds that among different
income groups in Korea inequality is highest for the bus
iness income group and lowest for the farm income group.
He, therefore, hypothesizes that this high degree of income
inequality in urban areas--especially in Seoul--has helped
increase anti-government behavior in elections.

11

3) Critical mass media hypothesis
Many of the mass media, primarily centered in urban
areas--especially in Seoul--were anti-government.

Their

rapid expansion created more political opposition and

191
instability in urban centers in Korea.

Under the influence

of the anti-government media, Seoulites were mobilized into
the opposition.

Rhee, for example, hypothesizes and empir

ically demonstrates an inverse correlation between the rate
of growth in newspaper circulation and electoral vote for
12

the government party (DRP).

4) Organizational infrastructure hypothesis
In contrast to the government party's advantage of
mobilizing administrative networks, through police and local
bureaucracy, throughout the nation, the opposition parties
are largely limited to urban centers in the scope of their
effective outreach.

According to Han, one of the main

weaknesses of the major opposition party is the inadequate
contact with the masses.

Operating in big cities and among

circles limited almost exclusively to professional politi
cians, major opposition party activities tend to be centered
13
in and around the parliament.
5) Urban-problems hypothesis
The Park government has made concerted efforts to
modernize the nation and has accomplished this goal to an
extent to its credit, but not without some serious negative
consequences.

Due to the inadequate planning, urban centers

were beset with a series of problems such as overcrowding,
insufficient and inadequate housing, traffic jam, energy
shortages, and inflation, etc.

Also, cities contain many

problem areas that could breed discontent which can easily
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be mobilized by opposition forces to challenge the govern
ment and its leaders (see Chapter II).
Alternatively, the reasons why the government party
receives more support from voters in rural areas can be
sought in the mobilization potential of rural social struc
ture as well as the prevalence of passivist political orien
tation of rural population in Korea.
other positive reasons.

However, there may be

For one thing, in view of the

fact that the DRP regime made available various regional
rural development projects through the New Community Move
ment, one may speculate on their positive impact on reduc
ing rural political disaffection.

Through these projects

many rural residents were encouraged to participate in
economic planning and development in their own communities.
Also, we might consider the campaign strategies of various
parties.

The opposition parties in Korea have made their

primary appeal to urban white-collar workers, and small and
medium businessmen, and middle class farmers.

Ideological

orientation of the main opposition party in particular was
derived from the Western liberalism.

In short, their basic

ideological posture was not congruent with aspirations of
the rural masses who are poor and look for better economic
conditions more than individual rights or liberties.
Another approach to understanding the "radicalization"
of the urban voting behavior may be found in political
theories of urban migration.

Much has been said about
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the "disruptive" political effects of urban migration.
Many scholars of varying theoretical backgrounds have
argued that urban migration involves a breakdown of tra
ditional value systems and of controls on deviant behav
ior , the weakening of family and kinship ties, and con
sequently, a general state of uprootedness, disorientation,
social atomization, insecurity, isolation, and anomie.
In this perspective, the predictions about the political
impact of urban migration have been quite pessimistic.
Despite some positive aspects of urbanization, the more
common line of argument is that rapid urban migration
causes political radicalization, instability, violence,
and therefore disruptive political b e h a v i o r . P y e argues,
for example, that such highly politicized new urban popula
tions "have become in a sense a loaded revolver pointed at
the responsible government and on the verge of being
triggered off at the slightest provocation."
Cornelius

16

and Nelson are critical of this "disrup

tive migrant" literature and provide evidence indicating
that such pessimistic predictions are not warranted. 17
Several factors have been cited to explain this apparent
paradox:

1)

urban migrants do not constitute an undif

ferentiated, homogeneous mass; on the contrary, they vary
significantly in terms of their motivation for migration,
skills and education, place of origin, prior exposure to
urban life, existing ties with their home villages, earlier
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patterns of political socialization, and the kind of polit
ical system they have moved into; 2 ) rural areas in devel
oping countries, which supply a majority of urban migrants,
are often noted by their conservatism, and such conserva
tive and deferential attitudes may well be carried over to
the urban setting; 3) even though employment opportunities
and living conditions for the urban migrants leave much
to be desired, migration to the city often brings about a
substantial improvement in their level of income, style of
18
life, and access to public services.
Cornelius marshals
an impressive array of empirical data in support of his
"supportive migrant" model which is reinforced by other
studies.19
Such observations prompted some political scientists
to formulate the so-called "second-generation hypothesis;"
that is, political radicalization occurs after the urban
migrants have been absorbed into the urban setting, dis
carded rural outlook and conservative attitudes, and gained
a certain amount of political sophistication.

20

There are

indications that second-generation urban migrants tend to
be more interested in individual mobility, in "making it"
than in organized collective action.

Some observers noted

that the political participation of the urban poor tends
to focus on the immediate needs of the community, notably
legalization to the titles of the land, and the installa
tion of basic urban services, and that once such needs are
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met, the rates of cooperative political activity are likely
to decline. 21

Members of the second generation

less politically participant than their parents.

tend to be
In short,

the extent of opportunities for individual mobility deter
mine the propensity for political participation.

Where

such opportunities are not sufficient, "collective mobil
ity" through political means is more likely to be sought
22
by the urban poor.
Clearly the first and the third of the above theories
of urban migration could be relevant to the understanding
of the radicalization of the K o r e a n urban voting behavior.

However, the available empirical data provided by Brandt
and others tend to support the "supportive migrant" model
which hypothesizes that the urban migrants tend to support
23
rather than protest against the government and system.
Despite the fact that all of the above theories and
hypotheses offer helpful perspectives

and

insights into

the understanding of Korean urban voting behavior, a most
comprehensive and flexible perspective can be found in
the decline-of-community model as articulated by Dahl and
Tufte.
According to this formulation of the model,

as the

size of a community increases, its density increases.

The

greater the number of people that one comes into contact
with, the more likely that he will find an ally.

As the

scale of the occupational and institutional associations
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with which one is involved increases, the costs of dis
sent decreases.

Unlike in small groups where dissent is

difficult due to personal overtones, in large scale organ
izational setting dissent is made easier due to the avail
ability of institutionalized channels to mediate conflict
within and among groups.

Thus, increased scale and dens

ity "facilitate the identification of shared grievances,
the organization of dissent groups, and the articulation of
sectarian interests." 25 Once established, these dissent
groups have an independent effect on increasing competition
26
through the mobilization of potential clientele.
Furthermore, urbanization is associated with the pro
cesses of economic development which entails growing size
of production units, the differentiation and specialization
of labor, and the increased distance between functionally
27
specific roles.
Therefore, as the size of the community
increases, it enlarges the number and diversity of inter
ests that might potentially come into conflict.

Diversity

and conflict, in turn, stimulate the polarization of loy
alties and the mobilization of resources, the outcome of
which is again increased political competition. 28
Based on these ideas, Dahl and Tufte hypothesize on
the relationship between urbanization and political com
petition:

"Among political units within a democratic

country, diversity and competition among political parties
increase with the size of the unit, the degree of
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urbanization, and the degree of specialization and differ29
entiation of labor and other resources."
They further hypothesize that the percentage of the
vote for the leading party will decrease with the size of the
unit, the degree of urbanization, and the degree of
30
societal differentiation.
Overall, the general perspec
tive emerging from the model, as far as this study is con
cerned, is that political competition becomes more intense
and the leading party's percentage of vote declines from
rural to urban areas.
II.

Relationships Between Demographic Indicators and
Partisan Support
In view of the mobilization potential of rural social

structure as well as the prevalence of passivist political
orientation of the rural population in Korea, we would
anticipate that rural areas would vote more for Park Chung
Hee and his party (DRP) than urban population.

Conversely,

we would also anticipate urban areas would oppose Park and
his DRP due to their superior access to education and mass
media--a fact that bespeaks greater political awareness
and sophistication of the urbanites.
Table V-10 and Table V-ll present the correlations
between the rates of government party support in the three
presidential and the five parliamentary elections and our
select demographic indicators of election districts along
the dimension of modernization.

TABLE V - 10

Correlation Coefficients* between Government Party Votes (DRP) and
Socio-Economic Characteristics of District: Presidential Electionss
1963, 1967, and 1971

District Characteristics

1963

1967

1971

POP (Population)

-19

-.10

-24

DEN (Density)

-.30

-.03

-.20

IND (Industrial)

-.58

-.01

-.25

POSTWARG (Postwar Generation)

-.21

-.07

-.22

PREWARG (Prewar Generation)

-.08

.10

.42

COLLENR (College)

-.49

-.12

-.27

ILLITR (Illiteracy)

.80

.30

.27

FEMALER (Female)

.07

.04

-.07

*See note under Table IV-13.

TABLE V - 11

Correlation Coefficients between Government Party Votes (DRP) and
Socio-Economic Characteristics of District: National Assembly Elections,
1963, 1967, 1971, 1973, and 1978

District Characteristics

1963

1967

1971

1973

1978

POP (Population)

-.26

-.31

-.32

-.22

.13

DEN (Density)

-.21

-.49

-.34

-.32

-.47

IND (Industrial)

-.34

-.62

-.45

-.23

-.43

POSTWARG (Postwar Generation) -.34

-.64

-.48

-.27

-.56

PREWARG (Prewar Generation)

.15

-.07

.38

-.00

-.02

-.37

-.60

-.44

-.22

-.52

.35

.41

.40

.25

.36

-.05

.03

-.08

-.08

-.26

COLLENR (College)
ILLITR (Illiteracy)
FEMAIER (Female)
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Again, on theoretical grounds we would expect election
districts whose main features include large population,
high density, high level of industrialization to show a
low level of government party support.

We would also

anticipate districts whose main features include high level
of education, concentration of postwar generation would
support less the government party than districts character
ized by a high level of illiteracy, concentration of pre
war generation and females.
Without exception, in all elections, variables popu
lation, density, industrialization, postwar generation,
college enrollment show strong negative (inverse) correla
tions while variables prewar generation, illiteracy, and
female show either no relationship or strong positive
relationship with government party support.

These find

ings again confirm our hypothesis concerning the degree
of urbanization and partisan support in Korea.
Let us attempt to offer a more systematic explication
for the urban-opposition party alliance (or, rural-government party alliance) phenomenon.
Dahl and Tufte hypothesize and empirically demonstrate
that small communities are characterized by relatively low
levels of partisan competition, suggesting that "in the
politics of homogeneity parties scarcely exist." 31
In rural settings, given the greater degree of prox
imity and familiarity in the relations between candidates
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and voters, politics is more likely to be characterized
by personalism, not partisanship, as the basis of polit
ical mobilization.

Most Korean residential communities

are characterized by pervasive face-to-face social net
works which have, historically, been utilized to maintain
community solidarity and a consensual approach to problem
solving.
In the rural areas of Korea, where the traditional
social structure is that of an authoritarian blood rela
tion or a centralized hierarchic system, there is con
formity voting sympathetic to the group in power.

By

contrast, in an anonymous and impersonal urban setting
where the educational level is higher and information is
better propagated, we can see that the political conscious
ness of relatively self-conscious urban citizens leans to
the opposition party.

Such opposition-prone tendencies of

urbanites are reinforced by their perception of heightened
reactionary trend against social injustice and political
corruption.
Moreover, urbanization is associated with increased
geographic mobility as well as increased density and social
differentiation.

The effect of increased mobility is not

only to weaken the individual's integration into the
community social networks but also to increase his anonym
ity.

The increased anonymity then defeats the kinds of

sanctions that communal groups have traditionally employed
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to ensure conformity.

Thus, in a mobile urban setting,

the associational infrastructure associated with residential
communities is not as effective in reaching or mobilizing
residents which in turn results in the reduction of govern
ment party support.
Many studies have emphasized the passive, parochial
character of Korea's traditional political culture, a cul
ture that is still in evidence in many sections--especially
in rural areas--of the country.

Typically, this orienta

tion is characterized by political apathy, deference to
local notables, and a low valuation of one's ability to
exert any influence over politics.

These passive paro-

chials tend to be oriented more toward personalities than
parties, to be preoccupied with special benefits for their
specific locales, and not concerned over issues.
As Korean society is modernized with rapid urbaniza
tion and industrialization, we can expect then these paro
chial, apathetic, spectator orientations to be replaced
by cosmopolitan, attentive, and participant orientations.
Thus as citizens become more aware and politically sophis
ticated, they will become increasingly discriminating in
their electoral choices with the net result of increased
opposition voting.
The process of rapid urbanization and particularly
high rates of in-migration will render traditional associa
tional networks ineffective with corresponding rise in
the proportion unattached or "floating" voters and, as
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the candidate-voter tie weakens, a greater reliance on
party label or "candidate image" results. These criteria
of candidate selection are not as strongly dominated by
the governing elite as are the community associational
networks.
In urban settings, voters are less integrated into
residential community structures and develop their can
didate image primarily through mass media, which, in
Korean context, tend to be "critical" of government per
formance.

Hence, urban voters are less likely to partic

ipate and less likely to support the government party
when they vote.

The urban voters are more inconsistent

in their voting behavior than their rural counterparts,
partly because they are more likely to be motivated by
changing political events and issues that are portrayed in
the media than by local area considerations and longstand
ing loyalties.
Aside from the immediate relevancy of the insights
inherent in the Dahl and Tufte's hypotheses on the impact
of urbanization on partisan orientation, there are several
reasons why it is proper to approach the problem of explan
ation for the changing voting patterns in Korea from such
a theoretical perspective.
First, rapid urbanization and industrialization in
the last two decades in Korea have been accompanied by a
dramatic structural shift in the organization of the
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Korean economy and spatial distribution of population
and employment.

For example, even as late as 1963, over

63 percent of the labor force was engaged in primary
industry.

The proportion, however, declined to 38 per

cent by 1978.

Workers employed in secondary industry

increased from less than 9 percent in 1963 to 23 percent
in 1978.

Also, between 1963 and 1978 there was an

increase of 10 percent of people engaged in tertiary
industry (see Table V-12).

The industrial composition

of gross domestic product has experienced similar changes.
Agriculture, fishery, and forestry represented over 46
percent of GDP in 1962 compared to only about 20 percent
in 1978.

Mining and manufacturing industries represented

only 10 percent of GDP in 1962 but 30 percent by 1978 (see
Table V-13).
The dramatic rise in the number of people employed
in the nonagricultural sectors, coupled with concomitant
decline in the number of people in agricultural sector,
tended to weaken the electoral strength of the DRP, because
the DRP's electoral stronghold has been the rural sector
of Korean society.

To the extent one's occupation is one

of the more important socioeconomic determinants of his
partisan orientation, political implications of the dramatic
shift in spatial distribution of population and employment
cannot be overlooked.

TABLE V - 12
Industrialization - Labor Force

Primary
industry

Secondary
industry

28.2%

1963

63.1%

1965

58.6

10.4

31.0

1970

50.4

14.4

35.2

1975

45.9

19.1

35.0

1978

38.4

23.2

38.4

Source:

8.7 %

Tertiary
industry

Economic Planning Board, Major Statistics of Korean
Economy: 1979, p. 19.

TABLE V - 13
Industrialization - Gross Domestic Product

Primary
industry

Secondary
industry

Tertiary
industry

1962

46.1%

10.0%

43.9%

1965

45.8

11.7

42.5

1970

32.9

17.5

49.6

1975

26.0

25.2

48.8

1978

20.2

30.1

49.7

Source:

Economic Planning Board, Major Statistics of Korean
Economy:
1979, p. 28.
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Second, urbanization is associated with increased
geographic mobility as well as increased density and
social diversity.

As we saw in Chapter IV, persons mov

ing due to residence change increased from 4 million in
1963 to almost 7.5 million in 1978.
Such a pattern of high mobility necessarily increases
the voter's anonymity, thus weakening the capacity of the
associational networks of residential communities in
reaching or influencing voters.

As they slip through the

community mobilization networks, their voting patterns
become more diversified, which in turn results in a decline
of support for the dominant party (DRP).33 Moreover, geo
graphic mobility, particularly rural to urban migration
tends to facilitate the voter's "physical detachment"
from the traditional conservative milieu and makes it easy
for the migrant to become a "floating vote."

Therefore,

some scholars believe that geographic mobility can change
34
the voter's partisan orientation.
Finally, the rapid urbanization and industrialization
in Korea has brought about a serious deterioration of urban
environment, i.e., pollution, congestion, inadequate hous
ing, crime, high consumer price and inflation, etc.

The

limited capabilities and resources of the DRP regime to
cope with these problems tended to heighten urban discon
tent, thus lowering urban electoral support for the
government party.
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III. Summary and Conclusion
The rate of government party support is higher in
rural districts than in urban districts in both presi
dential and parliamentary elections. The rank order of
the DRP support rates is generally the same as the voting
turnout rates, i.e., merged rural districts, urban, and
metropolitan districts.
Support for the opposition party came from primarily
urban districts and areas. However, the opposition sup
port was concentrated in large metropolitan areas and
districts. The relationships of the DRP vote with illit
eracy, prewar generation, and female are, by and large,
positive or very weak. On the other hand, the relationships
of the DRP vote with population size, density, industri
alization and college enrollment and postwar generation
variables are always strongly negative in all elections.
In short, urban conditions in Korea brought about an
increase in the opposition vote than did rural conditions.
Clearly, the percentage of the vote cast for the leading
party (the government party) decreases in the more urban
ized districts.
The urban-metropolitan voters vote consistently
more for the opposition party, thus substantiating the
hypotheses advanced by Dahl and Tufte on the impact of
urbanization on political opposition and on the inverse
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correlation between urbanization and the strength of

the

government party in democracies.
Unlike rural voters, urban voters are not likely to
be well integrated into their residential communities
and therefore are less likely to vote. Moreover, when they
vote, they are less likely to favor and support the govern
ment party.
The rate of government party support has fluctuated
more in urban areas than in rural areas. As the capacity
of community social networks to influence voting choice
declines in the process of rapid urbanization, more and
more urban voters develop and rely of necessity on their
"candidate image" as the primary cue to guide their
voting decision and behavior. In this context then there
is bound to be a rise in the proportion of inconsistent
or "floating" voters who tend to be more motivated by
changing political events or issues as they are portrayed
by mass media.
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CHAPTER

SIX

CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study has been to explore some
of the important empirical implications of the "declineof-community" model on political participation and parti
san orientation. More specifically, the objective of re
search has been to investigate urban-rural differences in
electoral participation in the Korean national elections
between 1963 and 1978 during the regime of President Park
Chung Hee.
Utilizing aggregate data and using election district
as our basic unit of analysis, we have attempted to analze:
1) urban-rural differences in voting turnout rate; 2)
urban-rural differences in partisan support; 3) the rela
tionship between urbanization as the surrogate variable
of socioeconomic development on the one hand and voting
participation on the other.
In addition to analyzing the linkage between place of
residence and electoral participation in Korea, we have
also tested the validity of leading models or theories on
politicization. Positing that urbanization correlates with
rate and direction of voting participation, our two main
hypotheses were: 1) the higher the degree of urbanization,
the lower the rate of voter turnout; 2) the higher the degree
of urbanization, the smaller the proportion of electoral
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support for the governing party. Placing the "urbanization"
factor in a broader developmental context, we have gener
ated sufficient evidences to substantiate the above pro
positions .
First, the findings presented in Chapter II suggest
that the main source of recent urban growth was rural-tourban migration, not natural population growth. Korea's
rapid urbanization was closely intertwined with the phe
nomenal economic growth in the post-1962 period. Korea's
impressive economic performance, one of the highest in terms
of growth rate, was accompanied by a dramatic structural
shift in the organization of the Korean economy and the
spatial distribution of population and employment. The net
effect of such dramatic socioeconomic transformation was
the lopsided population concentration in a few metropolitan
areas as well as the urban-rural gap in the distribution
of benefits and rewards of industrialization.
A high proportion of those who regard themselves as
middle class live in metropolitan centers where much of the
nation's wealth, talent, and many of its cultural resources
are concentrated. Many highly educated citizens in this
group who found themselves in less well-paid positions than
they would have liked remained dissatisfied, however, and
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together with students and intellectuals they formed the
core of opposition to the incumbent regimes. Urban pro
blems of housing, congestion, sanitation, pollution, etc.
caused urban discontent which opposition parties success
fully mobilized to their electoral advantage.
Second, analyses provided in Chapter III have shown
that the party politics in Korea were characterized by the
importance of personalities over issues, lack of ideologi
cal choice, lack of grass-root support, factionalism among
party executives, popular apathy toward party politics
and party politicians, and disdainful attitude toward "party
politics" by power holders. Moreover, the Korean experience
suggests that the nature and importance of electoral compe
tition are closely linked not only with changes in the
demographic attributes of the electorate but also with the
willingness or unwillingness of the governing elite to
allow the "natural" effects of socioeconomic change to
materialize. Their propensity to intervene in the unfolding
of such effects by altering the basic rules of electoral
competition was so widespread that parties failed to act
as an instrument of political participation and recruitment.
Political parties, as a result, functioned as a mere
device for accrediting candidates for election purposes.
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Third, the data presented in Chapter IV indicate that
rural districts clearly surpass urban districts in voting
turnout rate in both presidential and parliamentary elec
tions without exception. We have found that the degree of
urbanization was inversely correlated with the rate of
voting turnout not only in our data organized controlling
for urbanization but also in our correlations between our
selected environmental variables and voting participation.
Our findings clearly substantiate the decline-of-community
model on political participation while rejecting the mod
ernization model.
Explaining the persistent gap in urban-rural voter
turnout rates from the perspective of the decline-ofcommunity model, we have argued that low-voting rate among
urban-metropolitan voters is due to the weakening of the
pressure for conformity to community norms as well as the
inefficacy of community social networks in mobilizing
voters.
Finally, the data presented in Chapter V indicate that
the support rate for the government party is higher in
rural areas than in urban areas in both presidential and
parliamentary elections. Support for the opposition parties
came primarily from urban districts - especially large metro
politan centers. Findings in our correlation analysis fur
ther reinforce the notion that urban and modern conditions
are more conducive to the support of opposition parties
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than are rural and traditional conditions.
That urban-metropolitan voters consistently voted more
for the opposition party substantiate the hypotheses
advanced by Dahl and Tufte on the impact of urbanization
on political opposition and on the inverse correlation
between urbanization and the strength of the government
party in democracies.
With the declining capacity of community social networks
to influence voting choice in the process of urbanization,
urban-metropolitan voters develop and rely on their "candi
date image" as the primary cue for their voting decision.
To the extent that urbanization is associated with increased
geographical mobility, urban voters are not likely to be
well integrated into their residential communities which
in turn would make them not only less likely to turn out
to cast their ballots but also less likely to vote for the
government party when they do.
The rate of government party support has fluctuated
more in urban areas than in rural areas, resulting in a
rise in the proportion of inconsistent or "floating" voters
who tend to be more motivated in their voting behavior by
changing issues of the times as portrayed by mass media.
What is then the possible relevance of the Korean case
study for the broad field of comparative politics?
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Our study does not support some of the predictions of
social mobilization theory which maintains that urbaniza
tion, industrialization, increasing literacy, geographic
mobility, mass media exposure, etc., tend to expand the
"politically relevant strata" of the population and create
demands for a wider range of governmental services.
Rapid urbanization in Korea, however, coincided with
a substantial decline in voting participation. Such an
inverse pattern of association held true at various levels
of analysis: voting participation was lower in cities than
in villages, and the residents of more developed areas or
districts voted less often than their more backward coun
terparts. This finding, however, should not be interpreted
as a direct contradiction of the social mobilization theory.
Many surveys indicate that certain attitudinal concomitants
of political participation such as political awareness,
national identification, desire to participate, etc., tend
to increase with modernization.
It is also highly likely that many other forms of
political participation (protest demonstration, organiza
tional activity, etc.) are positively associated with
modernization. This suggests the relative independence
of voting from other forms of political participation, as
much of recent comparative research seems to indicate.
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As far as voting mode of political participation is
concerned, Korea's urbanization with its concomitant socio
economic change did not produce broader participation.
Exposure to modern urban culture, where the roles of mod
ern mass media and education are so crucial, tended to
increase political alienation, cynicism among urban,
especially metropolitan, voters because of such factors
as their heightened political self-consciousness, political
realism, and greater awareness of relative deprivation in
the urban environment. In this sense, then, urbanization
tended to lead to "withdrawal" from electoral participation. 2
As Korea becomes more modernized through rapid urban
ization, industrialization, educational and communications
development, all of which are taking place at a phenomenal
rate, we would anticipate that the social basis of con
formist electoral participation to decrease with concom
itant increase in more discriminating voting participation.
Continued socioeconomic changes will make mobilized voting
a less salient factor in Korean politics. Moreover, these
changes are bound to lead to a greater popular demand for
an active citizen role. This may strain the capacity of
the political system, a phenomenon that students of pol
itical development have called "the participation crisis,"
even if the ruling elites make efforts to accommodate
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proliferating demands.
In sum, then,' the issue of striking a reasonable
balance between socioeconomic development and political
development becomes even more a crucial challenge for
the political leadership in Korea in the days ahead. For
the stability of Korea's political system requires not
only its capability to deal with the pervasive effects
of rapid socioeconomic change but also its flexibility
to allow the freedom of responsible political participa
tion and competition.
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